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Abstract 
The thesis is devoted to a micro-sociological analysis of “big” 
protests. Comparing Russian “For fair elections” movement with 
Ukrainian Euromaidan, I study how eventful identities, solidarities, 
and cultural representations that emerged in the course of the protests 
then developed and changed contributing to either socio-political 
change, or reproduction. I analyze dynamics of both the uprisings 
themselves and the dynamics of post-protest collective action. The 
first part of the text analyzes a phenomenon new to Russia: the 
politicized local activism that has emerged in the wake of the “For 
fair elections” protests. Urban activism in Russian has been rarely 
politicized; rather, it addressed “familiar”, “close to home” problems 
and that kept distance from “politics”. Anti-Putin rallies of 2011-
2012 changed the landscape of Russian civic activism. Inspired by 
the experience of collective actions, protesters resolved to keep it 
going in their own neighborhoods, establishing local activist groups 
and tackling smaller-scale problems typical of apolitical activism, 
e.g., defending parks from deforestation and buildings from 
demolition, and working for improvements. However, activists 
attributed oppositional and “political” meanings to practices that had 
been rather apolitical before the protests of 2011-2012. Thus, my 
study revealed the significant eventful change in the political culture 
of Russian urban activism. At the same time, in many cases mass 
events lead to the intensifying of pre-existing political and cultural 
structures, cultures, identities and discourses. In the second part of 
the text I show that Euromaidan consecutively first weakened and 
then enforced the ethno-cultural and political split between Western 
and Eastern Ukranian citizens. While “Euromaidan” initially 
succeeded at creating a new civic identity that united the protesters, 
this identity failed to spread beyond the event. Paradoxically, the 
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initial push for civic unity and inclusivity, when intensified, 
transformed into a tool of promoting exclusivity. The text is based 
on the analysis of in-depths interviews and focus-groups. The 
conclusions address the theoretical discussions within the eventful 
approach in social science, pragmatic and cultural sociology.   
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Chapter I. General Introduction: the hope of 
eventful change 
     
Some of the biggest protests against authoritarianism and for 
democratization in the post-soviet region since the time of the 
colored revolutions has been the Russian “For fair elections” (“За 
честные выборы”) and Ukrainian “Euromaidan” movements. These 
disruptive mass mobilizations seemed to be “revolutionary” events 
to both participants and opponents because having begun as reactive 
protest campaigns (against electoral fraud in Russia and in response 
to the dispersion of a student rally by special forces in Ukraine), they 
rapidly developed into demands for regime change. But what is more 
important is that both Russian and Ukrainian protesters believed that 
these events were bringing about fundamental social 
transformations. These protests emerged within societies that have 
been considered as apolitical and undemocratic by many researchers 
(e.g., Prozorov, 2008; Way, 2015). That is why the protests were 
conceived as both surprising and promising by academics as well 
(e.g., Bikbov 2013). 
Researchers, journalists, and politicians have been debating 
the causes and possible consequences of the protests. However, there 
are still no empirically grounded analyses of the long-term causes of 
mobilization in Russia and Ukraine. My research does not attempt to 
give an answer to the question of why these protests occurred. My 
intention is rather to explore some consequences of these abrupt 
protest events. The question I pose in the thesis is whether these large 
protests that happened in authoritarian countries lacking 
institutionalized civil society and effective political representation 
has led to any significant social transformations. The focus of my 
research is thus eventful protests and social change. 
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In both countries, any revolutionary inspiration that emerged 
from the protests was quickly dispersed by political skepticism. 
Encouraged and empowered by the inspiring mass rallies, Russian 
protesters believed that their apolitical and conservative society had 
been changed dramatically. The protest movement, however, failed 
to articulate a political program that could attract wider audiences or 
consolidate the supporters. Consequently, after a year of 
mobilization, the protest movement faced a severe crisis. This crisis 
together with state repression demobilized the coalition of the 
opposition leaders and demoralized rank-and-file protesters. 
In Ukraine, participants of the Euromaidan movement 
believed they had solved the problems the Orange revolution failed 
to do. The protesters assured themselves that the new Maidan 
overcame regional cleavages between Western and Eastern parts of 
the country, built up institutions of civil society and replaced the old 
political elite and oligarchs with new political forces that were 
democratic and accountable to society. It did not happen, however. 
Euromaidan was followed by the rise of the so-called “Antimaidan” 
movement and then by the emergence of the civil conflict in the 
Eastern and Southern parts of the country. At the same time, even 
though some new politicians entered the political scene, the old elites 
preserved their political power. Although some new forms of 
popular counter-power or, rather, counter-democracy (in terms of 
Pierre Rosanvallon) were introduced, they failed to reverse the 
restoration of the new oligarchic neopatrimonial and authoritarian 
state. Finally, the Russian military invasion transformed the armed 
conflict into a conventional war (Arel and Driscoll, 2016). The war, 
in turn, reinforced the civil conflict and reanimated regional 
cleavages and xenophobia in society, all the while strengthening the 
positions of the Ukrainian far-right. 
The optimistic and pessimistic views on the protests are both 
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partial. Indeed, the protest events on one hand invoked some social 
change, but, on the other hand, they turned out to be the instruments 
of social reproduction. In Ukraine, the politicization that occurred 
during the Euromaidan and the war influenced the formation of a 
new national identity, facilitated the emergence of new civil society 
institutions and inspired some political reforms. At the same time, 
the rise of nationalism, its transformation into the ideology of the 
new oligarchic government together with the rise of far-right 
(un)civil society alienated large groups of people from both the 
political consensus and the emerging nation (Arel and Driscoll, 
2016). In Russia, the huge rallies against President Vladimir Putin 
gave birth to a new civic activism that then developed into well-
organized activist groups and the movement of independent 
municipal deputies (Kolesnikov and Volkov, 2017). At the same 
time, the nationwide opposition coalition disintegrated. However, 
this allowed the charismatic blogger and activist Alexey Navalny to 
become the leader of the stagnating movement. After 2014, Putin 
manufactured a counter-politicization. After the annexation of 
Crimea, he efficiently stigmatized the opposition in the eyes of major 
groups of Russian society (Kalinin, 2017). 
Why did the events manage to change some things while they 
failed to change others? And what influenced the post-protest 
trajectories of the protesters? Why did Russian protesters start, en 
masse, to create and join local activist groups after the protest 
declined? And why did Euromaidan activists become combatants 
and civil volunteers helping Ukrainian military forces while 
avoiding engagement in the new political movements and parties? It 
is easy to explain the post-protest dynamics referring to solely 
“external” causes, for example, the Russian military invasion in 
Ukraine, and Putin’s authoritarian turn and repressions. However, 
one needs to look at the hidden micro-dynamics of collective action 
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in order to understand the mechanics of both social change and social 
reproduction caused by the protests. In my text, I will analyze these 
micro-dynamics of social changes and inertia caused by the two 
events. I will show that micro-analysis of post-protest collective 
action can reveal some hidden but significant processes behind “big” 
events. The aim of my work is thus to develop a microsociology of 
eventful social change. 
My thesis is a study in the microsociology of big events. I 
will focus on solidarities that have emerged from the protests. These 
solidarities have expanded beyond the events themselves, invoking 
new dynamics of collective action. I will consider various 
dimensions of these solidarities, first of all, as collective identities. I 
will show how these new solidarities have influenced post-protest 
social change and, alternatively, political inertia. 
Then, I will trace how the events emerged and how certain 
eventful identities and solidarities that were born out of the protests 
developed thereafter. Finally, I will analyze how these micro-
dynamics have influenced broader processes, namely changes in 
political cultures and in social identities. 
In her book on eventful protests against authoritarianism, 
Donatella della Porta proposes the “conception of eventful 
democratization [that looks] at waves of protest for democracy [and 
focuses on] the internal dynamics and transformative capacity of 
protest” (della Porta, 2014: 30). Della Porta’s research question is 
similar to my own as it focuses on protests for democratization in 
authoritarian countries, considers these protests in terms of eventful 
mobilizations, and explores micro-dynamics of collective action: 
“Rather than analyzing the long-term effects of these moments as 
foundational (or not) for democracy, I will reconstruct protests 
during episodes of democratization, their origins, characteristics, and 
short-term effects. Without assessing the long-term consequences of 
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these episodes to see if they bring about sustained changes, I define 
them on the basis of their short-term effects in moving a step forward 
in the direction of democracy” (ibid: 17). However, the longitudinal 
research I have engaged in has allowed for not only short-term but 
also some middle-term effects to be considered. 
In my thesis, I will explore the dynamics of eventful 
collective identities and solidarities within two of the newest major 
protest movements—the Russian “For fair elections” and Ukrainian 
“Euromaidan”—through the lens of the theory of political events, 
pragmatic sociology, and social movement studies. I believe that the 
results of my research can contribute to both theoretical debates on 
the role of events in contentious politics and understanding of what 
happened in Russia and in Ukraine in 2011–2013 and 2013–2014 
respectively. 
        
The contexts: authoritarianism and depoliticization 
 
Both Euromaidan and the “For fair elections” movements were 
responses to the increase in authoritarianism: In Russia, the early 
2000s were the most important period for the contemporary political 
regime. Ivan Grigoriev and Anna Dekalchuk have established three 
key dimensions of authoritarianism in Putin’s Russia: 
 
It was in the first years of the first Putin administration that the 
regime moulded its character and learned its ways. A vast and 
theoretically rich literature documents and explains this process. 
Golosov (2011; 2013) shows how making regional authorities 
responsible for the United Russia party electoral performance and 
embedding the local and regional political machines into a single 
integrated system of delivering votes became the major building 
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block of the new Russian political order. Gel'man (2003; 2005) 
describes the governmental policies towards opposition parties to 
show how a new equilibrium of the “imposed consensus” was 
created. Lipman (2005) and Lipman and McFaul (2005) chronicle 
the governmental campaign to suppress independent media (first and 
foremost, television) (Grigoriev and Dekalchuk, 2015: 3). 
 
These circumstances led to the situation within which apolitical local 
activism and rare and short-lived one-issue protest campaigns 
became the most widespread forms of collective action in Russia. At 
the same time authoritarianism determined electoral protests. As 
Natalia Savelyeva and Margarita Zavadskaya explain, 
 
by many counts Russia belongs to this type of authoritarian regimes 
with all ambiguities of “elections without choice” (Hermet and all 
1978), implying that voters have the right to vote, but do not choose. 
The latter often forms a weak point of a regime: under certain 
circumstances fraud favors the break-out of mass protests or even 
“electoral revolutions which may end by an incumbent's dismissal 
and opposition's ascent to power with further regime change” 
(Savelyeva and Zavadskaya, 2014: 221). 
 
In Ukraine in the 2010s “[President] Yanukovych used his 
party’s control over the legislature to rapidly consolidate a greater 
monopoly of power than had existed before him” (Way, 2015: 78). 
Lucan Way describes the authoritarian tendencies that were similar 
to what had been happening in Russia: “Press freedom declined and 
electoral fraud increased, while parliament took on ‘a largely rubber-
stamp role.’ In late 2010, Yanukovych successfully pushed through 
a reversal of the 2004 constitutional reforms” (ibid.). However, it 
would be wrong to argue that Viktor Yanukovych was a dictator who 
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diminished the democracy developed by the previous truly 
democratic “orange” coalition: “increased pressure on journalists 
and expanded executive powers—were in sync with the aims of 
Yushchenko and Tymoshenko during their tenure” (ibid.). The 
difference was that Yanukovych managed to monopolize political 
power while Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko failed. 
Yanukovych learned that blocs and coalitions were temporary and 
unstable while a strong party was more useful in gaining political 
control over parliament and press. That is why Yanukovych chose 
another strategy and created the “Party of Regions” (“Партия 
регионов”) that was well organized and accumulated money from 
the Ukrainian oligarchs: “Backed by Ukraine’s ‘first party in power’ 
that dominated both the presidency and the legislature, Yanukovych 
was able to overcome the formal fragmentation of power, utilize the 
legislature to concentrate control, and pressure the judiciary to a 
much greater degree than had been possible in the Yushchenko era” 
(ibid.: 79). This strategy turned out to be successful: “As of 
September 2013, officials from the Donbas area controlled half of all 
government ministries, including the ministries of energy and the 
interior, and occupied high-ranking positions in two-thirds of the 
country’s provinces. Finally, like Kuchma, Yanukovych benefitted 
from the support of the country’s richest oligarchs” (ibid.). However, 
what the Yanukovych regime lacked was legitimacy based on 
ideology or the ability to suppress uprisings. That is why after the 
ex-President announced he would not sign an agreement with the 
European Union, the Euromaidan protests led to the regime collapse. 
As Way puts it, “Yanukovych’s authoritarian state—while relatively 
well-funded and organized—lacked the non-material sources of 
cohesion necessary to carry out consistent and sustained high-
intensity repression. As a result, the regime collapsed in late 
February 2014” (ibid.: 90). Thus, the increase in authoritarianism in 
20 
 
both Russia and Ukraine made the regimes stronger and, at the same 
time, weaker in the face of mass protests. Another circumstance that 
influenced protests was depoliticization. 
Post-communist depoliticization has largely been considered 
in terms of societies’ retreat into the private sphere. Scholars 
studying late Soviet society have shown that fear of repression 
limited protest behavior and decreased interpersonal trust 
(Kharkhordin, 1996; Shlapentokh, 1989). This led to the emergence 
of private networks that consisted of people who felt they could rely 
on each other. As Ingrid Oswald and Viktor Voronkov puts it, 
 
The public, or, rather, the “official” sphere was the realm of society 
which was ruled by formal law and repression through state 
authorities. All other social realms were regulated by norms of 
everyday life […] in the Soviet Union the social spheres governed 
by norms of everyday life expanded at the expense of the realms 
where formal law prevailed. At the same time, informal and formal 
spheres were completely mutually exclusive. What was allowed to 
be expressed in the one sphere was—almost automatically—
perceived as non-valid in the other one. […] The official sphere, with 
its formal judicial norms, became more and more clearly demarcated 
from the world of everyday life, with its own ideas of decency, 
compromise and justice. As these spheres and their distinctive legal 
norms became separated, informal legal norms became increasingly 
dominant in daily life. […] Not everything that happened outside the 
official-public sphere was “private”. Initially (in the early Soviet 
era), the private realm was rather undeveloped and hardly perceived 
as worthy of protection. This became manifest in the ideology of 
collective life or in facilities such as the famous “kommunalka” 
(Oswald and Voronkov, 2004: 105). 
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When the official and policed public sphere of the Soviet 
Union disappeared after its collapse, nothing came to replace it, and 
the subjects retreated into their circles of friends and relatives. In his 
research of the civil society in post-communist Europe, political 
scientist M. Howard claims that there is a direct interrelationship 
between the persistence of a private sphere and the lack of political 
and civic participation in post-communist countries (Howard, 2003). 
Howard argues that post-communist societies inherited a 
specific type of structure of social bonds that makes it difficult for 
civil society to develop: 
 
[In Communist societies] as a result of the high politicization of the 
public sphere, many people could express themselves openly only 
within close circles of trusted friends and family. Moreover, in a 
shortage economy, with few available goods to buy, connections 
played an essential role […]. Today, a decade after the collapse of 
the system that created and sustained this vibrant private sphere, 
networks of close friends and family remain important […]. Unlike 
in many Western societies—where voluntary organizations have 
become a central part of the social and political culture, and where 
people join organizations in order to meet new people and to expand 
their horizons through public activities—in postcommunist 
societies, many people are still invested in their own private circles, 
and they simply feel no need, much less desire, to join and participate 
in civil society organizations (Howard, 2002: 163). 
 
However, depoliticization is not just a lack of political 
participation. One needs to decipher this normative umbrella term to 
use it as a conceptual notion. In my view, post-communist 
depoliticization as a social and historical condition has generated 
certain beliefs as well as some specific modes of vision, attitudes, 
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and feelings toward politics in general (Zhuravlev, Erpyleva and 
Savelyeva, 2018). Among others, I am specifically interested here in 
two features of post-communist depoliticization: distrust of political 
representation and negation of any political teleology. Generally 
speaking, this means the rejection of the ideological, the 
representational, and the total, in favor of the factual, the direct, and 
the concrete. As Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim argue 
in their book on post-communist civic culture, the latter is based on 
the Kantian belief that “the principle of representation contradicts 
the self-determination of the individual” (Beck and Beck-Gernshein, 
2002: 209). The authors claim that “there is a subterranean 
connection between wanting to have fun and grassroots opposition, 
which has so far been little noticed but which constitutes the actual 
core of what one could call the ‘politics of youthful antipolitics’. 
Those who (whatever their intentions) refuse to care about 
institutionalized politics (parties, organizations etc.), but playfully 
follow the attractions of, for instance, advertising, are 
unintentionally acting very politically by depriving politics of 
attention, labour, consent and power” (Beck and Beck-Gernshein, 
2002: 162). The authors also argue that this anti-political and anti-
representational ethics presupposes the cult of specifics, or 
concreteness as opposed to political or ideological generality: “An 
ethics of everyday life is developing its own subpolitics, which is 
often very local and concrete and which politicians don't recognize 
because they don't know the cultural nerve systems of these 
individualized cultures. It is an ‘antipolitics’. We are witnessing 
today an actively unpolitical younger generation which has taken the 
life out of the political institutions and is turning them into zombie 
categories. This Western variant of antipolitics opens up the 
opportunity to enjoy one's own life and supplements this with a self-
organized concern for others that has broken free from large 
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institutions” (ibid.: 162). This trust in concreteness has been the 
result of the distrust of ideological discourses. As political theorist 
Sergey Prozorov writes on the post-Soviet condition, the latter is 
characterized by the “messianic suspension of all teleology, whereby 
the sacriﬁces of the past and the dreams of the future are all equally 
redeemed in the timeless now […]. In a sense, the 1990s were the 
time of the many ends of history, the simultaneous expiry of all 
teleological metanarratives that ultimately displaced the very 
teleological terrain in which they could compete. With the end of the 
Soviet order history ended not because of the ultimate supremacy of 
Western liberalism, but rather because the pitiful demise of the 
Soviet order made the very idea of rivalry between grand teleological 
metanarratives inconceivable” (Prozorov, 2008: 214). “Putin’s 
bureaucratic depoliticization—the author argues—suspends the 
legitimacy of all political options (witness the decline of all 
ideological parties, from liberals to communists) without itself 
occupying a substantive ideological locus” (ibid.: 220). In this thesis 
I will show that post-communist depoliticization has dramatically 
influenced the protests. The distrust of political teleology determined 
the protesters’ disinclination to articulate a political program for the 
movements. The rejection of political representation together with 
the anti-teleological “timeless now” temporality contributed to the 
emergence of the eventful protests that celebrated the unique and 
singular moments of togetherness within the autonomous and distant 
from “politics” spaces. In other words, post-communist 
depoliticization influenced the protests making them varieties of 
what I will define as the politics of authenticity. However, the 
influence on the protests of post-communist depoliticization was not 
only negative. As I will show, the politics of authenticity impacted 
the post-protest trajectories and repertoires of collective action. 
Thus, authoritarianism and depoliticization were among the 
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significant factors at hand that influenced the protests. It should be 
noted that the two are interrelated. Authoritarian states in post-Soviet 
countries have been based on depoliticized, fractured societies. As 
Allen C. Lynch points out: “a weak state structure facing a 
fragmented and exhausted society [...] fatefully constrained Russia’s 
prospects for political and economic development. [...] Too little 
structure existed in post-socialist Russia [...] to give shape 
effectively to the country’s political and economic course on behalf 
of public purposes” (Lynch, 2013: 50). According to Lucan A. Way, 
central to understanding both Russia and Ukraine is that “the 
weakness of formal rules makes it very difficult to characterize how 
in fact the systems operate” (Way, 2015: 91). Finally, Prozorov 
explains Russian authoritarianism in terms of the disintegration of 
state and society: 
 
We can thus better understand why the frequently discussed 
depoliticization of the Russian society took place almost 
immediately after the anticommunist revolution in August 1991. 
Rather than a betrayal of the anticommunist revolution, this societal 
retreat into immanence was rather its logical conclusion. The exodus 
of the society from the sphere of value-based political antagonism 
left Russian politics to its own devices, so that it increasingly 
resembled a spectacle with an ever-diminishing audience. In turn, 
the alienated, spectacular, self-consciously inauthentic nature of the 
postcommunist political order progressively contributed to this 
exodus, while from the mid-1990s onwards the regime began to 
consciously foster it as a convenient way to achieve the withdrawal 
of the system into self-immanence. It is therefore possible to speak 
of a mutual exclusion of the state and society from each other’s 
respective domains, whereby formal politics and social life unfold at 
such a distance from each other that it is increasingly impossible to 
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conceive of any possible relation between them (Prozorov, 2008: 
214). 
 
My thesis is devoted to a comparative analysis of the Russian 
and Ukrainian protests and their outcomes. The main problem I study 
is a post-protest social change. In the next chapter, I will describe my 
theoretical framework. I combine eventful approach, pragmatic 
sociology, cultural sociology, and social movement studies to 
explore eventful collective action in process. In the third chapter, I 
will expose my methodological approach and my data. I will 
describe how I combine discourse analysis, including narrative 
analysis, and life stories. In the fourth chapter, I will analyze the 
event of the Russian “For fair elections” protests. I will show the 
dynamics of the protest’s collective action and its subjectivities. In 
the fifth chapter, I will turn to an analysis of the process of the “re-
grounding” of these subjectivities and solidarities. I will study post-
protest local activism inspired by the “Bolotnaya” protest movement. 
In the sixth chapter, I will analyze the “eventful identity” of the 
Euromaidan mobilization. I will show some ambiguities and 
contradictions behind this new form of protest nationalism. I will 
demonstrate that Euromaidan nationalism could be interpreted as 
both inclusive and exclusive. In the seventh chapter, I will analyze 
the violent conflicts that occurred between the supporters of Maidan 
and Antimaidan movements in Ukraine and the role protest 
nationalism played in these. Finally, I will draw some theoretical 
conclusions in the last chapter. I will show how pragmatic sociology 
as well as political semiosis method help to develop eventful 
approach. I will make some conclusions about possibilities of 
democratization in the authoritarian capitalist societies. Finally, I 
will show how eventfulness as a temporal phenomenon is changing 
within the new revolutionary protests. In other words, I will show 
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the fruitfulness of my theoretical approach and how it contributes to 
the ongoing discussion on protests, social change, and democracy. 
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Chapter II. Theory: eventful approach, 
pragmatic sociology, social movement studies  
 
In his study of the French Revolution, William Sewell (1996) 
suggested an innovative approach to the analysis of social change. 
Sewell argued that the outburst of violence and public discussion that 
attended the taking of the Bastille shaped a new collective identity, 
a civic nation, the French people. In their programmatic article, 
Sewell and Doug McAdam define historical events as “turning 
points in structural change, concentrated moments of political and 
cultural creativity when the logic of historical development is 
reconfigured by human action but by no means abolished” (McAdam 
and Sewell, 2001: 102).1 
 
Eventful identity  
 
Analyzing Russian and Ukrainian protests I will show that 
the collective identities of these events were the results, not 
preconditions of the mobilizations. I will term them “eventful 
                                                          
1 However, an event does not appear out of thin air: its impact depends on the 
selfsame structures the event transforms. We simply must consider that events 
have their own rationale and causative force. Sewell stresses that a political event 
is not an accidental occurrence, but a convergence of different social processes, 
the outcome of the synchronization and mutual aggravation of crises in different 
parts of society. “A revolution is not just a forceful act in that it expresses the will 
of the people. […] Only when it became clear that the taking of the Bastille had 
forced the king to yield effective power to the National Assembly could the acts 
of the Parisian people be viewed as a revolution in this new sense. The epoch-
making cultural change—the invention of a new and enduring political category—
could therefore only take place in tandem with practical changes in institutional 
and military power relations” (Sewell, 1996: 853). 
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identities”. In their work dedicated to an analysis of theories of 
identity, James Jasper and Francesca Polletta assert that in certain 
situations, the events of the protest can, in itself, form a collective 
identity. They explain the phenomenon of eventful identity by using 
the concept of moral shock:  
‘Moral shocks’ produced, for example, by a photograph of a tortured 
animal or the disaster at Three Mile Island can mobilize people who 
do not know each other or the organizers...political activity itself 
provides that kind of solidarity:...we are caring, critical citizens. 
These ‘movement identities’ may come to serve much the same 
function as a preexisting collective identity (Jasper and Polletta, 
2001: 291). 
The American sociologist Jeffrey Goldfarb, in their stead, suggested 
calling the global wave of protests of the years 2011 to 2014 “the 
new social movements,” thus designating those movements in which 
mobilization was not merely a means to an end, but the goal of 
collective action. He argues that demonstrators occupied a space and 
the way they did so, the way they interacted with each other, was an 
important end of the movement. The form of interaction, as well as 
the identity and interest content, was central (Goldfarb, 2012). 
 How could the identity formed by such protests be characterized? 
Sidney Tarrow, in his research on the American Occupy Wall Street 
movement, perceptively remarked that such an identity is not 
founded so much on belonging to certain social groups or political 
camps, but on an occurrence of co-presence experienced by 
participants during collective action. He termed this type of 
identification the “we are here identity”: “By their presence, they are 
saying only, ‘Recognize us!’ If Occupy Wall Street resembles any 
movement in recent American history, it would actually be the new 
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women’s movement of the 1970s <...> their foremost demand was 
for recognition of, and credit for, the gendered reality of everyday 
life” (Tarrow, 2011). 
 Researchers have different answers to the question of what the 
emergence and meaning of such a type of identity is related to. As 
such, the sociologist Cihan Tugal asserts that these identities are the 
result of the central role played by the middle class in these new 
protests. Tugal writes,  
“The contradictoriness of these revolts manifested itself not 
primarily in the demands formulated (as they often tended to avoid 
concrete demands), but in the composition of the revolters, their de 
facto demands (such as the toppling of the Egyptian dictator Morsi 
through a dictatorial coup), their discourse, and their ‘prefigurative’ 
style. The common egalitarian style--a collectivistic occupation of 
the Commons that prefigured (or lived and anticipated) the world to 
come, rather than demanding it--was unintentionally coupled with 
class distinction...This specific predisposition to politics (where the 
pleasure of debate trumps the formulation of demands) should be 
added to the political markers and markers of class” (Tugal, 2015: 
80). 
 Other researchers suggest that such identities are, on the contrary, 
linked to a falling apart of social classes and an atomization of social 
groups, accompanied by an “evaporating” of group self-awareness 
and political ideologies (c.f., for example, Lichterman and Eliasoph, 
2003; Eliasoph, 1997). There are multiple points of view regarding 
the political effectiveness of movements united by such identities. 
Ernesto Laclau believes that ideologically “empty” emblematic 
identities are a guarantee of the unity of a movement, giving it 
strength (Laclau, 2005), while at the same time Ivan Krastev believes 
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that eschewing an articulation of concrete interests and preferences 
weakens a movement (Krastev, 2014). This brings us to the central 
problem of eventful protests and social change.  
 
Eventful protests: change or reproduction?  
 
There are two different aspects of eventfulness of protests. 
The first one is conceptualized in a phenomenological analysis that 
sees an event as a specific type of collective experience. This 
experience is an involvement in an abrupt collective action that 
transforms subjectivities and reshapes social relations within the 
very occurrence of mobilization. Such focus can be found in the 
concept of ‘eventful protests’. Donatella della Porta claims that 
“protest events have cognitive, affective and relational impacts on 
the very actors that carry them out”. Within the events, the author 
argues, “participants experiment with new tactics <…> create 
feeling of solidarity, and consolidate organizational networks” (della 
Porta, 2008: 30). Following William Sewell, della Porta analyzes 
specific temporality of an event within which a protest becomes “an 
arena of debates”, “brings about new networks”, and develops 
“feeling of solidarity in action” (ibid.: 32). 
The second aspect of eventfulness of protests is its structural 
effect. Analyzing how movements emerge from the experience of 
“eventful protests” such as social forums or local struggles della 
Porta focuses on the temporality of a singular mobilization while for 
Sewell himself who studies tectonic changes “internal temporality of 
events” is “duration between the initial rupture and the subsequent 
structural transformations” (Sewell, 1996). In fact, Sewell analyzes 
both aspects of eventful temporality. On the one hand, he argues that 
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the event “certainly raises the emotional intensity of life” and 
therefore intensifies collective action and public debates. Just as 
della Porta does, Sewell underlines the productive, or generic 
character of protest mobilizations that can generate new cultural 
meanings, collective identities and social relations. As I already 
wrote, in his brilliant study of French Revolution Sewell shows that 
the new understanding of a revolution and people’s sovereignty as 
well as new civic national identity emerged immediately after the 
taking of the Bastille and were the result of innovative interpretation 
of the violent attack on Bastille as a popular uprising. This 
interpretation was constructed in the intensified public debates 
among Parisian activists, deputies and intellectuals in the course of 
the mobilization itself. On the other hand, eventful temporality is a 
duration when structural changes in different realms of society 
coincide and constitute a societal structural transformation. Sewell 
argues that “a revolution is not just a forceful act that expresses the 
will of the people, but such an act that puts into place a new political 
regime. Only when it became clear that the taking of the Bastille had 
forced the king to yield effective power to the National Assembly 
could the acts of Parisian people be viewed as a revolution in this 
new sense. The epoch-making cultural change – the invention of a 
new and enduring political category - could therefore only take place 
in tandem with practical changes in institutional and military power 
relations” (Sewell, 1996: 853). Thus, a historical event is the result 
of a coincidence of different disruptive events in different social 
realms which is accomplished by significant institutional changes. 
This approach is similar to one of Pierre Bourdieu who, in 
his analysis of the political crisis of 1968, develops his own 
sociological theory of protest events. Bourdieu shows how the 
growth in the size of the population of both university students and 
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lecturers led to their downclassing due to the fact that the diploma of 
the former turned out to be devaluated while careers of the latter 
became at risk. As a result, conflicts between students and professors 
who defended the university order intensified and, after the crises in 
different departments and faculties coincided and met the crises in 
agencies of cultural production, the general crisis emerged 
(Bourdieu, 1988). 
Bourdieu considers event as a coincidence of various 
structural changes that happens within the specific eventful 
temporality. He argues that “a regional crisis can extend to other 
regions of social space and thus become transformed into … a 
historical event, when, through the effect of acceleration which it 
produces, it is able to bring about the coincidence of events <…> It 
follows that the position of the different fields in the general crisis 
and the behavior of the corresponding agents will depend … on the 
relation between the social time-scales germane to each of these 
fields, that is to say between the rhythms with which, in each one of 
them, the processes generating its specific contradictions are 
accomplished” (Bourdieu, 1988: 173). For Bourdieu eventful 
temporality facilitates what he calls the synchronization of various 
crises. Unlike Sewell Bourdieu argues that eventful temporality does 
not produce anything new but accelerates integration of critical 
moments in different fields of social space: the event “displays and 
amplifies the effect of synchronization produced by the crisis” (ibid.: 
185). At the same time Bourdieu does not reject the crucial role the 
event itself plays in social change. To the contrary, only the analysis 
of structural changes that precede an occurrence of the event helps 
us understand its transformative capacity. As the author claims, 
“paradoxically, it is no doubt only if we reinsert the critical moments 
into the series where the principle of their intelligibility resides, 
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negating what … makes for their singularity, that we can understand 
what is the unique criterion of definition of the critical situation, if 
not ‘creation of unpredictable novelty’, at least as intrusion of the 
possibility of novelty … as open time when all futures appeal 
possible, and are indeed so for that very reason” (ibid.: 162). 
Bourdieu and Sewell both analyze political events in their 
relation to social structures. However, if Bourdieu focuses on the 
structural causes of the event, Sewell explores consequences. That is 
why while Sewell shows how one abrupt event then invokes a series 
of other disruptive occurrences that together lead to structural 
change, Bourdieu analyzes the event as a mechanism that accelerates 
and makes visible various local ruptures that being integrated and 
reinforced within eventful “public time” produce the experience and 
image of a “historical event”. 
Thus, the experience of rupture in the routine of everyday life 
and coincidence of structural changes in various social fields within 
an eventful temporality are two different dimensions of eventfulness 
of protests. The two are interrelated: the crisis produces an 
atmosphere of uncertainty, fear and joy that mobilize collective 
action, initiate public debates, and intensify collective emotions. In 
turn, mobilized human action reinforces the uncertainty, 
synchronizes various social struggles, articulates new cultural 
meanings, and brings about social change (Bourdieu, 1988). 
However, these two dimensions are different. Moreover, there are 
major political events that produce the condition of uncertainty, 
mobilize collective will and inspire a struggle for social change, but 
do not lead to any structural transformations. Should we say that 
such mobilizations are not eventful? I believe, the answer is no. 
However, we should clearly distinguish between the two aspects of 
eventful temporality when defining and analyzing events. Indeed, as 
34 
 
Adam Moore argues, these two dimensions of eventfulness are as 
different as they can constitute contrast definitions of what an event 
is: “events stand apart from this ordinary background of life. This 
way of conceptualizing events stands in clear contrast with Sewell 
and Sahlins, who base their distinction upon analytically defined 
outcomes — structural transformations — rather than social 
experience and narration, where I think they can be more properly 
grounded (Moore, 2011: 300). In my thesis, I intend to link the two 
aspects of eventfulness of protests raising the following question: 
under what conditions an experience of rupture can become a factor 
of social and political change? 
As discussed earlier, eventfulness of protests can be 
understood in terms of collective experience of rupture in daily life 
and in terms of structural changes. Although the two can be different 
aspects of the same dynamics, they also can be viewed as 
contradictory. Indeed, while eventful structural change presupposes 
durable temporality of multiple transformations that occur in parallel 
social worlds, the experience of eventfulness is one-time. This 
contradiction becomes especially visible in some of contemporary 
protests that avoid political representation and an articulation of a 
political program. Indeed, as Kevin McDonald argues in his research 
on globalization conflicts and social forums, “the refusal of 
representation, the temporality of the present and the culture of 
immediacy involve a rejection of the idea of mediation and indeed 
mediated experience … The temporal experience of activists is 
strongly informed by the social experience of information 
technology: activists live a culture where the mobile phone 
accelerates temporality and mediates a culture of simultaneity <…> 
The temporal pressure associated with actions produces a sense of 
urgency that is central to the culture of activism, and to forms of 
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action constructed in terms of ‘the event’”. The author claims that 
many recent protests are characterized by “the imperative of 
immediacy, the utopia of instant exchange and simultaneity” 
(McDonald, 2010: 119). 
I suppose that events can invoke structural changes if they 
can attract and mobilize people outside spatially and temporally 
limited occurrence but also if they can change dominant cultural 
meanings, identities, and power relations. But how can eventful 
subjectivities, solidarities, and cultural meanings that are invented in 
action cause a transformation of dominant collective identities, 
social relations and symbolic structures? My argument is that the 
structural change an event produces can be an extension of 
subjectivities, relations and meanings that emerged within an event 
beyond the spatial and temporal boundaries of the happening. 
We should take into account the fundamental paradox of 
eventfulness. The ambiguity of eventful protests is that their 
atmosphere of spontaneity and uniqueness facilitates their expansion 
as it invokes the process of contagion but, at the same time, hinders 
their extension beyond limited time and space because the latter 
requires long-term collective action and cultural work, political 
representation and ideological debates that are often rejected as 
bureaucratic and authoritarian, as something that contradicts the very 
eventfulness as such. Inclusiveness of eventful protests is one 
example of this ambiguity. For instance, Donatella della Porta argues 
that the recent mass protests, especially American Occupy, Turkish 
Gezi and ‘Arab Spring’ were exemplary ‘eventful’ because produced 
collective identities and shared emotions within the very experience 
of the mass uprisings that were shared by thousands and were 
immanent to the very acts of mobilizations. These ‘contingent’ 
identities and emotions were definitive for the protests as they were 
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more important for protesters themselves than political agendas, 
ideologies, parties etc. The lack of strong ideological and 
representative impositions as well as highly emotional and self-
referential character of these protests made them tend to be “open to 
all”, she argues (della Porta, 2015). However, I suppose that the same 
features of political events can make them perceived by outsiders as 
not open but exclusive and sometimes even repressive. In fact, 
uniqueness and singularity of an event can make its effect limited by 
its direct experience. The openness experienced by participants of 
the event can be perceived as sectarian exclusiveness by outsiders. 
In other words, protesters should decipher the protest meaning for 
outsiders who do not share the eventful experience with these 
protesters. Otherwise outsiders can see a protest as a danger for them. 
In order to understand how events can invoke structural 
changes we need to elaborate the theory of political events defining 
them as not only happenings but also social mechanisms that 
multiply, reinforce and extend the effects caused by these 
happenings. We need to explore the events’ capacity to go beyond 
themselves as unique and singular occurrences.  
   Born out of the experience of an event, new identities and 
social connections spread through society and change it due to the 
synchronization and accumulation of changes in different social 
spaces. Sewell writes that 
“events should be conceived of as sequences of occurrences that 
result in transformations of structures. Such sequences begin with a 
rupture of some kind--that is, a surprising break with routine 
practice...an occurrence [then] becomes a historical event...when it 
touches off a chain of occurrences that durably transforms previous 
structures and practices. This happens above all when a rupture in 
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one particular structural and spatial location also produces 
reinforcing ruptures in other locations” (Sewell, 1996: 843). 
We see that, according to Sewell, structural changes are the result of 
the spread of an event beyond the boundaries of the region where it 
emerged, of its migration to contiguous social spaces. But how do 
events arise? How, specifically, do they migrate from one social 
space to another? In my opinion, this practical aspect of eventfulness 
is not sufficiently explored in Sewell’s seminal works. 
 
How do events move: pragmatic sociology and 
political semiosis 
 
Pragmatic sociology, in analyzing individual and collective 
experiences in different situations, allows us to examine in detail, on 
the phenomenological level, how events arise and spread beyond a 
specific time and place. Laurent Thevenot, in his recent works, 
suggested a theory of “regimes of engagement,” which analyses the 
various ways and scopes of people’s engagement with the 
surrounding world. He writes, “In our contemporary societies human 
beings constantly need to change the scope of their engagement, 
shifting along a scale between greater or lesser generality” 
(Thevenot, 2005). According to this theory, an experience of an 
event corresponds to a specific regime of exploration which is 
“exclusively present-oriented. Value is placed on surprise and the 
assurance of an excited self depends on the unflagging rejuvenation 
of the environment--including one’s body--which has to be arranged 
to produce the shock of newness” (Thevenot, 2014: 15). But does 
this shock produce a social change? 
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Pragmatic sociology of Bruno Latour who focuses on the 
transition from smaller scopes of social action to bigger ones2 allows 
a better comprehension of the problem that interests me. Latour 
studies spread of eventful experiences and meanings beyond the 
scope of the event. He thinks that this movement produces social 
transformation. In his famous study of the “Pasteurization of 
France,” Latour continues his study of technologies of belief, which 
contribute to transforming localized laboratory practices into 
universally recognized “scientific facts”. He strives to answer the 
question of how people begin to believe in the reality “discovered” 
by scientists in laboratory settings. Latour believes that scientific 
facts “are like trains, they do not work off their rails” (Latour, 1983: 
155). In other words, in order for people beyond the laboratory to 
believe in the reality “discovered” within the laboratory, that reality 
must be convincingly presented in new contexts and situations. 
In his work, Latour shows how Pasteur first “localized” the 
problem of Siberian ulcers in his laboratory, where he “discovered 
microbes,” then transferred his experiment to a farm. He practically 
built that up into a laboratory, and then initiated grandiose 
transformation in agriculture, technology, and the collection of 
                                                          
2  Here, we should clarify the different between Thevenot’s and 
Latour’s approaches to the question of scale. Thevenot writes: “the 
development of microhistory, accompanied by a strengthening of 
attention paid to ‘changes in scale,’ contributed to a rethinking of the 
classical sociological conundrum regarding the relationship between 
the micro and macro levels of analysis. An understanding of scale 
taken from cartography leads us to the perspective of the researcher, 
and to the problems he is confronted with in understanding society. 
What interests us, however, is the multiplicity of levels of 
involvement of the actors themselves, their interaction with the 
world and among themselves in activities of different scales” 
(Thevenot, 2006). 
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statistics on a national scale. As a consequence, he succeeded in 
having microbes recognized as a biology reality. At the same time, 
he succeeded in having the political danger of microbes recognized 
as they threatened all of France, and thus confirmed the political 
influence of microbiologists, simultaneously as political agents and 
those who fight microbes. 
In reality, Latour formulates his own theory of the political 
event, one not determined by “social context” but, on the contrary, 
one which changes society. Latour writes,  
The congenital weakness of the sociology of science is its propensity 
to look for obvious stated political motives and interests in one of 
the only places, the laboratories, where sources of fresh politics as 
yet unrecognized as such are emerging. Microbiology laboratories 
are one of the few places where the very composition of the social 
context has been metamorphosed. It is not a small endeavor to 
transform society as to include microbes and microbe watchers in its 
very fabric. [Pasteur’s discovery of microbes] is [a] fresh source of 
power for modifying society and cannot be explained by the state of 
the society at the time (Latour, 1983; 158). 
The reality of the discovery of microbes by researchers became the 
lever for creating social change, which works due to a change of 
scale; from the laboratory to France in its entirety.  
This spread of “scientific facts” beyond the space of their 
“discovery,” their taking root in society as a whole, occurs alongside 
changes in common social practice. As Latour states, 
It is only by hindsight that we say that in this year 1881, Pasteur 
invented the first artificial vaccination. By doing so we forget that to 
do so it was necessary to move...from the laboratory to the field, from 
the microscale to the macroscale...But how can laboratory practice 
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be extended? ...only by extending the laboratory itself. Pasteur 
cannot just hand out a few flasks of vaccine to farmers and say: ‘OK, 
it works in my lab, get by with that.’ If he were to do that, it would 
not work. The vaccination can work only on the condition that the 
farm chosen...for the field trial be in some crucial respects 
transformed according to the prescriptions of Pasteur’s 
laboratory...On the condition that you respect a limited set of 
laboratory practices (disinfection, cleanliness…) you can extend to 
every French farm a laboratory product made at Pasteur’s lab (ibid.: 
155). 
What was at first a capture of interest by a lab scientist is now 
extending through a network that spreads laboratory products all 
over France… Since scientific facts are made inside laboratories, in 
order to make them circulate you need to build costly networks 
inside which they can maintain their fragile efficacy. If this means 
transforming society into a vast laboratory, then do it (ibid, 166). 
Latour’s theory allows us to study what facilitates and what 
hinders an expansion of eventful “inventions” outside an event itself. 
I will show that the networks of elections observers allowed to 
translate protest experiences and meanings into urban activism in 
Russia. I will also show that within Ukrainian case protesters both 
managed and failed to distribute the new national identity into 
outside the revolutionary “laboratory” of Euromaidan where 
activists “discovered” a civic nation. That is why the huge event of 
the Ukrainian uprising failed to bring about social transformations it 
proclaimed. 
How do we trace the trajectory of eventful identities that 
relocate into “parallel” social spaces? The American researcher 
Robin Wagner-Pacifici critiques Latour for not paying enough 
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attention to the diversity of cultural forms in which an event can 
manifest itself as an event and point to a new, reliable, and stable 
reality. She writes, “It is the cultural work of the performatives, 
demonstratives, and representations to exile the mutability and 
dynamism of events as events appear to take the form of hard facts” 
(Wagner-Pacifici, 2010). In her more recent works dedicated to war, 
acts of terrorism, and violence, she formulates an original, 
culturosociological theory and methodology for studying political 
events (Wagner-Pacifici, 2010; Wagner-Pacifici, 2017). One of the 
main theses of her theory is that events are constantly in flux. Events 
become incarnated in different genres, such as, for example, 
representations and performative speech acts. Thanks to these 
genres, events last, multiply themselves, and develop--on the one 
hand asserting their completeness and maturity, and on the other 
continuing to arise in new forms, meanings, and contexts. 
 Within this lies their paradox. It is important to note that different 
groups of creators and consumers of culture--who help these events 
to happen, last, and end--endlessly argue over the meaning of these 
events and struggle for legitimate interpretations. Wagner-Pacifici 
agrees with Sewell that political events create new collective 
identities that contribute to social changes: “Great things are at stake, 
including the remaking of social and political identities and the 
redistribution of power and resources” (Wagner-Pacifici, 2010: 
1358). Additionally, she rightly criticizes Sewell for not describing 
in enough detail the process of the spread of cultural manifestations 
of an event in time, space, and various forms, as “[the representations 
of events] need to be generated and sent outward into the wider world 
of audiences and witnesses at a distance.” For that reason, she urges 
“to consider the [events’] specificities of the modalities, the diverse 
domains, and their interrelations” (Ibid). 
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 In fact, Wagner-Pacifici, just like Latour, poses the problem of 
“building the rails” upon which representations of the event spread 
throughout “society,” transforming culture and power. The only 
difference is that Latour studies “costly networks,” adding their 
materiality to the “symbolic structures” common to sociology, while 
Wagner-Pacifici focuses above all on “cultural forms.” She writes, 
The pathway of an event is never one-dimensional and linear--even 
as social and political actors consider the respective demonstratives, 
performatives, and representations, there is also the significant 
problem of identifying the accumulated effect of multiple modalities 
at work at the same time. The question of colligation here suggests a 
need for specification of historical technologies of communication 
and circulation. Modern mass-mediated communication travels in an 
instant, makes representations ubiquitous, and inserts the public into 
private, intimate domains of offices and homes (ibid.: 1374). 
She takes a significant step in the direction of normative and 
essentialist understanding of the event, insisting that those structural 
changes studied by Sewell are the consequences not of a monolithic, 
completed event, but the effect of a non-alignment of the different 
cultural forms of its incarnation and reincarnation, or of the disputing 
of the political meaning of the event among different publics. 
Wagner-Pacifici argues, 
“The restlessness of events is a function of the ongoing interpretive 
and interactional competitions and contestations among principal 
actors and witnesses...specific emergent significations may not quite 
work or may work only with particular participants or in particular 
contexts. Thus, we look not only for articulations between diverse 
semiotic modalities to make sense of the shapes being taken by 
events but also, and especially, for disarticulations to local event 
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fault lines. In fact, the transformational potential of events is best 
seen in these disarticulations. Thus...Latour...grasps but does not 
highlight the ways that these handoffs are managing the unsettled 
shock wave of an event (ibid.: 1372). This ambiguity of events 
makes eventful protests vulnerable to both social change and social 
reproduction.  
In fact, as Adam Moore demonstrates, large events are 
capable of not just changing, but also reproducing, established social 
structures. Analyzing the violent clashes between Bosnian and 
Croatian football fans in the Bosnian city of Motsar in 2007, Moore 
argues that a disruptive event blocked the articulation of a perception 
of social world that would be alternative to the dominant 
ethnocentric discourse and therefore contributed to reproduction 
rather than transformation of social structures. “As an instance of 
ethnic violence — rather than mere hooliganism — the events served 
as warning for those who sought to carve out alternative ways of 
coexisting and identifying themselves” the author claims. Moore 
argues that although social scientists often presuppose that social 
structures reproduce themselves in the normal course of daily life, 
while disruptive events tend to change structures, we should 
recognize that often social reproduction requires “maintenance 
work”, while abrupt events can be a mechanism of this work. In his 
research the author argues that “since the end of the war, ethnicity 
has remained the chief framework through which social life is 
organized and interpreted in the city <…> but cracks in the facade 
were beginning to show, opening up space <…> for people to 
consider the possibility of alternative forms of social identification 
and association” (Moore, 2011: 308). However, the two days of 
unexpected violence in the city that were followed by the work of 
interpretation of this violence in terms of ethnical cleavages, 
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contributed to reassertion of the ethnocentric discourse: “emplotted 
into this narrative framework, the violent events in Mostar were 
specters of ethnic conflict past and future, proof that attempts to 
return to a multiethnic way of living that existed before the war 
would be futile, or possibly even dangerous” (ibid.).  Moore 
concludes that political events if they do not articulate discourses and 
identities alternative to the dominant ones contribute to reproduction 
of social structures: “though the violent clashes recounted here were 
undoubtedly ruptures according to Sewell’s criteria — “a surprising 
break with routine practice” — the overwhelming response to them 
was neither repressive nor dismissive. Rather, the narrative reaction 
was that they illustrated the pervasive power of ethnic division in 
Mostar, despite the gradual institutional integration of the city in the 
previous decade. Narrated in this way, the events served to reinforce 
rather than threaten an existing social order” (ibid.: 309). In what 
follow I will describe how do I study structural change.  
 
Pragmatic of culture 
 
Although I believe that William Sewell’s approach is 
insufficient for research of eventful protest, I agree that what is 
crucial is structural change. In my text I will study how and to what 
extend the events of Russian and Ukrainian protests managed to 
change the dominant cultural and symbolic structures that define 
collective identities. 
When I speak of cultural structures, I follow Jeffrey 
Alexander in assuming that it is built from society’s prevalent 
cultural structures, i.e., binary codes, charged with collective 
emotions, that convey positive meanings to one pole of semantic 
oppositions, while imparting negative meanings to the other pole 
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(Alexander, 2003: 152). Alexander used his method to research US 
politics. Analyzing US civil society, he writes about the prevailing 
opposition in it between democratic and anti-democratic meanings. 
“‘Rule regulated,’ for example, is considered homologous with 
‘truthful’ and ‘open,’ terms that deﬁne social relationships, and with 
‘reasonable’ and ‘autonomous,’ elements from the symbolic set that 
stipulate democratic motives. In the same manner, any element from 
any set on one side is taken to be antithetical to any element from 
any set on the other side. Thus, hierarchy is thought to be inimical to 
‘critical’ and ‘open’ and also to ‘active’ and ‘self-controlled’” 
(Alexander, 2003: 123). This culture makes one practices legitimate 
while other stigmatized: “because worthiness can be achieved only 
by association to the discourse of liberty or by active opposition to 
the discourse of repression, political legitimacy and political action 
in the “real world” are critically dependent on the processes by which 
contingent events and persons are arrayed in relation to the 
“imagined” one” (ibid, 153). 
If the US deems the opposition between democracy and 
repression the most significant semantic code, Russia is typified by 
a culture of a-politicism, based on the opposition between the 
political and the apolitical or freedom from politics. Associated with 
violence, hypocrisy, and corruption, politics is regarded as an evil; it 
is contrasted with the honest, sincere individual life, dominated by 
personal relationships, the pursuit of prosperity, careers, and self-
distancing from the political realm (Zhuravlev, 2014). My text shows 
that post-protest local activism has altered the culture of a-politicism, 
destigmatized politics. At the same time, within Ukrainian case I 
study regional, linguistic and national oppositions, for instance, East 
and West, Russian and Ukrainian. I will show how these oppositions 
have been reproduced not changed in the course of collective action.    
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At the same time, Alexander’s approach appears excessively 
structuralist. I will show that the transformation as well as 
reproduction of political culture has occurred due to changes in the 
communicative and practical use of cultural codes. Hence, I will be 
relying on the approach to culture introduced by Laurent Thévenot 
and Nina Eliasoph, who in their research show how people 
differentiate cultural meanings in different ways, depending on the 
specific communicative and pragmatic circumstances (Eliasoph and 
Lichterman, 2003; Lamont and Thévenot, 2000). In what follows I 
will describe some basic elements of their approach. 
Nina Eliasoph and Paul Lichterman argue that one should 
analyze culture in a more pragmatic way than Alexander does. The 
sociologists agree with Alexander that cultural codes rooted in 
society form our collective representations. However, they argue, 
one need to analyze how these representations are used in practices 
of interaction and communication in order to grasp meanings of 
these representations that are, in fact, vary in different situations and 
for different persons. Eliasoph and Lichterman argue: “Groups use 
collective representations from the larger culture in a way that 
usually complements the groups’ meaningful, shared ground for 
interaction” (Lichterman and Eliasoph, 2003). Analysis of the 
communicative dimension of culture allows the sociologists to 
describe what keeps participants of various civil society groups and 
communities together. Indeed, shared meanings of collective 
representations (not representations themselves) that are produced 
and reproduced in practice of communication is what constitutes 
commonality of participants of various civil society groups (ibid.). 
However, Lichterman and Eliasoph limit their analysis by the focus 
on communication. Pragmatic sociology developed by Laurent 
Thevenot allows to see how culture can be seen in different day-to-
day practices beyond communication. More importantly, this 
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approach allows analyzing various pragmatic “regimes”, 
“grammars”, “modes” that form commonality. 
We need to consider “regimes of engagement” and “political 
grammar” in order to understand how the event changes codes and 
meanings. The regimes of engagement include familiarity, when the 
individual dissolves in a familiar environment whose objects are 
seemingly extensions of her body: interacting them with them does 
not demand goal-oriented behavior. Lying in our messy bedroom, 
we switch on our laptops out of habit, automatically, as soon as we 
have woken up. Another regime of engagement is that of individual 
planning, which involves a functional attitude to things in the 
environment and the prediction of routine actions in the future, e.g., 
as we get on the tram, we count on its taking us to the right stop. 
Finally, there is the regime of justification. People argue in the public 
space about the common good, e.g., employees and management sit 
around a table negotiating. The employees see the common good in 
terms of good pay, while management imagines that the invisible 
hand of the market sets wages and distributes goods fairly. Thévenot 
describes a fourth regime of engagement, that of exploration, which 
is “exclusively present-oriented. Value is placed on surprise and the 
assurance of an excited self depends on the unflagging rejuvenation 
of the environment—including one’s body—which has to be 
arranged to produce the shock of newness” (Thévenot, 2014: 15). 
The concept of this regime gives us a key for analyzing how the 
Russian protests were experienced as an event that gave impetus to 
the emergence of new local activist groups. I will show that, during 
the politicization of local activism, a new type of individual and 
collective know-how has been produced that integrates the familiar 
and the public, seemingly inserting one into the other. This 
integration influenced transformation of the opposition between 
“political” and “apolitical”. 
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 “Grammars of commonality” “help to differentiate ways of 
voicing concerns and differing” (Thévenot, 2014: 9). Thévenot 
identifies three such grammars. The first grammar, the grammar of 
orders of plural worth, is modeled on the negotiating table, on 
circumstances when individuals or groups discuss the common good. 
The second grammar, the liberal grammar, involves people coming 
together, communicating, and acting in concert via the articulation 
and taking into account of individual needs, objectified as a list of 
publicly available options to be chosen. (It is the act of choosing 
itself that corresponds to this grammar.). Finally, the third grammar, 
affinity through common places, involves a more silent means of 
uniting and acting in concert, based on the personal, emotional 
investments people have in common places, which can be places per 
se (homes or parks), but also songs, pictures, and things in the real 
world. Thévenot stresses that common places are never merely 
symbolic; they are likewise grounded in material circumstances. We 
shall see that, despite the centrality of fair elections and liberalism to 
the Russian protest movement, the grammar of commonality typical 
of both the “For fair elections” protests themselves and post-
Bolotnaya Square local activism is not the liberal grammar, but the 
grammar of affinity through common places. 
Finally, a reality test is a concept suggested by Thévenot and 
Luc Boltanski. This concept will help me to analyze how 
obviousness of alleged facts and personal know-how was politicized. 
As I already mentioned, despite Lichterman and Eliasoph, I examine 
communication in the broadest sense, thus avoiding reducing it to 
speech alone. As Boltanski and Thévenot have noted, “[T]he 
looming disagreement cannot be expressed in a pure debate over 
ideas; arguments have to be substantiated by things” (Boltanski and 
Thévenot, 2006: 36). Consistent methods or manners of reinforcing 
one’s own rightness with words and things are the reality test. 
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“People’s claims had to be confronted with the real world, hence 
pass a series of more or less standardised procedures they called tests 
[…]. In the end, it is the outcome of these tests that lends substance 
to the judgements people make. This is what provides them with the 
strength that they need to stand up to challenges” (Boltanski and 
Chiapello, 2005: 167). In my work, I show that the politicization of 
local activism has caused a new type of claim on legitimacy (cf. 
Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007), in which the persuasive power of 
self-evident facts and an appeal to personal experience have mutated 
from the idiom of a-politicism into a tool of political campaigning. 
This influenced the transformation of the opposition between 
“political” and “apolitical”. At the same time, within the Ukrainian 
case reality tests facilitated involving into opposite political camps 
whose struggle over each other has been reproduced dominant 
symbolic oppositions.     
        Thus, the eventful approach together with pragmatic sociology, 
cultural sociology and social movement studies will help me to 
research eventful social change at a micro level. Analyzing different 
theories of eventful collective action I showed that eventful 
temporality can be considered ambivalently. One the one hand, 
eventful temporality is analyzed in terms durable periods of social 
change. On the other hand, contemporary social movement 
researchers consider eventfulness in terms of experience “in action” 
that is characterized by the “break with routine”. In other words, 
eventfulness can be seen as at the same time future and present-
oriented. I then showed that a “break with routine” can be transposed 
into a process of structural social change if an eventful collective 
action spread over various social spaces. I suggested that pragmatic 
sociology as well as cultural sociology, including political semiosis 
and narrative analysis, are fruitful for a research of how events 
“travel”. Finally, I analyzed the theories of cultural structures as well 
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as pragmatic approach to how they constitute and change. In what 
follows I will expose my methodological approach.    Narrative 
analysis as well as discourse analysis in general is the main 
methodology in my text.  
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Chapter III. Methodology 
Methods: political semiosis, pragmatic approach, life 
stories analysis  
Narrative analysis 
 
My research is mostly based on an analysis of in-depths 
interviews. Analysis of the informants’ narratives allowed me to 
grasp eventful experiences and identities. Narratives are the sort of 
discourse that often used to represent eventful experience. Moreover, 
narratives about events are the part of events themselves as they 
reinforce eventful temporality. This dimension of the narrativity is 
in the center of the methodological analysis of Margaret R. Somers: 
“While the older interpretation of narrative was limited to that of a 
representational form, the new approaches define narrative and 
narrativity as concepts of social epistemology and social ontology. 
These concepts posit that it is through narrativity that we come to 
know, understand, and make sense of the social world, and it is 
through narratives and narrativity that we constitute our social 
identities”. The author emphasizes the role of narrativity in the 
process of dramatic subjectivity transformations: “Ontological 
narratives make identity and the self something that one becomes 
<…> Ontological narratives affect activities, consciousness, and 
beliefs and are, in turn, affected by them” (Somers, 1992). Adam 
Moore in his work about “eventful reproduction” emphasizes the 
role of narrativity that influences political effect of eventful 
collective action: “Narrated in this way, the events served to 
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reinforce rather than threaten an existing social order” (Moore, 
2011). As Francesca Polletta argues: “grasping the prevailing 
common sense about storytelling is important to understanding not 
only how narrative ﬁgures in everyday life but also how it ﬁgures in 
efforts to bring about social change” (Polletta, 2006: 2). At the same 
time that author claims that “stories are influential as preservers of 
the status quo” (ibid.: 15). Polletta poses the fundamental question: 
“does personal storytelling in general is ineffective for 
disadvantaged groups or that it inevitably reproduces rather than 
undermines the status quo?” (ibid.: 18). 
A narrative as a genre is a temporal representation of events 
sequences that are socially, temporary and spatially localized. As 
Andrew Abbott argued, “[for those who propose a narrative as the 
foundation for sociological methodology] social reality happens in 
sequences of actions located within constraining or enabling 
structures. It is a matter of particular social actors, in particular social 
places, at particular times” (Abbott, 1992: 428).  
Being a discursive practice that constructs eventful identity a 
narrative is different from discourses based on classifications, 
taxonomies, categories that express more stable and developed 
systems of beliefs and preferences. Indeed, as Fancesca Polletta 
argues, “narrative’s temporally configurative capacity equips it to 
integrate past, present, and future events and to align individual and 
collective identities during periods of change. These features 
distinguish narratives from frames, which are said to contribute to 
identity-formation through taxonomic atemporal and discursive 
processes of analogy and differences” (Polletta, 1998: 139). 
Temporal organization of storytelling makes narratives an 
alternative to taxonomies way of political subjectivity formation. 
That is why it is fruitful to exploit narrative analysis when studying 
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collective identities that are immanent to political actions, that are 
formed in the course of these actions. As Margaret S. Somers puts it, 
“Without emplotment, events or experiences could be categorized 
only according to a taxonomical scheme. Yet, we do not act on the 
basis of categories or attributes. Polkinghorne implicitly addresses 
the difference between emplotment and categorization when he 
notes that social actions should not be viewed as a result of 
categorizing oneself ("I am 40 years old; I should buy life 
insurance") but should be seen to emerge in the context of a life-story 
with episodes ("I felt out of breath last week, I really should start 
thinking about life insurance") (Somres, 1994: 616). Within the 
process of politicization new identities are forming and social 
relations are reconfiguring: “While a social identity or categorical 
approach presumes internally stable concepts, such that under 
normal conditions entities within that category will act uniformly 
and predictably, the narrative identity approach embeds the actor 
within relationships and stories that shift over time and space. It thus 
precludes categorical stability in action. These temporally and 
spatially shifting configurations form the relational coordinates of 
ontological, public, and cultural narratives. Within these temporal 
and multilayered narratives identities are formed; hence narrative 
identity is processual and relational” (ibid.: 621). In what follows I 
will describe methodological dimension of my empirical analysis.  
In this work I consider the processes within which protesters’ 
narratives of events construct identities, both individual and 
collective. In both cases, Russian and Ukrainian, I study how 
narratives of individual political subjectification during the protests 
and stories of emergence of a nation or a civil society constitute 
identities. As Francesca Polletta argues, 
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“the relation between narrative and self operates <…> in everyday 
contexts. We act, say narrative psychologists, not on the basis of 
identities deﬁned in categorical terms but by locating events within 
an unfolding life-story. We ﬁt events in our lives into incipient 
stories of tragedy or triumph, redemption or self-discovery <…> the 
stories that we tell ourselves align our actions with our identities, 
often subtly altering both. This is true of collective identities as well 
as individual ones. In telling the story of our becoming, as an 
individual, a nation, a people, we deﬁne who we are. Narratives may 
be employed strategically to strengthen a collective identity, but they 
also may precede and make possible the development of a coherent 
community or collective actor” (Polletta, 2006: 12). 
In my text I consider three dimensions of narratives: their 
plots, their interrelations with other narratives and discourses and, 
finally, what Polletta terms an epistemology of narratives (ibid.: 27).  
    Studying protesters’ narratives of eventful self-construction and 
self-discovery, I consider the plots of their stories that “have an 
identiﬁable beginning, middle, and end” (ibid.: 6). In both cases, the 
informants tell two central stories: one of their individual 
politicization and another one of civil communities’ (Russia) and 
civic nation’s (Ukraine) emergence. The fact that in most of the 
interviews the narratives of self-discovery (or transformation of the 
self) were temporarily limited by – and reduced to - one, single 
imaginary big event has allowed me to argue about “eventful 
identities” that were narrated as momentarily forged. Analyzing 
these single-event narratives within which beginning and end of a 
story often coincide, I consider how narratives reflect and form 
eventful temporalities and experiences. Within my cases, protesters’ 
narratives often lack any developed political or ideological 
discourses, therefore their stories do not “say explicitly to their 
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audiences <…> rather, larger meaning seems to arise from the events 
themselves” (ibid.: 10). Analysis of the plots of the narratives of self-
transformation “in a moment” allowed me to construct the 
conceptual model of collective action which I call “politics of 
authenticity”. In a sense it is somehow similar to what Polletta 
describes in her book: “episodes of mobilization set poorly in to our 
standard models of movement emergence, which view challengers 
and their interests as long-standing. To the contrary, in these cases, 
people’s stakes in collective action seem to have been generated 
<…> the event, which drove people to act even in the absence of 
organizations devoted to the cause. The force of stories of a child 
abused or a community endangered seems to come from the clarity 
of their normative conclusions. Events demand concerted action” 
(ibid.: 19). However, one should not take informants’ narratives at 
face value. The main “minimalist” narratives of eventful 
politicization are related to other narratives. Moreover, they are 
possible only because other narratives exist, and the latter make 
sense of the former. 
Francesca Polletta argues: “stories are inﬂuential not because 
they are told over and over again in identical form but rather because 
they mesh with other familiar stories” (ibid.: 15). Within my both 
cases I, first of all, analyze interactions between two narratives, one 
of personal politicization and another one of emergence of a nation 
or a civic community. The fact that they often coalesce into one 
narrative allowed to reveal the mechanisms behind new “eventful” 
identities formation. At the same time, these narratives of eventful 
and successful formation of new subjectivities and new nations are 
related to other narratives – that of personal political apathy and 
failed attempts to create a civic nation or a civil society. As Polletta 
writes, “for every story that enjoins us to turn the other cheek when 
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insulted, another instructs us to let no assault on our dignity go 
unavenged. Stories attesting to the virtue of the unencumbered 
individual are countered by stories about the virtue of loyalty to the 
group” (ibid.: 15). In other words, narratives of personal 
“awakening” referred to stories about previous depoliticization while 
the story about emergence of a civic nation in Ukraine was based on 
the narratives of Ukrainians’ “political passivity” and of failure of 
the Orange revolution to build up a nation.  I also compare in my text 
the informants’ narratives of politicization and of emergence of civic 
communities with other forms of discourse in order to resolve my 
main problem of eventful protest and social change. 
Francesca Polletta claims: “Much of the time, structures are 
reproduced through stories that thematize familiar oppositions. 
Sometimes, stories undermine those oppositions in ways that 
mobilize overt challenge <…> [stories] navigate similarly between 
the culturally privileged and denigrated poles of well-known 
oppositions <…> People can and do tell stories that refuse the 
standard cultural oppositions, and sometimes these have powerful 
effects. But more often, such stories are discredited, ignored, or 
assimilated to one or the other side of the oppositions they are 
intended to challenge” (ibid.: 15-16). In my text I analyze how 
“challenging” narratives that proclaim social change either transform 
dominant cultural oppositions or, alternatively, turn out to be 
assimilated by them. Comparison of protesters’ narratives of their 
and their countries’ transformations with other discourses: with 
taxonomical statements of the same informants within the same 
interviews, with their narratives and rhetoric within follow-up 
interviews and their Internet posts; finally, with official and 
dominant political hegemonic discourses allow to analyze social 
reproduction and social change. For example, analysis of the 
57 
 
evolution of narratives and rhetoric of Russian protesters revealed 
that the opposition between “politics” and “real deeds”, which had 
been the foundation of the culture of apoliticism, has been 
transformed into an opposition between “good politics” and “bad 
politics”. At the same time the comparison of narratives and 
taxonomical discourses of Ukrainian protesters as well as research 
of the evolution of their narratives over time revealed that while 
during the Euromaidan protests the participants claimed that many 
Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians were welcomed in the 
movement which overcame the very opposition between Russian 
and Ukrainian and between Eastern Ukrainian and Western 
Ukrainian, these oppositions were reasserted and re-politicized 
during the military conflict that started in 2014. 
Finally, in my text I analyze epistemologies of the protesters’ 
narratives and rhetoric. Polletta argues: “by an epistemology of 
storytelling, I mean a set of popular assumptions about how stories 
work: how audiences respond emotionally to stories, how stories 
convey or circumvent the truth” (ibid.: 22). It is analysis of narratives 
that allowed me to make some conclusion about civic cultures or, 
rather, civic epistemologies of Ukrainian and Russian protesters. As 
we know from at least Michele Foucault the issues of politics and 
truth are interrelated (Foucault, 1967). Analysis of protesters’ 
narratives allows to reveal which events among others the informants 
emphasize as decisive or as the moments of truth. These events are 
narrated as triggers of activist involvement and collective action. 
Analyzing the informants’ narratives, I suggested that both Russian 
and Ukrainian protesters shared political epistemology of self-
evidence within which what were represented as self-evident “facts” 
or felt as authentic experience were more reliable than, for example, 
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political ideologies or programs. Apart from discourse analysis I use 
biographical method in my research.      
 
Life stories 
  
Finally, I will conduct biographical analysis. One needs to 
scrutinize life stories of interviewees in order to understand the 
factors at work in eventful identities dynamics. As Donatella della 
Porta argues, Donatella della Porta says that “in order to study the 
formation of collective identities it is necessary to have detailed 
information on the whole process of political socialization, from the 
first encounters with politics to the choice of political activism <…> 
The focus of the analysis here becomes the way in which the story 
transforms within the individual conscience, how public events 
interfere in private life, how the perception of the external world 
induces or blocks active behaviors with respect to this” (della Porta, 
2013: 279). In fact, analysis of life courses will allow to understand 
which conditions and experiences were crucial for identities 
formation and transformations. Although I did not do quantitative 
analysis of factors and causes of mobilization, the analysis of 
biographies allows to figure out some structural factors as well as 
“turning points” that influenced politicization and identity. Indeed, 
life stories contain information about an informant’s social position, 
key events and experiences that influenced her politicization and 
emotions and representations of these events and experiences. That 
is why analyzing life stories one can make conclusions about causal 
relations between “objective” circumstances and “subjective” 
outcomes. As Olivier Fillieule puts it, people’s biographies are both 
“a series of objective changes of position and an associated series of 
subjective upheavals” (Fillieule, 2010: 4).   
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    In what follows I will argue about the case selection and describe 
my data.   
 
Case selection: why Russia and Ukraine?   
 
The global protest wave of 2011-2014 inspired the new 
discussions on the old problem of protests and social change. One 
the one hand, the huge uprisings that led to a regime change, failed 
to transform dominant social, economic and political orders. Many 
explained this referring to the fact that the protests lacked a positive 
program of social transformations and failed to transform themselves 
into political parties. That is why the “revolutionaries” turned out to 
be too weak in comparison with the elites which acted in favor of 
maintaining status-quo. On the other hand, some other protests, at 
first sight unsuccessful, could lead to structural changes, although 
hidden and occurring at a micro level. For example, Lance Bennett 
argued that the protests of 2011-2014 did not propose social and 
political demands. However, they eventfully changed the very 
language of public discourse: “protesters raised questions about 
inequality and the false promises of deregulated markets. These 
underlying issues stemming from the Indignado and Occupy protests 
circulated widely in many societies, leading to changes in national 
conversations and political agendas. These shifts in national 
discourses were major accomplishments coming from loosely 
organized protests that are not easy to classify as social movements, 
since they lacked central coordination, collective identity frames, 
and focused political demands” (Bennett, 2012; 31). This change in 
the public discourse then led, in turn, to broader transformations in 
the society and politics. Russian and Ukrainian protests I study in 
this text are the part of the global protest wave of 2011-2014. 
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Ukrainian and Russian uprisings share with some of the 
protests in the U.S., Europe and Northern Africa several important 
features: eventful experience and celebration of togetherness; 
revolutionary ambitions but the distrust of political representation; 
finally, disillusionment after decline of movements or a regime 
change (Zelinska, 2015; Bikbov, 2014; Krastev, 2012). This 
disillusionment was caused by the feeling that the events have gone 
while the societies and governments did not change. That is why I 
believe investigations of the post-soviet cases will allow to 
understand better the wave of the protests of 2011-2014. 
At the same time, some journalists and researchers for no 
good reason have been represented this wave as a singular 
phenomenon. Such generalizations ignore the fact that the events are 
slightly different. That is why one should carefully study differences 
and similarities between the protest events if wants to reveal a range 
of factors at hand that influenced the movements and therefore the 
whole wave. From this perspective, the comparison of Russian and 
Ukrainian cases against the global background is useful because the 
two protests are similar and at the same time distinct from each other 
and from Western European, American and African events. 
Moreover, these cases represent the story of huge mobilization, 
dramatic struggle for social change, disillusionment and hidden and 
slow social and political transformations. That is why an 
investigation of these cases is useful in researching the issue of 
eventful protests and social change. Both Euromaidan and anti-Putin 
rallies were characterized by avoiding articulation ideological 
preferences and social demands. Instead, both protests were focused 
on the emblematic slogans of a regime change and fair democracy. 
Protesters believed social and economic demands were secondary or 
were to be implemented automatically after the political changes 
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were brought about. However, if Ukrainian protesters managed to 
change the government Russian did not. Unlike Russia, Ukraine had 
competitive party system and institutionalized political opposition as 
well as violent far-right groups together with the tradition of long-
term anti-government campaigns with protest camps. That is why the 
violent mobilization of protesters from below together with parties’ 
activities from above led to the regime change while in Russia the 
uprising was suppressed by the authoritarian state. However, while 
in Ukraine the war, rise of radical nationalism and the new oligarchic 
authoritarian state blocked social and political reformation, in Russia 
the energy of the protest was channeled into development of the new 
local social movements after the decline of the nationwide rallies. 
The huge mobilization of the Euromaidan could continue within 
social movements as well as conventional politics but was 
transposed into the military volunteering. At the same time, the very 
war and the rise of nationalism that have been legitimized by the 
inheritance of the Euromaidan now allow the post-Maidan elites to 
reproduce the old order against which the protesters struggled: to 
strengthen authoritarianism, to maintain neopatrimonialism, to 
impose ethnic, regional and cultural exclusive nationalism. The 
Russian case shows something different. Tired of an abstract rhetoric 
of the “fair elections” agenda, rank-and-file protesters engaged into 
local activism that started struggle for a social change at a micro-
level. At the same time, the opposition movement led by Alexey 
Navalny developed a political program that helped him to oppose 
Putin during the presidential electoral campaign of 2017-2018. Thus, 
the both cases represent paradoxical and contradictory processes of 
struggle for social change. 
The goal of my thesis is to ground the issue of eventful 
protests and social transformation in empirical research. The 
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research is aimed at overcoming the normative discourses that 
evaluate empirical data against the background of political theories 
or of immediate subjective experience of the very protesters. In my 
opinion equating social change with a regime change is too 
formalistic while reducing social change to transformation of 
subjectivity is too optimistic and apologetic. In other words, 
comparative political science that often measures social change with 
a regime change often cannot see some deeper social dynamics. At 
the same time, it would be misleading to equate social change with 
elusive, solely subjective and invisible experience and knowledge of 
actors themselves. The ambition of my thesis is to study change and 
reproduction as structural phenomena though at a micro level. In my 
text I will show how allegedly revolutionary protest in Ukraine led 
to reproduction of collective representations and cultural meanings 
that supported regional divisions Euromaidan wanted to overcome. 
In other words, I will show how exactly the allegedly 
“transformative” event finally reproduced those symbolic structures 
it pretended to downplay. At the same time, I will show how “failed” 
uprising against authoritarianism in Russia produced structural 
transformation of what can be called a civic culture. In concrete 
terms, I will show how the eventful experience of collective action 
led to the transformation of the very meaning of a civic action and 
of those cultural structures that defined and articulated it. 
The problem of social change and reproduction has been 
traditionally studied within quantitative research (Bourdieu, 1984; 
Vester, 2004). However, I follow a case study approach as a research 
strategy. Although social change is a structural phenomenon, it is not 
always possible to measure it. In my research I deal with identity 
formation, collective representations, cultural meanings that are 
structurally determined, but, at the same time, hardly measurable. 
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However, a case-study strategy allows to grasp and investigate 
structural dimension of eventful social changes and reproduction of 
identities and culture. My research devoted to eventful identities 
studies both structural changes in collective representations and 
cultural meanings and their contribution to broader processes of 
social and political changes. 
Another reason to prefer case study approach is that social 
changes I deal with occur at a micro-level. I analyze the protests that 
are allegedly aimed at a systemic change, but, at the same time lead 
to neither any societal transformations nor emergence of new long-
term movements or parties. However, these protests change 
protesters’ subjectivities and political cultures dramatically. But one 
has to look at a micro level of local political and civic practices in 
order to see these transformations. 
Since the new protest wave revealed the new types of social 
change caused by the eventful mobilizations, it is useful to follow a 
case study strategy. As Donatella della Porta puts it, “in qualitative 
… comparison based on a case strategy, explanations are genetic (i.e. 
based upon the reconstruction of the origins of a certain event), and 
generalizations are historically concrete (Ragin and Zaret 1983: 
740). Theorization and generalization, in this tradition, are provided 
not by statistical regularities but by ideal types. These are abstract 
models, with an internal logic, against which real, complex cases can 
be measured” (della Porta, 2008: 206). Within this text my goal is to 
analyze micro-processes that are invoked by eventful experiences in 
terms of social change. In other words, I am interested in how micro-
dynamics of collective identities and collective action invoked by 
eventful protests can contribute to a larger social change or, 
alternatively, turn out to become an instrument of a social 
reproduction. In this perspective, my aim is ‘not to maximize 
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resemblance or even to pinpoint differences among whole countries 
but to discover whether similar mechanisms and processes drive 
changes in divergent periods, places and regimes’ (McAdam, 
Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 82)” (della Porta, 2008, pp. 215-216). 
Finally, methodologically I am aimed at what Philippe Schmitter 
calls “discovery” not “proof”: “There exists a very broad range of 
social and political topics for which it is possible to conceptualize 
the variables that may contribute to an explication, but not to assign 
any sort of provisional ‘if . . . then . . .’ status to their relationships. 
For these topics, the opposite research logic is one of discovery and 
not of proof. The purpose is to improve one’s conceptualization of a 
topic, probe its plausibility against a range of data and eventually 
generate hypotheses among its conclusions, but it would be 
premature to expect them as a pre-condition for conducting the 
research itself” (Schmitter, 2008, p. 271). However, my investigation 
is not limited by only “discovery”. Rather it is discovery and proof. 
Using systematic analysis of the interviews, focus groups and 
observations I come to the conclusions about structural 
transformations or reproduction of collective identities and political 
cultures.   
 
Fieldwork and Data 
 
Russian case 
 
My text is based on three types of empirical data: interviews 
with rank-and-file Bolotnaya Square protesters; interviews with 
focus groups, comprised of members of post-Bolotnaya Square local 
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groups; and, finally, participant observations of the work done by 
local activists. 
Semi-structured interviews with rank-and-file members of 
the Bolotnaya Square movement were conducted by the authors and 
their colleagues in the Public Sociology Laboratory (PS Lab) during 
2011–2013, as well as during elections to the Opposition 
Coordinating Council. The interview guide included questions about 
the chronology of events, motives for involvement in them, assessing 
the movement, and the political experience and views of informants 
and their social origins. Each interview lasted from fifteen minutes 
to an hour. I conducted and analyzed a total of 159 interviews. 
The second and third types of empirical data we collected 
were individual interviews and focus group discussions with 
activists in post-Bolotnaya Square local pressure groups, as well as 
embedded observations of their work. We studied seven such groups, 
six in Moscow, and one in Petersburg: Civic Association, 
Headquarters, People’s Council, Public Council, Social Observers, 
Citizens, and Civic Community. (All the names of the groups have 
been changed to protect them.) The guide for the in-depth 
biographical interview consisted of a biographical section, as well 
questions dealing with how the interviewees had become engaged in 
local activism, how they assessed the work of their groups, their 
practices and motives for involvement. Each interview lasted from 
one to three hours. The interviews with members of Civic 
Association, Headquarters, and Citizens were conducted in 2012–
2013; the interviews with members of the other four groups, in 2015. 
We were able to conduct follow-up interviews with certain activists 
from Civic Association and Headquarters in 2014–2015 to get a fix 
on how their motives, discourses, and practices had evolved. In 
general, we interviewed nearly all the most active members of Civic 
Association, Headquarters, and People’s Council, while Public 
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Council, Social Observers, Citizens, and Civic Community were 
surveyed only partially. We also conducted three focus group 
discussions with activists from Civic Association, Headquarters, and 
Citizens in 2014. The focus group discussions were meant to chart 
the evolution of the new local activism. Finally, we conducted 
several embedded observation sessions of activists from Civic 
Association, Headquarters, and People’s Council in action (holding 
general and informal meetings, interacting with voters during an 
election campaign). My analysis is thus based on 45 informants, 
sixteen of whom we interviewed on more than one occasion, as well 
as three focus group discussions and five participant observation 
sessions. The following diagram summarizes the data on which the 
conclusions in the text have been based. 
 
Finally I will use the PEPS (Protest Events, Photos, and 
Slogans) dataset kindly provided by Mischa Gabowitsch and his 
colleagues from the Bremen University. 
 
67 
 
Ukrainian case 
 
Within the collective research project of PS Lab we collected 
75 interviews with the participants of Euromaidan rallies and camps 
in Kiev, Kharkiv, Odessa, Lviv and 70 interviews with the 
participants of Antimaidan rallies, marches and camps in Kharkiv, 
Odessa, Sevastopol, Simferopol and Kerch’. Among bystanders of 
Euromaidan we interviewed 44 men and 35 women who were from 
17 to 53 years old. All interviews were collected in summer 2014. 
We chose those respondents who were not politically active before 
the protests. Usually we found the accounts in Facebook and 
Vkontakte that fitted our criteria of being a ‘newcomer’, or ‘first-
timer’. This criteria helps to grasp the effect of the event. 
We took semi-structured interviews that consisted of several 
blocks: biographical one; experience of participation in public 
sphere, activism and politics; political and ideological preferences; 
experience in Euromaidan / Antimaidan; opinions on the general 
situation in the country. As I focus on the problem of eventful 
collective identities and their development after and beyond the 
event I will mostly analyze the answers to the three blocks of 
questions. The first block of questions concerns eventful collective 
identities: “What were the most important things for you in 
Maidan?”, “What did you feel when you came to Maidan”, “Who 
are people who come to Maidan?” etc. The second block of questions 
concerns national identities: “Do you feel and consider yourself as 
Ukrainian?”, “What does it mean for you to be a Ukrainian?” etc. 
The third block of questions concerns social identities especially 
regional, linguistic and ethno-cultural ones: “Could you describe the 
sides that are present in the conflict in Donbas and in other Eastern 
and Southern areas?”, “Do you see any differences between people 
from different regions in Ukraine?”, “Do you see any difference 
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between Ukrainians and Russians and between Ukrainian and 
Russian societies?” 
Finally, I will refer to the interviews we took with pro-
separatist combatants in Donetsk and Luhansk in 2016-2017. 
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Chapter IV. The Russian case: “Bolotnaya”  
 
In the following two chapters, I will show how the eventful 
protest influenced the fundamental element of Russian culture, 
namely, a-politicism. In this chapter I will focus on the rallies against 
Putin and for fair elections. In the next chapter I will analyze how 
this protest impacted urban activism in Russia.   
 
Introduction: political or a-political?   
 
In the wake of the unexpected, strident protests of 2011–
2012, when hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets to 
protest the Putin regime and demand fair elections, the academic and 
public debate about whether Russian society was apolitical sparked 
up again with renewed fervor. Some sociologists argued Russians 
were passive conformists, worried only about personal prosperity, 
not the common good. Moreover, Russians, who were 
paternalistically minded, counted on achieving this prosperity with 
the state’s assistance rather than through their own efforts (Zharkov, 
2017; Gudkov, 2017; Gudkov, Dubin & Zorkaya, 2012; Rogov, 
2011). They were opposed by more critically minded and 
methodologically progressive researchers, who pointed to the 
diversity of disagreements, conflicts, and protests in Russia (see, 
e.g., Clément, Miryasov & Demidov, 2010). The latter approach is 
much more theoretically and methodologically congenial to me than 
the first, and yet I would be the first to admit that Russian society has 
largely been apolitical. At the same time, I do not equate a-politicism 
with passivity. A-politicism is a specific culture, meaning a set of 
habitual ways of understanding the immediate world and acting in it. 
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These ways generally lead to non-involvement, but they can, on the 
contrary, provoke specific forms of collective action. 
I argue that a-politicism should not be deemed a tautological 
umbrella term, denoting popular passivity, but a set of cultural and 
practical mechanisms that generally supports non-involvement in 
public politics, but might also encourage the emergence of certain 
types of collective action. I define a-politicism in Russia in terms of 
three basic elements. The first is a culture that opposes a-politicism, 
supposedly part of a normal life, to politics. In other words, the 
societal majority buys into the notion that politics is associated with 
violence, empty rhetoric, deceit, and corruption. It is something 
amoral, while private life, associated with honesty, sincerity, 
success, and dignity, is something good. Second, a-politicism 
represents the primacy of the private or, rather, familiar realm in 
people’s daily lives and careers. Whereas the culture of a-politicism 
consists of collectively shared and emotionally charged meanings, 
the primacy of the familiar realm means that a particular know-how 
is widespread in society. The dominance of private or, rather, 
familiar know-how in Russia has generated a public realm that is 
unfamiliar and underdeveloped, and sometimes even “frightening” 
(see, e.g., Prozorov, 2008). Third, a-politicism is based on certain 
regimes of visibility, i.e., on means of telling truth from falsehood, 
the authentic from the inauthentic. When communist ideas forfeited 
their legitimacy in late Soviet society, a specific regime of 
authenticity emerged. It consisted in the fact that, in contrast to the 
ideological narratives and clichés people heard on TV and 
mistrusted, things that spoke for themselves, so to speak, “self-
evident facts,” and personal experience came to possess more 
truthfulness. People in the Soviet Union contrasted the lies on 
television about the Soviet people’s increasing prosperity, 
supposedly due to the Party’s growing ranks, with the self-evidence 
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of poverty, decline, and boredom (Yurchak, 2005). It was this regime 
of truth that has remained a vital source of mistrust in politics and 
political discourse. Thus, a-politicism in Russia is a stigmatization 
of politics, the immersion of daily life in private experience, and the 
authenticity of facts confirmed by personal observation in contrast 
to ideological mumbo-jumbo. These elements have the force of an 
imperative, of an obligation. In other words, society says to its 
members: do not get mixed up in politics, which is dirty; do not step 
beyond the realm of the familiar; do not trust the ideologically 
freighted speeches you hear on TV. 
I will show that the event of “For fair elections” protest 
transformed this a-political condition. However, the eventful protest 
led to limited changes. The transformation was happening only at the 
local level. Yet, I do not say about ephemeral influence of the protest 
on protesters themselves and their subjectivities. I will show that the 
event has produced new stable form of collective action. It 
politicized local activism that has been a-political in Russia before 
2011. Indeed, local activism for the past ten years has been the most 
widespread form of collective action in Russia, but which has taken 
on a new shape and content only since 2012. I have decided to focus 
on local activists for two reasons. On the one hand, after the protest 
rallies of 2011–2012, Russian local activism converged with 
opposition politics, and we were thus able to observe politicization 
in action. On the other hand, local activism involves a liminal state 
between political protest and apolitical boosterism. 
This politicization was caused by transplantation of the 
eventful identities, solidarities and cultural meanings into the space 
of local activism. In what follows I will describe my vision of local 
activism as a political activity and depoliticization as a cultural 
phenomenon.   
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The dynamics of the events  
 
In December 2011, the wave of huge rallies, marches, and 
“Occupy” camps began to emerge in Russia. The protests were 
triggered by the fraud in the Duma election of December 4, 2011 – 
the fraud that was not greater or more cynical than the previous 
elections in the 2000s. There had been no strong opposition parties, 
either within or outside the Parliament, that would have prepared or 
organized the protest. But suddenly, after the Facebook and 
vlontakte.ru had been flooded by the reports of the fraud by the 
independent observers, and the ruling “United Russia” party showed 
historically low results even after the fraudulent boost, thousands of 
people - many of them youngsters participating in protest actions for 
the first time - flooded the streets, and on the Sunday to follow, about 
100000 people gathered for an authorized rally in the center of 
Moscow (with much smaller but relatively considerable rallies in 
other big cities). Protesters mainly opposed the authoritarian corrupt 
regime in power and wanted a political change (namely, Putin 
personally became a target of discursive attack, particularly after he 
had violently offended the participants of the demonstrations, 
comparing their insignia, white ribbons, with condoms, and accused 
them of  getting “cookies” from the West). But, as in the US and 
Western Europe, the movement quickly started showing its 
limitations, both in the breadth of protests (which were mostly 
concentrated in Moscow and, to a much lesser extent, St. 
Petersburg), and in the radicalism of agenda. The main slogans of 
the protesters included fair election (and the replay of the December 
vote) and the denunciation of corruption. Honesty and dignity were 
the main values involved. The objective statistics shows that the 
protesters, heterogeneous as they are, represented on the average a 
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richer and more educated strata of population that even the 
population of Moscow not speaking of other regions (Volkov 2012). 
Another form of protest were, in fact, the occupy actions in 
Moscow and Saint-Petersburg. Copied from the US OWS initiative, 
these actions created a sense of festivity and joy for a few days of 
their existence, until they were ultimately dissolved by the police. 
Activists ran regular assemblies that were supposed to coordinate the 
life of the “camps”, and the political demands (fair elections etc.) 
were restated, but no effort was made to coordinate assemblies in 
different cities or create a representative organ on their basis. The 
main political message of the Occupy, everywhere, was not a 
demand, actually, a fact of occupying the city and of being-together. 
During the autumn of 2012, new local activist groups were 
created in several districts of Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Nizhny 
Novgorod, while the people who pretended to be the political leaders 
of protests tried to institutionalize their leadership. On the one hand, 
the so-called “leaders of the opposition” (well-known politicians and 
journalists as well as bloggers and leaders of radical left-wing and 
right-wing groups which appeared as spokespersons of the 
movement) organized primaries to the “Steering Group of the 
Opposition” in order to legitimize their leadership and to organize 
the rallies and marches on behalf of the “For Fair Elections 
Movement”. On the other hand, a few rank and file participants 
united in local groups which devoted themselves to observing 
election procedures, solving local civic problems, discussing local 
political campaigns and participation in municipal elections. 
On the May 6 2012, police brutally dispersed the mass rally. 
Many rank-and-file protesters were accused of attacking the police 
and imprisoned. At the same time Putin won presidential elections. 
Finally, the movement faced severe internal crisis as it failed to 
propose a strong political program and agenda. People demobilized 
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while the state became more authoritarian. In 2014, Russia annexed 
Ukrainian Crimea. Russia’s regular army as well as voluntary 
military unites took part in the war in Ukraine. 
In what follows I will analyze the eventful protests for fair 
elections and the effects it had on Russian local activism.  
 
The trigger of the protest: moral investment and 
moral shock  
 
The Russian campaign “For fair elections” began as a 
reactive protests mobilized by a moral shock. People were outraged 
by the fact they were cheated by the authorities. In this sense, the 
elections themselves invoked the mobilization. Many political 
scientists who study post-electoral protests argue that electoral fraud 
can be an independent factor of a mobilization. Valerie Bunce and 
Sharon Wolchik claim that elections can cause mass mobilization 
that would not have occurred without such a trigger (Bunce and 
Wolchik 2010). In the analysis of the Russian protests Natalya 
Savelyeva and Margarita Zavadskaya argue that “rigged elections 
can be transformed into an independent protest agenda per se for two 
reasons. Firstly, the time of elections decreases the costs of 
participation - less repression, more international attention etc. 
Secondly, elections facilitate mobilization because of the 
simultaneous involvement of large number of people <…> In the 
case of Russian protests, a whole bunch of necessary mobilizing 
factors according to “color revolutions” literature (e.g. Tucker 2007) 
is absent, but elections become the trigger of protests <…> the fraud 
[itself], despite its “insignificance”, nonetheless creates an imagined 
community of robbed voters by providing mass nature of 
participation. Besides, the individualized nature of the voting act 
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makes the perception of fraud, regardless of their expectedness, “a 
moral shock” or perception of procedural unfairness and, therefore, 
not 'the stolen elections', but rather 'the stolen votes' become the 
protest trigger” (Savelieva and Zavadskaya, 2016: 226). Thus, 
sudden mobilization was a surprise for the very participants and 
produced the experience of rupture in daily life. 
However, one could surprise why electoral fraud caused 
moral shock in Russia? The elections of 2011 were not the first 
rigged elections in the country’s recent history, and the close 
attention paid to the vote count was the hobby, so to speak, of a 
narrow circle of opposition-minded observers. Many believed that 
what mattered most in elections was that they were generally fair and 
brought back a logical result. What changed in 2011? 
Following the argument of Natalia Savelieva, I assume that, 
thanks to an extensive media campaign, which focused the attention 
of ordinary people on the elections (and included, on the one hand, a 
discussion of potential vote rigging and, on the other, elaborated a 
voting strategy meant to harm the ruling party, United Russia), a 
large number of people attached great personal importance to them, 
although previously elections had been regarded as unimportant, not 
worth anyone’s time, a mere formality that had no impact on 
anything. Speaking in Thévenot’s terms, the cliché of the elections 
turned, in a matter of six months, into a common place, situating the 
post-electoral mobilization in the grammar of personal affinities to 
multiple common places. 
This was how one of our informants answered the question 
of why he decided to attend the protest rallies. 
Yes, I believe that [fair elections] are important, because whatever 
the elections are like, they should be fair. They should not forget we 
are not fools. People have eyes and brains. We understand 
everything quite well, and they should not take us for fools. I’m not 
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sure we can shunt aside Putin, because he is backed by major 
financial organizations. He’s the head of state, what can you say? 
But, in fact, we could at least show them that we are not stupid louts, 
that we see the violations, that we know they are deceiving us. Why 
are they doing this? So yes, I support fair elections. What matters is 
that elections are held. Let people have their say. That is what 
matters to me: the right to vote (Interview RU1). 
In this case, we see that the appeal to personal feelings and emotions 
is both subjectively significant and the most legitimate argument for 
the man’s involvement in the movement. Our informants told us they 
had been personally insulted by how the elections had been held. It 
was not a problem for the protesters that a vote for a party other than 
United Russia had not be tallied, but rather that each individual vote 
had not been counted, whatever party the person had voted for. 
One’s vote was not deemed a means of expressing one’s 
opinion or part of the machinery for maintaining the commonweal, 
but as a personal belonging. Our informants first morally invested in 
voting and, then, after encountering incontrovertible proof their 
votes had been stolen, as shown on YouTube, for example, they were 
outraged. 
Yeah, those videos showing violations [at polling stations]. Yeah, it’s 
quite important: those video also influenced me. [I watched] literally 
a dozen of them, but they had a big impact on me. [Question: In what 
sense?] Well, you see they’re deceiving you. And anger rises inside 
you: what the hell?! It’s like you want change, you believe [in the 
process] and go to vote, you spend time going to the election, you 
spend two hours or so on it, and before that you spend a bunch of 
time figuring out whom to vote for, although there is no one to choose 
from (Interview RU2). 
Chockablock with moral and personal utterances, such as “My vote 
was stolen!” and “Give me back my vote!”, the vocabulary of the 
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protesters pointed to the fact that votes were regarded as something 
personal and even material (see, Savelyeva and Zavadskaya, 2014). 
 
The eventful identity of the “Bolotnaya” movement 
 
The experience of eventfulness that influenced dramatically 
the dynamics of the “For fair elections” mobilization was produced 
not only by the moral shock but also by the feeling of unexpected 
togetherness and solidarity. Protest mobilizations, especially what 
della Porta calls “eventful protests” usually produce the feeling of 
solidarity. However, I would claim that in the Russian case this 
emotion was especially significant and constitutive for the dominant 
collective identity. The protests “For fair elections” was the first 
huge mass political protest after 1993 and therefore produced the 
effect of contrast between previous experience of private sphere and 
abrupt experience of collectivity in public (Zhuravlev, 2014). The 
very collective action was the end not just a mean of the 
mobilization. I would say that the Russian movement is similar to 
what Jeffrey Goldfarb calls “new new social movements”. The 
author suggests that the recent movements such as American Occupy 
and the Arab spring are characterized by a certain inversion of ends 
and means: “The coming together based on some shared concerns 
with different identities and even different goals has been a common 
feature of the movements in our most recent past. The demonstrators 
occupy a space and the way the do so, the way they interact with 
each other is an important end of the movement. The form of 
interaction as well as the identity and interest content, is central” 
(Goldfarb, 2012). Indeed, disruptive experience of unity, association 
and presence rather than articulation of specific demands or 
interests dominated the discourse of motives of the most of our 
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respondents:  
Q.: What do you like about this rally? 
A.: I like the fact there are lots of us, that we exist, that we are 
talking, that we have come to the rally (Interview RU3). 
Another respondent answer to our question:  
  Q.: How can you change the situation in the country? How can you 
make a difference?  
  A.: To come to the rally. Just to show that I’m more than nothing 
(Interview RU4). 
The very reality of many different people who united was the end of 
the movement:   
Q.: What do you like in these rallies? 
A.: I like that many people come. You know, yesterday there were 
even more people! (Interview RU5) 
Another respondent expresses the similar impression:  
Q.: What do you like and dislike in this rally?  
A.: I appreciate the fact that more and more people are coming. 
People became organized. Now they can express their opinions. 
What I don’t like is that … I would like if there would be more people 
in the streets. Many talk about this with each other but unfortunately 
they don’t come (Interview RU6). 
  The identity did not denote and express a take on civil rights 
and equality or a doctrine of the civic nation, but rather the eventful 
experience of “awakening civic consciousness,” to borrow the words 
used by our informants themselves. This experience was produced 
in the regime of exploration, which Thévenot connects with digital 
consumption, but which just as nicely captures the experience of 
sudden politicization in an apolitical society, an experience that 
consists in discovering a new world—the public sphere. As a 
common place in which protesters invested know-how and emotions, 
Bolotnaya Square was not produced in the course of repeated 
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practices by a select group, as in Thévenot’s textbook examples 
about the photos and songs of lovers and friends, but during an 
eventful public and, simultaneously, personal, intimate experience 
enjoyed by thousands of people. In other words, the experience of 
the event facilitated a common place in which thousands of people 
invested - not in the regime of familiarity, however, but in the regime 
of exploration, in the eventful regime of discovering and navigating 
the public sphere. The grammar of common places in the regime of 
exploration: this was what brought the protesters at the Bolotnaya 
Square rallies together. 
My findings are supported by the results of other research. 
Sociologist Alexander Bikbov argued about the Russian protest that 
“it was not an experience of negation [of those in power] but the 
experience of constituting the new commonality” (Bikbov, 2012a). 
Bikbov claimed that “in the space of the rallies people acted as if 
anything did not exist before them” (Bikbov, 2012b). The sociologist 
wrote that “when people came to the streets all the previous motives 
[which pushed people to come to the rallies] became insignificant” 
(Bikbov, 2012a). 
In what follows I will consider collective identities that were 
articulated in the protest. I will show that the dominant collective 
identity was an “eventful identity”, i. e., a collective identity that is 
produced within and by an experience of collective action and shared 
by participants and bystanders of a protest event. Such an identity is 
different from what is usually meant by the term as it presupposes 
presence rather than belonging. I will analyze the collective identity 
of the Russian protest movement exploring slogans as well as 
interviews.  
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Collective identity in slogans  
 
Slogans are important instrument of not only articulation but 
also production of collective identities in action. As Pierre Bourdieu 
argues “in politics, ‘to say is to do’, that is, it is to get people to 
believe that you can do what you say and, in particular, to get them 
to know and recognize the principles of de-vision of social world, 
the slogans, which produce their own verification by producing 
groups” (Bourdieu, 1991). As mentioned above, Russian protesters 
enjoyed the experience of mobilization that became an end of the 
movement and an instrument of its mobilization besides any concrete 
demands. As researchers have argued, various forms of individual 
and collective self-expression were an important practice within this 
experience (Gabowitsch, 2017). Different personal and collective 
identities were articulated within the rallies and marches “for fair 
elections” via slogans. In what follows I will present the results of a 
systematic analysis of all the slogans that are available in the 
database PEPS. Some slogans contained references to social 
positions and social groups on behalf which a protestor speaks 
(“honest citizens”, “hoodwinked investors”) or to which she appeals 
(“Russians”). Then, there are slogans that contain statements with 
reference to persons (“I”, “we”, impersonal). Which identities do the 
slogans represent?  
    David Snow describes three types of identities: social, personal 
and collective. Social identities are social roles; they are used to 
place people in the social space. Personal identities are “self-
designations and self-attributions regarded as personally 
distinctive”. Finally, collective identities “are constituted by a shared 
sense of ‘we-ness’ and ‘collective agency’” (Snow, 2001). 
Participants of the rallies for fair elections occupied various and 
different positions in social space. However, there are few slogans 
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that express social identities. The slogans that refer to social groups 
(“anthropologists”, “young families”, “hoodwinked investors”, 
“pensioners” etc.) or speak on behalf of movements and parties 
(“Communist Party is for fair elections!”, “Moscow University is for 
fair elections!”, “Autonomous action is for direct democracy” etc.) 
are rare. 
 I should note that usually social groups are represented as subjects 
of claims in the slogans that articulate the universal demand “for fair 
elections”: “Anthropologists are for fair elections!”, “Creative urban 
class? It’s about us!”, “Make way for the young, we are here!”, 
“Veterans of Chernobyl are for the people, Russia and constitution, 
AGAINST Medvedev, Putin and criminal power vertical!”. At the 
same time in the slogans that express social critique or social 
demands social groups are represented as not subjects but targets of 
demands: “Hands off Russian army”, “We demand increase of 
pensions not of the presidential term” etc. Thus in the slogans that 
contain the demand “for fair elections” collective “we-ness” is 
depersonalized as it does not express any specific demands. At the 
same time in the slogans that articulate specific social and political 
demands any collective “we-ness” is absent. The more frequent 
slogans are the slogans that articulate what I call “quasi-identities”. 
These slogans refer to fairy-tale and movies characters (Chuck 
Norris, Cheburashka, Father Frost etc.) or to state media discourse 
that stigmatizes protesters (“network hamsters”, “Bandar-logs” etc.). 
They aimed at normalization and justification of protest behavior 
through the assertion of evidence of truthfulness and legitimacy of 
protesters’ claims. For instance, well-known Russian musician Oleg 
Nesterov says in interview about his poster: “You see? Even 
Cheburashka is for fair elections not to speak about more serious 
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persons such as Crocodile!”3. 
When protesters refer to media stigmas, they either negate 
them (“We are not Bandar-logs”) or they use subversion to de-
stigmatize themselves (“Network hamster shrugged”, “Saluto from 
Bandar-logs”). In one of his speeches one of the leader of the protest 
Alexey Navalny said: “They call us little hamsters from social 
networks. Yes, I am a little network hamster! And I’ll gnaw through 
the throats of these cads”. Another type of collective identity can be 
termed a “negative identity”: “We are not an opposition, we are your 
employers!”, “We are not scum!”, “We are not a crowd!”, “We are 
not slaves!” etc.  Finally, to directly refer to the subject of the 
actionparticipants of the meetings used several vague categories 
such as “the nation,” “citizens,” “the country,” “Russia,” and 
“146%.”  At first glance, it seems that they refer to concrete groups, 
albeit broad, undefined ones, such as, for example, “residents of a 
single country.”  In addition, they have their own goal of not 
indicating a specific group, but asserting the community as such by 
using universal categories that include all members of society.  
Slogans such as “#ordinarypeople,” “Russia, get up!,” or “We are 
citizens of a free country!” do not articulate any new or previously 
created specific identities referring to existing groups, their interests, 
or demands.  On the contrary, this abstract identity refers to a 
situational unity of all protesters, having suddenly come together at 
the meeting and feeling solidarity. 
This identity that is the most widespread in the Russian 
rallies is produced by participants and bystanders who constitute 
together the imaged community of those who are involved in the 
unique and singular event of the uprising. Filling the space of slogans 
                                                          
3 https://www.svoboda.org/a/27267727.html 
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with expressions such as “Can you see us over there?  That’s us!,” 
and “We exist!,” the “For Fair Elections” movement represented 
itself by highlighting its own presence. The “we” of the protesters 
says nothing about their interests or goals, but it does announce 
ordinary people’s eventful experience of solidarity in public sphere. 
At the same time, the reference to national categories such as 
“Russia” or “the people” are not arbitrary. In a way, this identity is 
civic and national. The protesters claimed to represent the whole 
society, the whole country except of the minority of those in power 
-the “crooks and thieves”. Protesters claimed they represent not a 
minor group of the society or a conglomerate of such groups but the 
society as whole. 
Another dominant expressive form was the strategy of 
individual representation.  The refusal to identify different groups by 
their individual interests within the single whole of the protest meant 
that its basic element was necessarily the individual.  The universal 
and abstract “we” represented in the eventful identity indicates the 
insufficiency of collectivity, as much as that “we” can fall apart in a 
moment into its individual parts, not belonging to any concrete 
commonality. This is expressed in the frequent use of the possessive 
(“My voice was stolen,” etc.) and reflexive pronouns (“I want to 
choose the president myself,” etc.), appeals to personal wishes (“I 
don’t want 146%, I want the truth!”), feelings (“I am very angry!!” 
etc.), and personal experience (“I saw them stuff the ballot-box”).  In 
other words, the majority of the participants of the protests appealed 
using the first person, represented with their slogans not their group 
affiliation, but their individuality. Thus, the dominant collective 
identity of the protest is in a way self-referential: it does not serve as 
an instrument of expression of social content (that is, of the goals 
and interests of the sociopolitical subject of society) through the 
medium of a political form (i.e., a political association of citizens 
85 
 
along with the mechanisms of representation). Instead the content is 
subordinate to the form: people gathered together to express a feeling 
of community that is produced by this very mobilization and to 
demand the acknowledgment of the authentic nature of the event of 
mobilization itself. 
 
Demands and voting strategies 
 
 In what follows I will show that the avoidance of 
sociopolitical self-definition of the collective “we” was a conscious 
step, a particular strategy of the protesters who wanted to sustain the 
“situational” community constituted by the experience of the event. 
The central slogan of the protest was “for fair elections”. 
However, this slogan was rather a metaphor of systemic change than 
a specific claim. Indeed, the Russian protest movement was not a 
single-issue movement. It was the movement against the political 
regime. Although the protesters sometimes claimed that it was the 
strategic reason to focus on the demand of fair election and to 
eliminate other demands, we should not rely on their own words. In 
her brilliant work on local activism, Nina Eliasoph shows that 
although activists insisted they were engaged in collective action 
because they wanted to improve some specific conditions of their 
life, in fact they wanted to believe they could make a difference, 
because this belief was rooted in American political culture 
(Eliasoph, 1997). 
Although Russian protesters adopted the procedural 
discourse of the liberal leaders, they were not committed followers 
of the liberal political doctrine. Ilya Budraitskis claims that “in 
Russia the previously passive and depoliticized social groups that 
made up the diverse composition of the Moscow protests united 
86 
 
precisely around a demand for a return to purer procedures of 
representative democracy. A fundamental rejection of the current 
political choices was tied to the slogan of “fairness,” while the 
dubious tagline, “Democracy is a procedure,” became one of the 
most popular expressions among opposition leaders and journalists”. 
However, the slogans were so popular not because the participants 
of the rallies were proponents of representative democracy, the 
author argues. Alternatively, “people demanded a return of the very 
right to politics, but they refused to think about how that right might 
be realized meaningfully” (Budraitskis, 2014). Budraitskis thinks the 
Russian protest was aimed at a radical change in the political system. 
Elections were the main mechanism and symbol of this system. That 
is why it became the target of the protesters. The author argues: 
“The tradition established through years of managed democracy 
preferred a sequential relationship between the elections to the Duma 
and the presidential elections: the first always took place in 
December and preceded the second, which took place in March. The 
parliamentary elections <…> were a necessary step, revealing fully 
Parliament’s status as a mere simulation of politics. <…> at first the 
ruling party would win the repellent speculative fight, and then, 
already as a form of triumphant legitimization, the president would 
affirm his rightful power above even the political sphere, and above 
society as a whole. <…> United Russia, defined as the “party of 
power” <…> fulfilled an important function in that scheme. <…>  
However, the circumstance of these electoral procedures in Russia, 
which had to reinforce the political alienation of the absolute 
majority of the population from participation in politics, turned out 
to be the political school that enabled a significant portion of the 
voters to study the system’s weak points. In the summer of 2011, 
even before Putin’s run for a third presidential term was made public, 
the popular opposition figure Aleksei Navalny called in his blog for 
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people to vote for “any party at all other than United Russia” <…> 
From the start, the idea of voting against United Russia suggested 
that the main political challenge of the elections was to wreck the 
symbolic victory of the ruling party <…> Navalny only voiced what 
millions of people understood intuitively <…> In the end, the 
question of the future Duma served to focus the passive mass 
discontent that not only could find its political expression but also, 
outside the parameters of the electoral process, could become the 
general foundation for active protest” (ibid.)  
Indeed, despite its apparent concreteness, the demand for 
“fair elections” intuitively became understood by the protesters as a 
metaphor of an effectively working social system in which no one 
steals, lies, takes bribes, etc. For this reason, many protesters insisted 
that the problem of the elections needed to be addressed first, and 
that everything else would “take care of itself:” 
I think that the demand for fair elections in itself implies certain 
changes that will make life better not only for the hipsters, for 
example, but also for retired people, and so on. That is, global 
changes. It’s not so simple: “Let’s put whoever did it in jail. Once 
again, it is the system. That is, everything is interrelated and 
everything is connected (Interview RU7).                
What about other slogans and demands? My argument is that 
avoidance of any particular demands was the conscious strategy and, 
at the same time, ethics of protesters. In order to demonstrate this, I 
turn to the answers we received to one of our questions: “Do you 
think that the “Movement for Fair Elections” should include new 
demands?”, and to our analysis of voting strategies for the 
Coordinating Council of the opposition. The creation of the Council 
was proposed by the leaders and speakers of the movement who 
wanted to legitimize their leadership in the eyes both participant and 
outsiders of the movements. At the same time formation of the 
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Council allowed to organize “the first fair elections in the country”. 
The answers we received to the question about new demands 
led us to conclude that the protesters consciously did not want to 
include concrete demands into the movement’s agenda because of 
the fear of singling out specific collective identities within the 
movement  and fracturing the eventful “we” of all the protesters, 
which was considered a guarantee of solidarity and the durability of 
the movement.  Here is a typical example: 
Q.:  Do you think the movement for fair elections could possibly 
include any social demands? 
A.:  The movement “For Fair Elections” is good because it unites a 
lot of people.  And if it is changed in some way to include some social 
or political demands, anything other than fair elections, this would 
just divide people.  Some people would support some of the demands, 
some people are on the left, some are on the right, some are against 
private property, somebody wants something else, and so on.  It 
would just divide people, it would not be such a strong movement, 
and everything would die off  (Interview RU8). 
Furthermore, our respondents even refused to include in the 
general agenda social, economic, and political problems that 
appeared socially important and might demand solutions at the level 
of civil society and government. Together with Natalia Savelyeva 
and Maxim Alyukov we examined the logic behind this refusal by 
studying the voting strategies of the Coordinating Council of the 
opposition: 
I made notes every time after the debates.  I took note of people who 
were capable of talking about their ideas beautifully, coherently, of 
drawing a crowd, whose point of view…I agree with, and even those 
with whom I didn’t agree, for example the nationalists, but those who 
could unite the protest. …Probably, KS should organize the protest 
meetings and make people of different viewpoints not argue with 
89 
 
each other, and go out and do what had to be done (Interview RU9). 
Created from above by the speakers who wanted to preserve 
their status as “leaders” the Council reflected the ideological and 
political heterogeneity of the speakers’ community. This strategy 
aimed at preserving status quo in the self-proclaimed leadership 
rather than at representing the protest movement from below. A the 
same time, this approach corresponded with the mood of ordinary 
participants who wanted to preserve the “unity” they experienced 
during the mass rallies and marches. The participants believed that 
representation of every ideological camp and every political position 
allowed to preserve the unity (Zhuravlev, Savelieva, Alyukov, 
2014). According to the procedure, voters were to choose not one or 
several candidates from the list, but a certain number of candidates 
from four lists (general, leftist, liberal and nationalist “curies”). As a 
result, many ordinary participants voted not for candidates they 
liked, but for at least one candidate from every “curia” (often they 
voted for one leftist, one liberal, and one nationalist candidate). In a 
way, the Council was to represent not a variety of positions and 
groups but a certain meta-political principle, not all the participants 
of the protest movement but the movement as a whole. At the same 
time, as Natalia Savelyeva has shown, it was to represent both the 
participants’ differences and their unity. Any contradictions and 
differences between political positions or ideological preferences 
had to be represented and, simultaneously, overcome (Savelyeva, 
2013). 
The logic of representation of the “unity of different” did not 
presuppose that people who had different political preferences would 
reject them in favor of a “general line”. Leftist were not expected to 
become liberals while liberals did not need to become conservatives. 
The “condition of possibility” of collective action of these very 
different people was based on the belief that they were already 
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united, that they already had something in common - something that 
was evident for all but was not clarified (even if was symbolized by 
the label “For fair elections”). As Natalia Savelyeva argues in her 
article on the Coordinating Council, “the members of the council did 
not have a task to create something new for the movement, to 
articulate a political program of the protest. Alternatively, the only 
goal they had was to find out the goals that allegedly had already 
been evident for the participants” (ibid.). As one respondent said: 
I understand, that people who come to the rallies are different and 
that they will behave differently, and I’m tolerant. But I like that 
people are united by the common necessity to come to the streets for 
some reason (Interview RU10).   
The very experience of the eventful protest constituted this 
tacit knowledge of the common ground of the protest movement. The 
phrase “for some reason” in the quotation that expresses uncertainty 
of the movement’s agenda refers to the self-referential character of 
the eventful protest. Indeed, the desire to sustain and reproduce the 
collective action itself led to the rejection of any concrete demands 
which seemed to be superfluous. The participants perceived the 
movement as a unique moment:  
Q.: Do you think the movement could include more demands into its 
agenda?  
A.: This is a one-time action. This is not a continuous process. This 
is a situation that emerged in this moment. That is why now we need 
to solve this problem [of fair elections]. After that a normalized 
political process will start, and every political party will agitate 
(Interview RU11). 
Q.: Do you think the movement could include more demands into its 
agenda? 
A.: I think it should be limited by the one demand of fair elections. 
This is the amazing moment, when Udaltsov, and nationalists and 
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liberals are in agreement! (Interview RU12).  
 
The crisis of the movement 
 
The eventfulness of the protest “For fair elections” having 
facilitated mobilization of thousands of previously apolitical people, 
at the same time hindered articulation of a political agenda. As 
historian Ilya Budraitskis argues, “the movement’s slogan, “For fair 
elections,” was the right strategy, capable of activating the internal 
contradictions of the political system and of becoming a rallying 
point for a disintegrated society. This slogan not only did not suggest 
a unifying program for making radical changes, but as a strategy, it 
turned out to be limited to a specific political moment” (Budraitskis, 
2014). 
After the battle between protesters and police that took place 
on the 6th of May 2012 more than 10 ordinary activists were arrested 
and then imprisoned. The movement gradually demobilized. In the 
end of February 2015 Boris Nemtsov, one of the movement’s 
speaker was killed. The march in memory of Nemtsov mobilized 
about fifty thousand people. This demonstration was arranged before 
Nemtsov’s murder and was supposed to be a march against the war 
in Ukraine and “against the economic crisis”. Interestingly that 
although it was the first time the “leaders of the opposition” 
articulated an economic agenda, the causes of crisis were framed in 
terms of moral condemnation of Putin’s aggressive foreign politics 
and unrecognized by the Russian state military aggression in 
Ukraine. Annexation of the Crimea and the war were framed as the 
causes of sanction that in turn caused the crisis. In other words, 
although economic issues were articulated there were no public 
discussions and demands concerning neoliberal economic politics. 
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Instead, the previous frame of condemnation of the immoral and 
authoritarian President was now adjusted to the new issue. Ilya 
Budraitskis wrote that the march was the finale of the protest 
movement: “Now it is clear that the movement will not go away. It 
became the way of self-expression of the certain part of the society. 
At the same time, this is the deadlock of the movement that should 
be overcome in order to give the voice to those people who suffer 
from the war and the crisis but prefer to keep silence because do not 
know how to speak and act” (Burdraitskis, 2015). Collecting the 
interviews in 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015 we could see how the initial 
empowerment and inspiration gave place to a disillusionment:  
Q.: Did you plan to participate in the march before you found out 
what happened last night?  
  A.: Yes, I did.  
 Q.: Are you familiar with the demands?  
 A.: Maybe I read something what Navalny spoke about, however, I 
did not read what Nemtsov wrote. 
 Q.: Do you support any of these demands? 
A.: These demands? OK, I support that all these economic problems 
are caused by the war. I agree that it should be stopped. Maybe it 
was Nemtsov who argued that the main anti-crisis measure is to stop 
the war.  
Q.: Which demands do you suppose to be the most relevant now? In 
general?  
A.: I think it is now impossible. It is meaningless <…> I don’t believe 
something will change. It is absolutely clear (Interview RU13). 
    As political scientist Ilya Matveev noted about the Nemtsov 
march, “Most of the speeches were confused and contained clichés. 
The necessity to suggest a real political agenda, and articulated 
political positions was evident” (Matveev, 2015). Thus, the crisis of 
the movement and its demobilization were caused not only by the 
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state repressions but also by its specific self-referential character. 
Many respondents told us that the rallies were meaningless for them 
after 2013. As one of them claimed 
I […] began to understand the senselessness of what was happening 
in the form it was happening, that rallies were pointless (Interview 
RU14).  
 
Another respondent says:  
The wave of the protests declines <…> For me the rallies now are 
absolutely meaningless. And I think they are meaningless now for 
very many. And one can understand why. The demands that are 
proposed in the rallies are not fulfilled. Why to come there?! 
(Interview RU15).   
One of the respondents who attended the rallies criticizes them in 
2013:  
There are many who are against [the regime and Putin]. There are 
more than 100 thousands people who came to the rallies. But if you 
don’t explain why we come to streets, in favor of what, then people 
don’t want to come. They don’t’ want to come just for Navalny or 
Nemtsov. They don’t like them and I don’t like them. That is why 
political program, not just people, is what we need. But we don’t 
have it (Interview RU16). 
Another respondent who gave us the interview in 2015 told the 
typical story of how he had been changing the attitude toward the 
protests: 
[When the rallies started] those in power let say have seen us. 
Russian population got known about us as well. We have realized 
that our activity is popular. However, on the other hand, the 
subsequent rallies – and I came to them as well – they not only 
became marginalized… Not only less people came… There was the 
feeling that people came but didn’t believe it was possible to change 
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anything… They just dallied away time… 
Q. What do you mean when you say that the rallies became 
marginalized? 
A. I don’t know… Maybe there were too many people … Maybe we 
just did not understand why we came and what we wanted to achieve 
anymore... (Interview RU17).    
We see that the lack of a program and demands is the target 
of the critique of the protesters. However, the dominant collective 
identity being transplanted into other contexts became more concrete 
and more effective. 
Thus, I showed how the “Bolotnaya” movement produced 
the very vague collective identities that have been immanent to the 
collective action itself. These identities are characterized by the lack 
of ideological and political concreteness as well as by high level of 
inclusiveness. In a sense the dominant identity of the protest is self-
referential as it expresses not a belonging to a social group or 
common interest but rather the experience of togetherness itself. At 
the same time, this identity is based on the populist opposition 
between morally defined citizens and ethically stigmatized elites 
headed by the president Putin. 
In the next chapter I will show the evolution of the eventful 
identity within the local activist groups that were created by the 
rallies’ participants in their local areas. I analyze mechanisms and 
outcomes of this identity transplantation.  
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Chapter V. After the protest: from rallies to 
local movements  
 
In this chapter I will consider the post-protest local activism 
in Russia. I will show how the political subjectivities that had 
emerged during the rallies changed within the local activist groups. 
Considering this process of transformation, I will study the broader 
question of how the process of politicization invoked by the 
“Bolotnaya” movement spilled over to urban activism. Finally, I will 
show how the protest event of the anti-Putin rallies has transformed 
the culture of local activism in Russia by politicizing it.  
 
Pragmatics of local collective action 
 
The sociology of social movements has been more and more 
interested in local activism in recent years. Moreover, the discussion 
has centered on the question of evaluating the political weight of 
small activists in society as a whole. Is local activism capable of 
driving social change and democracy? Are small deeds politics and 
weekend campaigning merely ways of letting off steam that only 
aggravate the alienation of ordinary people from socially important 
decision-making? The issue of the a-politicism and politicization of 
local activism emerges against this background. 
In what sense is local activism apolitical? It contained the 
three basic elements I figured out defining a-politicism in Russia: 
stigmatization of the political, dominance of familiar over public, 
and the authenticity of facts confirmed by personal observation in 
contrast to ideological discourses. Indeed, when speaking of the 
apolitical politics of small deeds, sociologists have noted three of its 
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features: an ethic of “civic” rather than “political” action (Bennett et 
al., 2013); the physical proximity of the space in which activists 
operate (Eliasoph, 1996); and, finally, a specific idiom whose 
persuasiveness relies on “getting things done,” which is contrasted 
with, allegedly, hypocritical and mendacious ideological discourses 
as being more authentic, reliable, and sincere. 
In her study of activist groups, the American sociologist Nina 
Eliasoph discovered that activists would refuse to regard their 
actions as political even when, objectively, they directly affected the 
state and the public sphere. She dubbed the phenomenon “avoiding 
politics.” Volunteers worked in a space they labeled “close to home.” 
In their conversations with each other and presentation of their work 
to others, they evaluated it according to the tangibility of specific 
wins and small changes. Eliasoph writes, “In interviews, most 
volunteer group participants used the labels ‘close to home,’ ‘for the 
children,’ and ‘affects me personally’ interchangeably with ‘do-able’ 
and ‘not political’ (Eliasoph, 1997: 608). Eliasoph thus regards the 
spread and popularity of local activism in the US as a consequence—
and driver—of depoliticization. 
Other scholars have described local activism as an institution 
that, on the contrary, politicizes society. Indeed, are a distancing of 
oneself from big-time politics, concern for the local environment, 
and an ethic of concrete deeds always apolitical?  In a recent work 
dealing with US activist and volunteer groups, Elizabeth Bennet and 
her colleagues have echoed Eliasoph’s notion that the local activism 
of recent years has been motivated by “disavowing politics” (Bennett 
et al., 2013). The sociologists discovered that while engaged in local 
collective action—combating pollution, fighting to save the local 
heritage, unmasking corruption in local governments, etc.—the 
activists stubbornly refused to define their work as political. 
However, Bennett and her colleagues arrived at a more optimistic 
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conclusion than Eliasoph. Due to the stigmatization of politics, 
increasingly deemed a dirty, corrupt business, local activism had 
become an exemplar of a public realm not stained by politics. As the 
sociologists noted, “By making politics ‘bad,’ civics can be ‘good’” 
(Bennett et al., 2013: 523). 
Local activism is thus fundamentally ambivalent in terms of 
politics.  On the one hand, it is fundamentally apolitical, since it 
permits people to be content with small deeds while ignoring the 
large-scale political processes on which people’s lives depend. On 
the other hand, it functions as a hidden channel for politicizing the 
apolitical. 
Just as with the US politics of small deeds, we must note, 
however, that these selfsame elements of depoliticization in Russia 
have not only defined political apathy but have also triggered 
specific kinds of collective action. First of all, we have in mind the 
grassroots local activism prevalent in Russia in the 2000s. 
The stigmatization of politics spurred apolitical local activism 
in Russia during the 2000s and 2010s. This activism was marked by 
the emergence of a particular ethic of collective action that might 
called the principle of getting “real” things done. In contrast to dirty, 
deceitful politics, activists fashioned an ethic that affirmed the 
primacy of specific actions, producing outcomes beneficial to 
society at large.  A similar ethic of small deeds was typical of 
volunteers in Moscow and other fashionable social practices. During 
the late 2000s, it latently politicized the urban communities whose 
members would later constitute the Bolotnaya Square movement. 
The ethical focus on change that began with something small or with 
oneself was widespread among young civic activists (Zhelnina, 
2014). Gradually, the principle of small deeds was transformed from 
an ethic of local collective action into a quasi-ideology of civic 
action (Volpina, 2012). 
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During the 2000s and 2010s, the familiar realm was a source 
of local campaigns, centered on, for example, historical preservation 
and NIMBY battles. Sociologist Boris Gladarev has shown that 
Petersburg’s right to the city movement emerged from an 
“attachment to places close to home”. Petersburgers saw their city as 
something physically and emotionally familiar to them, and so the 
destruction of the historical built environment mobilized them to 
campaign, sometimes successfully, to preserve the so-called 
Northern Capital’s historic look. According to Laurent Thévenot, an 
“attachment to near and dear places” is not strictly individual. It can 
connect people and thus lead to collective manifestations. “Protests 
anchored in personal and familiar attachment to places—not only 
historical monuments but old trees or courtyards too—can 
nevertheless attain a large scope and level of commonality. Places or 
monuments are protected not only as historical relics but as common 
places which are invested personally and emotionally” (Thévenot, 
2014: 22). 
Finally, the regime of visibility, which endows personal know-
how and self-evident things with authenticity, in contrast to 
ideology, facilitated both oppositional and pro-Putinist politicization 
in the wake of 2011. For example, it led to the emergence of what 
my and Ilya Matveev have dubbed the “politics of authenticity.” 
Analyzing the success of opposition leader Alexei Navalny, Matveev 
writes, 
The displacement of [ideologies and] discursive politics likewise 
generated a demand for authenticity. […] Alexei Navalny’s 
popularity is largely based on the fact that all his statements are 
exposés featuring inevitable demonstrations of the alleged evidence: 
scanned copies of documents, video clips, etc. These pieces of 
evidence do not serve as proof as such as much as they generate an 
aura that makes the utterance universally valid.  […] Authenticity’s 
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“apolitical” aura provides confidence in it. […] [Navalny] divined it 
was the right time to toss aside labels and -isms, and speak only of 
“concrete” problems (Matveev, 2012).  
Thus, we have seen that a-politicism, understood as the 
stigmatization of politics, the primacy of the familiar realm, and the 
obviousness of alleged facts and personal know-how can both 
restrict and inspire collective action. A vivid example is local 
activism, both in Russia and other countries. And yet, Russian local 
activism has remained apolitical in the sense that it has failed to 
establish stable and socially reproducible patterns of politically 
meaningful collective action. It has not established its own political 
tradition. How could local activism become part of the political 
culture and the political tradition? My texts attempts to answer this 
question. 
We shall see that the new local activism has overcome isolation 
in the familiar sphere, destigmatized the political, and gone beyond 
self-evidence facts and personal know-how. In other words, unlike 
collective action prior to Bolotnaya Square, post-Bolotnaya Square 
activism has been an outcome (as well as a mechanism) for 
transforming the basic norms, rules, and practices of a-politicism; 
hence, we are able to speak of social change. It would be a mistake, 
however, to imagine that politicization in Russia involves a break 
with a-politicism, that it is implemented in the process of leaving 
private life behind and entering public life, of rejecting small deeds 
in favor of campaigning on behalf of a party or during an ideological 
conversion that strips individual facts and personal experience of 
authenticity, reducing them to particulars. On the contrary, 
politicization involves integrating the familiar and the public, small 
deeds and politics, self-evident facts and political arguments. As 
Carine Clément and Anna Zhelnina rightly argue, “[P]oliticization is 
not a move from the close and familiar environment towards 
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generalities, but the positioning of politics within the close world 
which has been practically and emotionally […] inhabited” (Clément 
and Zhelnina, forthcoming). In my analysis, I shall try and prove that 
the expansion of the realm of collective action to a more public 
sphere has relied on the know-how of the familiar sphere, that 
destigmatizing the political has required reliance on getting real 
things done as a means of legitimation, that the transition from the 
language of facts and personal experience to a language of more 
generalized political judgments has been impossible without 
particular techniques of persuasion and affirmation, based on a belief 
in facts and trust in immediate experience. 
In what follows I turn to the analysis of how the event 
influenced post-protest local activism. 
In his article on the Occupy Wall Street movement, 
anthropologist Jeffery Juris traces the evolution of collective action 
from “clusters of individuals” to “working groups” (Juris 2012). In 
his analysis of how mobilization, in the shape of gatherings of many 
people in a single place and time, gives way, as it wanes, to the 
creation of working groups who set themselves the task of tackling 
specific social and political problems, Juris briefly notes that these 
two forms are linked by continuity: activists establish local groups 
to continue the Occupy Wall Street movement amidst new 
conditions. Donatella della Porta in her analysis of “eventful 
protests” touches upon the similar dynamics focusing on its 
mechanisms. She shows how “protests create communities”. 
Following William Sewell, she argues that protest events even if are 
not “transformative” in Sewell’s sense can have some transformative 
micro-effects. “Looking at the “byproduct” of protest itself” della 
Porta explores how mobilization create an environment in which 
“organizational networks develop; frames are bridged; personal 
links foster reciprocal trust. In this sense, protest events—especially, 
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some of them—constitute processes during which collective 
experiences develop in the interactions of different individual and 
collective actors, that with different roles and aims take part in it”. 
The author argues that collective identities are one of the most 
important “byproducts” created by protests. These new contingent 
identities can then inspire new, post-protest social movements (della 
Porta, 2008: 30). We have observed the similar evolution of forms 
of protest and collective identities, at the basis of this transformation, 
of replicating the experience of being in the movement, in Russia in 
2011–2013, when after the large-scale rallies people who were 
involved in them organized local activist groups. 
Encouraged by their experience of the public events, some of 
the people involved in them, sensing that the protest rallies were 
becoming less and less meaningful, i.e., that they had achieved their 
goals (which had never been articulated), decided to organize 
neighborhood associations that, on the one hand, would enable them 
to realize their desire to engage in public work, and, on the other, 
render collective action more specific, tangible, and effective. 
However, as one might have expected, it was no accident that the 
activists turned to this type of work. First, thanks to their time as 
polling station observers, activists from the same neighborhood were 
able to meet each other and, in Moscow, independent candidates to 
the city’s municipal districts. They could have met each other before, 
after or during the 2012 presidential elections, or they might have 
been personally acquainted through the same internet community, 
such as an electronic mailing list. Our interviews have shown that in 
many cases networks of election observers were the basis for the 
emergence of local groups. 
This shift in mobilization from mass rallies to local groups is 
rather atypical in Russia. For example, both Carine Clément and 
Boris Gladarev, who have studied the protest movements that 
103 
 
functioned in Russia before the rallies for fair elections, point to the 
same trend: people organize themselves into movements when they 
encounter problems in their daily lives, problems they have a stake 
in solving (Clément et al. 2010; Gladarev 2011). For instance, using 
Laurent Thevenot’s theory Gladarev shows that “breakage” within 
“a regime of familiarity” in private realm invokes collective action. 
As Thevenot himself summarizes, Russian “protests anchored in 
personal and familiar attachment to places – not only historical 
monuments but old trees or courtyards too – can nevertheless attain 
a large scope and level of commonality. Places or monuments are 
protected not only as historical relics but as common-places which 
are invested personally and emotionally” (Thevenot, 2014). Unlike 
these protest groups, which spring into existence because of urgent 
local problems familiar to everyone involved, the pressure groups on 
which we focus were not mobilized by a specific issue requiring 
immediate collective action. Members of these groups decided to 
come together before choosing the issues on which they would work. 
As a female lawyer involved with Civic Association told us, “[A]s 
for the issue that arises before us, of what [issue] to take up, one can 
take up anything. Because there are an enormous number of tasks 
we face” (Interview RU15). On the one hand, the new local groups 
resemble the social movements studied by Clément and Gladarev, 
since their problems and agendas can be the same — preventing trees 
from being cut down in parks, stopping the demolition of old 
buildings, etc. On the other hand, the genesis of these groups is 
completely different: they were mobilized not by incursions by 
authorities into familiar spaces or by problems demanding 
immediate solutions, but by the desire to extend collective action as 
such, to continue the experience they had at protest rallies or during 
their work as elections observers. 
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How can we explain the reverse order in the process of 
politicization, from the general to the specific, as opposed to the 
more usual sequence, from the specific to the general? In my view, 
the answer lies in the role that the rallies and the experience of being 
elections observers have played in the lives of people involved in the 
movement. I assume that the rallies were an event that created the 
collective identity of those involved, who have attempted to extend 
the experience of protest activity after the mobilization waned. 
Why did protesters choose to continue their protest activities 
by taking up local problems and choosing a local scale of action? 
The fact is the new movements are connected with the rallies in terms 
of both continuity and contrast. Many members of new local pressure 
groups see activism in their neighborhoods not simply as a 
consequence of the Movement for Fair Elections, but as part of the 
movement and a means of continuing their activism until the next 
elections. 
We are just a small part of it all [i.e., the Movement for Fair 
Elections]. […] Until the next elections, [in] the off-season, [we 
have] to reposition ourselves as some kind of civic association, that 
is, to gradually solve problems in the neighborhood itself  (Interview 
RU18). 
In other words, the eventful identity that was shared by the 
temporary community of those who were involved in the unique 
event, was transmitted into the local groups. Moreover, as one could 
see, this collective identification was one of the mechanisms of the 
emergence of these groups. The new local groups have been sparked 
by the same emotions that triggered the wave of protests in 2011–
2012. Then, according, to Denis Volkov, the “unexpectedly large 
number of protesters and many new young faces at Chistye Prudy 
[in central Moscow] generated, according to interviews with 
participants, an enthusiastic atmosphere. This feeling stimulated 
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[people] to create new public associations, as well to get involved 
and change existing associations” (Volkov 2012). This enthusiasm 
was due primarily to a sense of unity with other protesters. Many 
activists from local groups stressed this continuity with the rallies 
and their working as elections observers, which had to do with the 
desire to extend the experience of solidarity and collective action as 
such. 
From the outset we thought about this and probably realized it 
wouldn’t end like this, that something would still connect us, because 
we had spent several days together, studying these books, and had 
closed ranks. So somehow right off the bat the thought didn’t even 
occur to us that we wouldn’t do something together (Interview 
RU19). 
The narrative of the informant refers to the abrupt experience of 
“being together during several days” that formed eventful collective 
identity that, in tern, inspired activists to sustain the moment and 
reproduce the community who share this identity. 
On the other hand, these same civic activists have spoken 
about their motivations for joining the groups in terms of “real 
deeds,” as opposed to the mass rallies, which were too much like 
politics and too remote from people’s specific needs, leading to no 
practical changes.  
I […] began to understand the senselessness of what was happening 
in the form it was happening, that rallies were pointless. If I had to 
choose between attending a dubious, unauthorized rally with no 
clear point, to taking to the streets with [leftist protest leader Sergei] 
Udaltsov’s red flags, and really trying to do something in my 
neighborhood, I would choose to try and do something in my 
neighborhood (Interview RU14). 
As I have argued the lack of concrete demands and political 
agenda led to the mood of disillusionment. Post-protest local 
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activism seemed to be a kind of collective action that allowed 
preserving the experience of eventful collective action and, at the 
same time, overcoming the political tautology of the rallies. Thus, 
the work done by activists in new local pressure groups embodies 
two aspirations. They want to see the direct results of their efforts 
while also extending the experience of community they had during 
mass demonstrations and while working as elections observers.  
 
Politicization of local activism  
 
In what follows I turn to the analysis of politicization of the 
post-protest local activism. I will show how familiar and public were 
integrated, how a-political ethic of “real things” was re-framed, and 
how what I termed the obviousness of facts became an instrument of 
political polemics.    
 
Integration familiar and public 
 
Although the post-protest local activism was rooted in the 
protest event it would be mistaken to think the neighborhoods 
themselves were mere projections of the new civic meanings and 
tactics. As they began their work as local activists, they identified 
themselves and what they did with Bolotnaya Square. However, as 
they became involved in local activism, the protesters rediscovered 
their own habitats, their own neighborhoods and towns. On the one 
hand, neighborhoods took on more specific shapes; their borders and 
geographies emerged. On the other hand, these were not geographies 
of familiar places, but geographies of issues in need of solutions and 
action. The agenda was broadened. Whereas before the 2011 
mobilization, local campaigns had orbited around particular issues, 
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they now dealt with the whole slate of issues plaguing an area. The 
work they did made the activists see the area as their own. 
I liked my neighborhood more [after taking up local activism]. When 
you do something for it, try and solve its problems, it becomes a 
living thing to you. Your attitude to it changes. So, when things 
happen, when trees are cut down, when paving tiles are laid down in 
parks where they should not be at all, it cuts you to the quick 
(Interview RU20). 
Acting according to a plan—canvassing neighborhoods to 
hand out newspapers, photograph violations of planning laws, etc.—
the activists re-appropriated them. More important, however, is the 
fact that the rediscovered neighborhoods are not just places or 
constellations of issues, but have come to be seen as civil society in 
miniature. The neighborhoods were seemingly repopulated with 
“citizens.” 
“We are going to try and find relevant projects in our neighborhood 
and engage as many people as we can in them in order to wake up 
civil society” (Interview RU21). 
In other words, activist saws their neighborhoods not only in 
terms of issues but also in terms of people, who had either become 
citizens or had the potential to become them. 
The people [in our neighborhood] are active, and there are not so 
few of them, something on the order of ten to twenty people, which 
is, indeed, a serious number. I saw that the residents of our 
neighborhood were also not some kind of rabble, but that there were 
many decent, caring people among them. This despite the fact that it 
is an average neighborhood where people who did not live there 
before move because it is cheaper for some of them (Interview 
RU22). 
It is important to note that this integration of civic and 
familiar was happening in the course of re-discovering local areas. 
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One of the informants told us about the campaign within which the 
activists managed to get a housing repair grant from the government. 
This campaign finally led to the creation of a housing cooperative in 
one of the houses. The house, therefore, became the space of civic 
action:  
“I understood, you know, this is a funny thing <…> local problems 
are … I just realized that the house and communal areas … it is not 
something alien, this is something common <…> And we can have 
an impact on it if we want and other people can have <…> And I 
realized that we should attract not only people from the protest 
movement but rather and mostly such chairmen of the housing 
committees because they know local problems and how to solve 
them” (Interview RU23). 
 The activist of another group wrote in his Facebook: 
Again and again, I listen to blah-blah-blah about strong men who 
are waiting for taking power <…> But the base of Russian life is not 
such men but women, middle-ranking civil servants, workers in 
housing bureaus, directors of schools etc. Women who solve various 
local problem and plant flowers in courtyards. Some of them support 
Putin but rather they support the Communist Party, some of them 
are a-political but still… (male, born in 1976). 
Thus, the integration of familiar and civic, or public, 
happened in the course of post-protest local activism dynamics. It 
occurred not because the familiar was abandoned for the sake of the 
public, but because local activists saw the civic in the familiar. They 
came to see the familiar as part of the commons generated by the 
protest movement. 
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Politics and Getting Real Things Done 
 
We have seen that a peculiar double transition, first from 
individual outrage over stolen votes to large-scale protests, and then 
from the latter to localized collective action, resulted in an 
integration of the familiar and the public. Continuing this line of my 
analysis, let me proceed to study yet another hybrid that fused 
apolitical small deeds, regarded in pre-Bolotnaya Square activism as 
part of familiar space, and the political, which was outside this space. 
I have written that pre-Bolotnaya Square local activism 
reproduced the prevailing cultural opposition between the political 
and the apolitical in the opposition between real things and politics. 
The ethic of many activist groups was based on this juxtaposition. 
Jefferey Alexander argues that high-profile political events 
cause a re-articulation of fundamental cultural codes (Alexander, 
2003). Indeed, the 2011–2012 wave of protests, despite its 
politicizing tendency (or, on the contrary, thanks to it), re-manifested 
the opposition between politics and a-politicism. For example, many 
activists in post-Bolotnaya Square groups emphasize the specific and 
productive tendency of getting real things done, as opposed to 
meaningless political rallies, when talking about their motives. 
 
I understood the meaninglessness of what was happening. The 
rallies were meaningless in the way they were held. They had to be 
conducted in a way that was meaningful. But when they are held 
merely for the sake of holding them. […] Later, I joined 
Headquarters and realized it was more productive. […] If I had to 
choose between attending a dubious unauthorized rally, a rally with 
no clear message and chockablock with [far left opposition leader 
Sergei] Udaltsov’s red flags, and trying to get something real done 
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in my own neighborhood, I would choose to try and get something 
done in my own neighborhood (Interview RU14). 
Elaborating and simultaneously criticizing Alexander’s 
approach, Eliasoph and Lichterman have called for a pragmatic way 
of analyzing cultural codes. The sociologists argue that in different 
circumstances and different communities people understand, 
articulate, and give meaning to the prevalent cultural oppositions in 
different ways (Eliasoph and Lichterman, 2003). My study has also 
shown that when new local groups are launched, politics and 
specifics can be combined and evaluated in different ways in the 
rhetoric of activists. 
First, the juxtaposition between politics and getting real 
things done could be normative. In this case, the opposition reflected 
the juxtaposition of two worlds. In one of them, activists could 
engage with specific issues for the benefit of others while keeping a 
distance from politics per se. In this rhetoric, the solving of specific 
problems was conceived as valuable in itself and an end in itself to 
be pursued. 
I have an active stance, but I try to do my activism reasonably. I want 
to arrive at an outcome, not—“all the world’s—” Damn. I’ve 
forgotten the lyrics of “The Internationale.” “We will destroy this 
world [of violence] / Down to the foundations, and then / We will 
build [our] new world.” I’m more interested in building than 
destroying. So, destructive and aggressive activists are not my cup 
of tea. I realize that when we destroy everything down to the 
foundations, it will be rough to build our own world on top of them. 
I would argue we have to build on the basis of what exists, gradually 
replacing the bad things” (Interview RU25).  
In his discourse, the political was associated with aggression, 
abstraction, showing off, destruction, propaganda, critique, 
ideology, and chatter, while getting real things done was bound up 
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with specificity, meaningfulness, goodness, usefulness, practicality, 
effectiveness, familiarity, mundaneness, peace, and realism. 
On the contrary, another discourse, based on the opposition 
between politics and specifics, endowed the political with a positive 
meaning. In this discourse, getting real things done generally 
functioned as a tactic that legitimized collective action, which 
inevitably had a political dimension.  
Maybe this business [a project for producing a brochure on the 
history of a Moscow district], by taking a step back from politics, 
will get people interested by getting them used to each other, and 
then, when the time comes, get them into politics again (Interview 
RU26). 
Echoing Alexis de Tocqueville’s words that voluntary 
associations were the schools of democracy, real things were 
imagined in this case as a kind of recipe for civically educating the 
residents of the district. 
Until the off-season, until the next elections, we need to reorient 
ourselves into a civic association, meaning gradually solving 
problems and scoring some political points. […] I would not say we 
have deliberately decided to move together in this direction and 
establish a political force, but rather a certain base of concerned 
people, a framework for developing civic society and pressure 
groups in P (Interview RU18). 
 In this discourse, getting real things done was associated 
with what interested people, got their attention, raised recognition, 
strengthened reputations, trained people to fight for their rights, and 
overcame apathy. In this neighborhood, local activism was 
juxtaposed with “pure” politics, which in this case were not regarded 
as excessively aggressive, ideologized, and propagandistic, but was 
imagined as insufficiently effective and not based on real experience 
with the populace. 
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Juxtaposing politics to real things in favor of either of the 
former or the latter, both types of discourse were superseded, during 
the evolution of the activist groups, by a new, third discourse that 
united politics and specifics in a single frame. To understand how 
this came about, we must not only turn to the communicative use of 
cultural codes, but to repetitive practices that alter the pragmatic 
context and, ultimately, the meaning of cultural oppositions. 
The activists perceive the opposition between politics and 
real things in various pragmatic contexts, endowing it with meaning 
and invoking it in the things they say. Unlike pre-Bolotnaya Square 
activists, the members of post-Bolotnaya Square local groups, on the 
one hand, have sought to reproduce the experience they went through 
at the political rallies on Bolotnaya Square; on the other hand, they 
have become involved in collective practices, including not only 
previous practices but also new practices or, at very least, practices 
rare among previous activists, i.e., involvement in municipal district 
elections, the publication of opposition newspapers and leaflets, and 
public discussions with local authorities. 
The political background of getting real things done reveals 
itself as the repertoire of local collective actions expands. One of the 
turning points in the evolution of the post-Bolotnaya Square activist 
groups was when they became involved in elections to municipal 
district councils, which are not legislative bodies, but are primarily 
charged with overseeing tiny budgets for improving local amenities. 
Reflection on involvement in municipal district council campaigns 
quite often revealed the tactical aspect of getting real things done. 
Yes, I’m more inclined to a political approach. […] First, there are 
lots of political activists, and second, they say the right things when 
they are involved in local affairs. It is due to these affairs that people 
are already quite familiar with [he names three activists]. They are 
getting their hands dirty dealing with playgrounds, gardens, and 
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bike paths, and people have seen them on TV and outside, when they 
talked with them. They have seen them at presentations and 
collecting signatures on petitions. People already know them, and so 
when there are elections of municipal district councilors, they might 
vote for them, despite all the obstacles (Interview RU27). 
As they have become involved in municipal district council 
election campaigns, the activists have, one way or another, had to 
deal with various issues and projects simultaneously. 
Q.: Why did you decide to focus on the neighborhood level? Am I 
right to think that initially your idea was to do something in your city 
district [whose representatives sit on the city council, which has both 
legislative powers and has access to the city’s budget]? 
A.: Because I ran for a seat on the municipal district council, and I 
imagined that dealing with local issues is also important and 
realistic, if you want to call it that. You cannot take on everything, 
but on the local level, everything is familiar and you live here. And 
it’s seemingly a way of getting ready for the next elections, learning 
about the problems of the whole city district, knowing what platform 
to run with during the next elections. That is why, probably. 
Q.: I see. And the newspaper? What role did you see for the 
newspaper? What mattered about it to you? 
Answer: Probably merely as a way of informing residents about 
what was happening, so they had a different source of information. 
Because all the newspapers in the district were pro-regime, and they 
promoted a single viewpoint. But we wanted to launch an opposition 
newspaper that would talk about other things the pro-regime 
newspapers hushed up (Interview RU28). 
By becoming involved in various campaigns and projects, 
members of the new groups do real things and take part in opposition 
politics at the same time. Gradually, inspired by the experience of 
eventful politicization at the Bolotnaya Square rallies, the practices 
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of collective action bring together or, rather, integrate politics and 
getting real things done into a single frame. The interviews, 
including the follow-up interviews and the focus group discussions 
we conducted in 2014, pinpointed the emergence of a new discourse 
in which real things and politics were two sides of the same coin. 
They were no longer opposed to each other, nor did they relate to 
each other as ends and means. They had fused. 
Whereas, getting real things done has been in more 
conventional local activism, in a certain sense, an autonomist, anti-
political doctrine, the post-protest groups nurtured a notion of the 
inevitable relationship between specific issues and politics at a later 
stage in their evolution. 
[Russians] have no clue that the number of trash cans at the bus stop 
to the subway and the number of benches next to your residential 
building’s entryway are political issues. It depends on who is in 
power and what he or she does when in power. Because when people 
in power don’t notice the needs of ordinary people, it has an impact 
all the same. A beer kiosk can open or an ice-cream kiosk can open. 
A library can open on the first floor of your building or a pharmacy 
can open. It largely depends on what happened on election day 
(Interview RU29). 
The evolution I analyzed, which saw the integration of 
politics and getting real things done, caused the category of the 
political to take on a new meaning. In later interviews, activists 
willingly talked about politics as something essential, vital, and 
beneficial, emphasizing, however, that they were talking about 
“good” politics rather than “bad” politics, about grassroots politics, 
say, as opposed to official politics. 
For example, an informant defined good politics—that is, 
democratic politics, focused on the needs of specific people—as the 
“ground floor” of the legislative branch, thus voicing a notion of 
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good politics as a peculiar compromise between politics per se and 
grassroots activism. 
Politics, even small-time politics, is a long-term project. […]  I saw 
this as a really good fit with the theory of how ordinary people are 
involved in politics. Here they are, the ordinary problems of 
ordinary people. Here it is, the lowest level where legislative 
decisions are made and where, theoretically, they can get their foot 
in the door as activists, into the place where problems are solved. 
This energy could be multiplied by the authorities vis-à-vis the 
populace (Interview RU29). 
Thus, the know-how inherited from Bolotnaya Square and 
the practice of various campaigns, including election campaigns, on 
the one hand, dragged getting real things done into politics, so to 
speak, and, on the other hand, grounded politics in specific issues. 
Politicization occurred not due to bypassing the theory of small 
deeds in favor of the so-called political struggle, but by integrating 
the former and the latter. The upshot was that the opposition between 
politics and specifics, which had been the foundation of the culture 
of a-politicism, has been transformed into an opposition between 
good politics and bad politics. This major social change—the 
transformation of political culture—has been an effective tool in the 
eventful politicization of local activism. 
Facts and Politicization 
 
We have seen how, by rooting politics in getting real things 
done, post-Bolotnaya Square activists have destigmatized it. Good 
grassroots politics has now gained a new legitimacy. In new activist 
groups, this legitimacy depends not only on getting real things done 
but also on allegedly self-evident facts. 
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Even as the Bolotnaya Square movement was underway, the 
apolitical idioms of facts and personal experience had become 
peculiar tools of political legitimation and agitation. In the discourse 
that shaped the collective anger over the alleged theft of votes, the 
appeal to evidence was mediated by the technique of presenting the 
facts, of demonstrating the act of eyewitness. The dissemination on 
YouTube of videos, allegedly containing evidence of vote rigging, 
whose purpose was to get people out to the protest rallies, is a 
paradigmatic example of politicizing factual evidence. 
Personal experience and facts combined at the protest rallies 
of 2011–2012 into a single regime of visibility. For example, the 
well-known slogan “I Saw the Ballot Stuffing!” refers, on one hand, 
to the irrefutability of the video evidence of vote rigging, while, on 
the other hand, it invokes the personal experience of outrage as, for 
example, in the famous slogan “I’m angry as hell!” Another instance 
in which references to facts merge with references to personal 
experience are presentations of the self, of one’s presence, in the 
public sphere, the self-depiction of one’s own grassroots activism as 
an irrefutable fact the regime must face. 
 
Q.: What did you expect from today’s rally? 
A.: I wanted them to see we were not fools and we were not sheep. I 
wanted them to see that there were not five of us, like they have been 
saying. Eighty thousand people show up, and they say there were 
five thousand people. And I wanted them to know that not everyone 
agrees with what they are doing now (Interview RU30)  
    The new local activist groups have turned this technique 
for politicizing evidence into a reproducible practice, into a reality 
test (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006), in which the self-evident facts 
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the activists have tested through their personal experiences expose 
the regime and support the stances taken by the activists. 
I should emphasize that, when speaking about reality tests, 
my focus is on the pragmatic aspect of politicizing evidence that 
relies on the material nature of real objects in the world. Mundane 
believability, by reinforcing a political stance, is therefore such an 
effective tool of politicization, because it lets us “touch” the 
truthfulness of the convictions acquired during the protests. 
How the politicization of evidence, of obviousness, has been 
turned into a sustainable practice for testing reality can be seen from 
one of our embedded observations. In late 2014, we observed Civic 
Association’s election campaign. We accompanied the activists on a 
“photo walk,” during which they recorded damage in their 
neighborhood’s infrastructure. They took snapshots of potholes in 
the streets, an abundance of garbage cans in places where they cannot 
be put by law, broken swings on playgrounds, etc. At the same time, 
they conversed with the local residents. This was how the activists 
got ready for the forthcoming municipal district council elections, in 
which members of their group were running as candidates.  
 
A., the group’s informal leader, yells at M., “You talk to the 
residents, only give them the right message.” I ask A. what the right 
message is. He stops, interrupting his discussion with I. about what 
to photograph and how to photograph it. He explains to me that “one 
shouldn’t buttonhole them right away,” although they “definitely 
have to invite people to the meeting” He says there is no need to 
promise people anything, since promises are “old-fashioned.” They 
have to get specific things done and show results. They do not need 
to make promises, but to talk about what they have already done. 
“People don’t believe in windbags and blowhards. You have to show 
them you got the bench put there yourself and sat the old woman in 
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it yourself.” And yet as A. says this, he has brought the process of 
photographing the area to a halt. I. says to him, “Fuehrer, that’s 
enough. You can give your political speeches later, but now we have 
to finish the job.” 
We see that the activist and his colleagues are employing 
seemingly apolitical language or, rather, a procedure for highlighting 
telltale facts by photographing the concrete problems in their 
neighborhood and the physical outcomes of real work—an old 
woman sitting on a bench. Indeed, the activist contrasts the image of 
the old woman seated on the sturdily assembled bench with 
“buttonholing” and political chatter. However, at the same time, real 
things function here as a political tactic meant to win people’s trust 
during the election campaign. Evidence and facts persuasively 
demonstrate the effective work of the local activists and the current 
administration’s inability to cope with its duties. In other words, this 
observation shows us how specifics, politics, self-evident facts, and 
campaigning combine. The activist group’s leader voices the 
doctrine of getting real things done, buttressing it with evidence, 
even as he delivers a short political speech that temporarily halts the 
routine job of photographing specific problems. Moreover, his 
speech is meant to explain a tactic that should convince and mobilize 
local residents to support the activist group at elections and not the 
ruling United Russia party. So the “fuehrer’s” comrade asks him to 
cut the “political speeches” and get back to the real work. 
The know-how of post-protest local activism has integrated 
the visibility of facts, personal experience, and political 
campaigning. What matters more, however, is that this know-know 
has established a reality test that legitimates or “justifies” (as 
Thévenot and Boltanski put it) politics per se, for in an apolitical 
society you have to make excuses for your civic activism. 
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Biographical Hybrids 
 
We have seen how the event of Bolotnaya Square has led to 
the politicization of local activism. In the wake of “For fair elections” 
protest, activism has produced new syntheses of specifics and 
politics, new combinations of the private and public realms, and new 
regimes of visibility. However, Bolotnaya Square has also entailed 
the emergence of hybrids of a completely differently kind: the 
combination in the lives of activists of elements of know-how which 
had existed independently of each other prior to the large-scale 
protests. On the one hand, people have met in the post-Bolotnaya 
Square local groups whose lives would hardly have intersected 
outside Bolotnaya Square. The sociologist Olivier Fillieule would 
have called them people with different “activist careers.” On the 
other hand, Bolotnaya Square contributed to the fact that previously 
incompatible things have been combined in the lives of the same 
people, for example, the value of personal self-realization, 
professionalism, and political activism. I shall consider both of these 
trends in more detail. 
The analysis of the biographical interviews with members of 
post-Bolotnaya Square local groups revealed four different activist 
careers, leading to involvement in the new local activism. This 
analysis was conducted within the Public Sociology Laboratory 
project under supervision of Svetlana Erpyleva who figured out four 
activist careers. Representatives of the first career type, whom I, 
following Svetlana Erpyleva (Erpyleva, forthcoming), call “doers,” 
have been activists since childhood, when they were involved in any 
non-contentious “commotion” at school and university,” where they 
acted as “ringleaders” and “social activists.” As adults, many of them 
found a beloved profession or occupation to pursue and had devoted 
all their time to it while trying to make a small income or, on the 
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contrary, sacrificing their main occupation to realize themselves in 
what they loved doing. They went into local activism after Bolotnaya 
Square primarily to do something concrete, thus remaining true to 
their active attitude. 
Representatives of the second type, whom Erpyleva calls 
“volunteers,” were also active at school and university. However, in 
later life, they decided to realize themselves in non-contentious 
social activism, mainly by working in charity organizations and 
foundations. After Bolotnaya Square, they joined the local groups 
not in order to criticize the political regime, but to help specific 
people in their neighborhoods. 
Representatives of the third type, whom Erpyleva has dubbed 
“oppositionists,” hail from politicized families, and discussed and 
followed political events in Russia from an early age. Uninterested 
in public activism at school, which they considered a chore and a 
formality, they maintained an interest in politics as they continued 
their socialization, and well before the Bolotnaya Square protests 
they were involved in the opposition’s battle with the regime. Thus, 
when the large-scale protests erupted, they had almost become 
professional political activists. They considered local neighborhood 
activism as an effective means of mobilizing “ordinary” people for 
the long-term battle with the regime. 
Finally, there are the representatives of the fourth type of 
activist career, whom Erpyleva has dubbed “oppositional thinkers.” 
They had a vigorous interest in politics and a critical attitude toward 
the powers that be in their lives prior to Bolotnaya Square, but it 
never led to any active opposition work. As an informant explained, 
“[Before] I just discussed [Russia’s] problems. My dissatisfaction 
grew, but there was never any impetus to act” (Interview RU31).          
During the Bolotnaya Square protests, fourth-type careerists 
sensed acutely that, after a long period of waiting, the time had 
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finally come for action. In pursuit of this action, they organized local 
groups or joined already-existing groups, often becoming leaders in 
the groups. 
Ordinarily, these four careers rarely intersect and shape 
different social institutions: apolitical professionalism; apolitical 
volunteer social organizations, focused on helping individuals but 
not on changing the ground rules; professional big-time politics, as 
reflected in the competition among political parties; and “kumbaya” 
oppositionism in the social networks. During the popular protests of 
2011–2012, representatives of these different careers came together 
in the same place, and later, thanks to the event of Bolotnaya Square, 
they wound up in the same local groups. People who had been active 
at school met up with people who had hated this activism as a chore. 
People who believed in charity made the acquaintance of people who 
had criticized it as pointless and as something that propped up the 
current system instead of combating it. People who had always tried 
to do specific, tangible, and effective things, albeit on a small scale, 
encountered people who had preferred to reflect on the world’s big 
problems. The intersection of these careers within the new local 
activism partly shaped its hybrid nature. 
Aside from bringing together activists whose paths had not 
previously crossed, the event of Bolotnaya Square also facilitated the 
fusion of various experiences and know-hows in the same careers. 
Thus, a focus on personal realization and a successful professional 
career has usually been contrasted with a focus on social and political 
activism, which presume that a person is forced to sacrifice career, 
family, and free time for the sake of their work. However, the lives 
of the individual members of the new local groups have shown that 
the idea of personal development and overcoming personal crises, 
and the notions of professionalism, hobby, and activism have 
combined in different proportions as post-Bolotnaya Square 
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activism has progressed in the lives of some its proponents. People 
who, on the eve of Bolotnaya Square, were going through personal 
crises and could not find their place in life discovered their calling in 
post-Bolotnaya Square activism. People who had devoted their lives 
to professionalism in a particular field and had been passionate about 
it for its own sake for many years at some point realized that local 
activism would help them become better professionals, and their 
professional skills make them better activists. Moreover, some of 
them went through a personal crisis because their beloved profession 
seemed pointless; local activism, on the contrary, endowed it with 
meaning by uniting it with higher ends. Thus, as they worked in the 
post-Bolotnaya local groups, some of our informants acquired their 
life’s calling. 
Good examples of such hybrids are Eli (Headquarters) and 
Mila (Civic Association). Eli was educated as a programmer, but for 
many years he had worked as a manager at an oil company, doing 
work he personally found uninteresting, but which paid well. After 
he was laid off, he discovered he had forfeited his programming 
skills and worked part-time as a gypsy cab driver. This moment in 
his life coincided with his vigorous involvement in the Bolotnaya 
Square protests, and subsequently he attended most opposition 
rallies and events. In 2012, after accidentally seeing a help wanted 
ad for Probok.net [“No Traffics Jams,” a crowdsourced internet-
based project, partly sponsored by the Moscow City Government, 
for solving the city’s extreme traffic problems], he got a job there, 
since as a cab driver he was upset with the city’s endless traffic jams. 
Becoming more and more enthusiastic about solving the city’s 
transportation problems, his political views moderated: he became 
convinced that cooperation with the authorities was necessary to 
solve specific problems. While taking part in Alexei Navalny’s 
mayoral election campaign in his neighborhood, he met 
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Headquarters activists and joined the group. At the same time, he 
gained admission to the Higher School of Urban Studies, having 
decided to engaged with the city’s problems professionally. We see 
that until he was actively involved in a local group’s routine work, 
his politicization and professionalization progressed in parallel, 
unconnected with each other. In some sense, they were at odds with 
each other. Because of Bolotnaya Square, his political views 
radicalized, while they became more moderate due to his job at 
Probok.net. Only his post-Bolotnaya Square activism brought 
together his social causes and his professional practice. Thus, for 
example, Eli became actively engaged in all group projects having 
to do with municipal improvements. A simple desire to combat 
traffic jams was transformed into the idea of professional self-
realization in urban studies, which has become inalienable from 
active involvement in the reconstruction of his own district. When 
he was asked why he was involved in the work of the local activist 
group, Eli explained, 
Because I live here, in this district, and I want it to improve. Besides, 
being involved in social activism, I have begun to understand how 
political power is construed and how the various social forces in the 
city interact, and this is something I need as an urbanist (Interview 
RU32). 
We see he does not simply employ his professional skills in activism. 
The activism itself makes him a better professional. 
Mila is another example of a biographical hybrid. She has 
chosen her profession in adolescence: she has tried to pass 
examination to enter journalist department of the Saint Petersburg 
State University twice, but failed. Finally, she entered library 
department in other college, but left it in a few years. When 
explaining this decision, Mila says that she cannot do the things she 
sees no meaning in. She found the job of a reporter at the local TV, 
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and then she worked in different local newspapers. At that time Mila 
became interested in covering local problems of the neighborhood. 
Then Mila gave birth to two kids, took a break in journalism, tried to 
organize the centre for kids in her neighborhood. Explaining this 
break, she referred not only to family situation, but also to feeling of 
senselessness her journalist work, which had no actual goal. 
However, the effort of kids’ centre organization was unsuccessful 
and she gradually came back to the freelance journalist work in local 
newspapers. During the time of the Bolotnaya, she followed all the 
events and defined herself as a supporter of the movement, but did 
not visit the rallies. Being the mother of little kids, Mila participated 
in the campaign against burning garbage dump and met there a few 
activists from “Civic Association”. A year after she helped to 
organize local debating club on the basis of the newspaper she 
worked in and met the leader of “Civic Association” again. It was 
the time when the group was preparing to the municipal elections 
and the leader of the group persuaded Mila to be among group 
candidates. After elections Mila started to do some journalist work 
for “Civic Association” and then became one of the group activists. 
She participated in all the group meetings and specialized in group 
press releases and the media coverage of group activity. In one year 
she started to help other activist groups to cover their work; she 
explained that as a journalist she knows how to attract media 
attention to a problem. The groups she helped paid her some small 
money, so she did not need to do other paid job. Mila also explained 
that activism gave her the sense and the meaning for professional 
activity and for the life in general:  
Activism is the most important thing in my life if not speak about 
family, children etc. Activism does only make sense. Why did I take 
a pause and stopped doing journalism? Because I realized I cannot 
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write a word if I don’t understand what is the goal behind it. 
(Interview RU33).  
At the time of the last interview, she saw her activist and 
professional mission in changing the situation in Russian journalism. 
Thus, Mila acquired purpose of life and became professional 
journalist in activism and professional activist in journalism. We can 
see how the idea of personal self-realization, professionalization, 
paid-job and political activist project merged in her biography. 
The event of Bolotnaya Square has thus led to the emergence 
in post-protest activism of new hybrid lives. On the one hand, people 
with careers that ordinarily take them in different directions suddenly 
find themselves together. On the other hand, different kinds of know-
how that ordinarily are at odds with each other suddenly become 
parts of a single whole. These hybrids contribute to the politicization 
of the new local activism, which has been negotiating the habitual 
opposition between the apolitical and the political. 
   Illustrated by one interview 
 
I have shown how being transplanted into local activism 
space the eventful identities, meanings and experiences politicized 
it. In order to demonstrate the effect in a more concrete way I will 
refer to the one interview with the leader of one of the groups. 
Analysis of this interview allows to grasp the dynamics of 
politicization of local collective action. 
Telling about the genesis of the activist group the informant 
himself articulates the continuity between eventful experience of the 
anti-Putin rallies and the group formation. He starts with the 
narration of the event that produced the new solidarities: “This set us 
in turmoil. It unified and solidated us, the parliamentary elections, 
when everybody came to the streets” (Interview RU18). Then he 
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recalls that he wanted to transform this association into an effective 
collectivity: “Starting communicate with other people I realized that 
we should not just gather but we should become a team. Since that 
moment I start searching for such a team and then I found [the 
group]” (Interview RU18). One can see that a motivation of 
localization of collective action lies not in the locality itself but in 
the aspiration to make collective action more efficient and effective. 
Then the respondent talks about re-appropriation of the locality in 
the course of practice of local activism: 
Gradually I began … I suppose that if I was not involved in the issue 
of the park, I would do other things today. I started seeing the town 
in a different way through these problems, I started feeling the town 
in a different way, I started understanding what’s happening. I had 
never noticed that there were some problems in P. (the name of the 
town – O. Zh.) (Interview RU18). 
In the following quotation the activist speaks about new 
understanding of the locality that becomes not just a place but a civic 
community: 
My task [as an activist] is twofold. On the one hand, I want to 
preserve my town. Previously [when the rallies happened] I was 
concerned about the problems of the state, I wasn’t interested in 
local problems. But now I see how bad the situation can be if we will 
not resist. So the first task is preservation. It can deals with anything: 
improvement of the area, separate collection of waste etc.  <…> On 
the other hand I want people’s mentality to be changed. And this is 
even more important. I want to inspire people. This is what Navalny 
has done and I want to continue. Because we [the local group] are 
the result of what he has done. And the second task is linked to the 
first task. The most important thing for us is to inspire people to 
unite, to do something, to act collectively. In this case we will 
preserve the town” (Interview RU18). 
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If in the cases of pre-protest local activism localities were familiar 
realms, they became public spheres within the new, post-protest 
local movements. 
Then he speaks that local problems and real deeds turned out 
to be interrelated with politics within the activist group:  
“It is needed to achieve the situation in which not one or two but fifty 
thousand dwellers would join the group <…> The same story was 
the struggle for the park. It began as the protection, but then civic 
consciousness emerged, then we all united and we won. If all citizens 
of P., i. e. ninety thousands people will join our group we will solve 
all the problems” (Interview RU18). 
Finally, he uses the metaphor of seeing to reflect on obviousness of 
problems to address: 
“Previously I did not note many things but … when you start acting, 
you see more and more: you see one problem, then another one … 
now I see everything” (Interview RU18). 
 
The Emergence of a Group Style 
 
I have seen how apolitical and political trends have mingled 
in the new local activism. However, we should note that the 
rapprochement between the apolitical and political was also present 
in earlier, pre-Bolotnaya Square local activism. But in this case, we 
are dealing with the emergence of relatively sustainable and 
reproducible styles of collective action, which were shaped through 
processes of integrating the apolitical and political, as analyzed 
above. In their work with American activist groups, Nina Eliasoph 
and Paul Lichterman analyze so-called group styles, i.e., sustainable 
collective notions of self and others, as they exist in the 
communications practices of group members (Eliasoph and 
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Lichterman, 2003; Lichterman and Eliasoph, 2014). In our case, we 
can likewise speak of a prevalent group style, that, on the one hand, 
typifies all the groups we studied and, on the other hand, 
distinguishes them from other, conventional activist groups. 
A group style is a set of notions shared by members of small 
groups, the group’s attitude to the outside world, the way the group’s 
members perceive themselves, and the discursive practices they use 
to discuss problems relevant to the group. 
“Group boundaries” put into practice a group’s assumptions about 
what the group’s relationship (imagined and real) to the wider world 
should be while in the group context. “Group bonds” put into 
practice a group’s assumptions about what members’ mutual 
responsibilities should be while in the group context. “Speech 
norms” put into practice a group’s assumptions about what 
appropriate speech is in the group context (Eliasoph and Lichterman, 
2003: 785).  
Eliasoph and Lichterman emphasize that the concept of a group style 
does not merely describe a set of notions and norms. It embraces the 
pragmatics of the collective intelligence and communication that 
enables us to see the practical aspect of the ideas and idioms shared 
by members. Can we say that post-Bolotnaya Square local activism 
evolved a new, specific style for all these groups? If it did, how could 
we characterize it? To answer the question, I will analyze three 
aspects of group style on the basis of my empirical findings. 
How do the activists imagine the border separating their groups from 
the outside world? On the one hand, this border is conceived, in the 
spirit of Bolotnaya Square, as a frontline between citizens and the 
authorities, as embodied by Putin and United Russia, and, on the 
other hand, in terms of a local activism that gives priority to 
neighborhood problems. The superimposition of these borders has 
given rise to a stable notion of themselves as active citizens of their 
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districts, fighting the authorities at the grassroots. In other words, 
how the local groups relate to the outside world is the product, on 
the one hand, of the localization of a civic “we are here” identity, 
construed as an antithesis to the Putin regime and, on the other hand, 
filling the space of the familiar with civic content. The localization 
of opposition activism has in no way elided the opposition between 
people and the authorities. On the contrary, by contrast with the 
abstract, moralistic notion of honest citizens battling the dishonest 
Putin, typical of Bolotnaya Square protesters, the image of the 
conflict between people and authorities has become much better-
defined and specific in local activism. Here is a telltale example from 
one of our participant observation sessions. In a small town in 
Moscow Region we observed how a group’s activists interacted with 
local residents during a campaign in which the group’s members 
were running for seats on the municipal district council. During a 
short interview after meeting with residents, a female activist 
explained to us that one objective of their campaign was to take as 
many seats as possible from incumbent United Russia councilors. 
Chatting earlier with residents involved in a campaign against the 
demolition of residential houses, she tried to persuade them not to 
vote for the councilors from the so-called party of power. She 
invoked the following arguments. If they voted for X. from United 
Russia, they would in fact not be voting for his political party, but 
for the construction company owned by the councilor, which had 
already demolished several residential buildings in the district. 
Therefore, they could continue their campaign against the 
destruction of the houses by becoming actively involved in the 
elections, by campaigning and voting against United Russia. Thus, 
the district’s specific problems and the obvious goals of the 
developers, which you could see with your own eyes by looking at 
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the demolished houses, concretized the idea of a political conflict, 
separating “us” from “them.” 
The import of the border separating local activist groups from 
the outside world has also become better-defined in a spatial sense. 
Analyzing French local activists and comparing them with US 
activists, Thévenot and Moody write, “[The typically French idea of 
local community is both 1) a resident people (‘habitants’) with 
shared customs, family connections to the region and land, and 
mutual ties to a patrimony which must be cultivated and preserved; 
and 2) the ‘collectivité locale,’ which is less an autonomous, self-
governing political entity than a piece of a much larger collective 
and national political unit, which is justified on civic terms” 
(Thévenot and Moody, 2012). The same can be said about our 
groups, in which collective action is conceived as both local and part 
of a broader opposition movement that covers the entire country. 
However, whereas Thévenot and Moody accent local collective 
identity, rooted in family ties, common traditions and norms, and so 
on, our activists do not have a local collective identity. 
Turning to the second element of the group style, as singled out 
by Eliasoph and Lichterman, namely, how activists see each other, 
we have to identify the image of the “grassroots neighborhood” that 
sets the new local associations apart. This hybrid perception of the 
neighborhood as, on the one hand, something whole in the sense of 
a set of specific problems and, on the other, a Russia-wide grassroots 
community “scattered across the neighborhoods” (as one informant 
put it) has made post-Bolotnaya Square local activism a unique 
phenomenon in Russia. At the same time, despite the attachment to 
familiar places and the image of a “neighborhood’s active citizens,” 
local Russian activists usually do not see each other as local 
residents. As Eliasoph writes of a US activist group, “To summarize 
the group style of ‘timid afﬁliation,’ [the] members understood 
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themselves as rooted, if ambivalent, members of the Airdale 
community, not as random individuals with gripes, or outraged 
outsiders. They needed to respect each other as local residents” 
(Lichterman and Eliasoph, 2003: 756). In my case, on the contrary, 
while identifying with the grassroots movement in general, local 
activists, with some exceptions, see no essential differences among 
residents of a given district or town and the residents of Moscow and 
St. Petersburg as a whole. “[Our task] is to make the life [of the 
neighborhood’s residents] and people generally and the city 
comfortable. Well, at least to improve one’s little corner so that . . . 
You see, the environment in Russia is so aggressive that no one here 
feels comfortable” (male, born 1964, Public Council). In this 
interview excerpt, we see that your own little corner differs from the 
city per se only in terms of scale. Another activist has similar 
memories. “At some point, I went into the courtyard of my building 
and decided that our city was so awful” (male, born 1974, People’s 
Council). In other words, when he went into his courtyard, he saw 
his city, not his neighborhood. 
Analyzing the third, communicative aspect of group style, 
Lichterman and Eliasoph see a link between the common idioms of 
groups and their motives. “[W]ithout these shared languages, 
communicating motives would be nearly impossible; without the 
communication […] forming motives would be nearly impossible” 
(Lichterman and Eliasoph, 2003: 742). My research has shown that 
local activists have elaborated a new vocabulary of motivations. The 
fusion of the ethic of getting real things done and oppositionism into 
a single political worldview occurred while designing a new 
language that constructed a system of notions distinguishing 
legitimate motives and aspirations from illegitimate ones. As the 
new local groups have evolved, the activists have come to a common 
understanding of the movement’s objectives. They have to engage in 
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politics while accomplishing real things. At the same time, they have 
to pursue real objectives that can facilitate political change, 
especially the battle against the Putin regime at the local level. The 
concept of a group style describes the idioms, notions, and intuitions 
shared by all members of a group. Showing how group styles work, 
Lichterman and Eliasoph give examples of how discursive practices 
that do not conform to group styles are excluded from the space of 
communication or are not supported by members of the group. 
Similarly, in this case, by conforming to an idiom or vocabulary of 
motivations based on a synthesis of real things and politics, activists 
have excluded real things without politics and politics without real 
things from their group’s discursive and practical commons. Thus, 
activists who wanted to be involved only in small deeds for their own 
sake gradually left the groups. At the same time, the discourse 
arguing that getting real things was valuable in itself has become 
illegitimate. During a focus group discussion, an informant recalled 
a comrade who had left the group. 
So, that was something that N. did, maybe for six months or a year, 
and then he left activism.  Now, for some reason, he and his brother 
can write such criticism in response to our critical posts. Recently, 
U., his brother, came back from the army, and he was interested in 
what we were up to. But they have this thing that they support the 
movement as a whole, but they don’t like certain things. For 
example, they don’t like the fact we write harsh things about United 
Russia. They say we had better get things done. I have always hated 
it when people say you should do more things, because that 
sentence—“Well, come on, do it!—applies to everyone. 
Q.: Do they only criticize you, or are they also involved in 
campaigns? 
A.: No, they are not involved. They follow us on the social networks. 
I recently posted a snapshot of a horrible park bench, writing that 
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the urbanists from the Zyuzino Municipal Council had shown their 
stuff. The bench was awful. U. decided to show us that we only 
criticize. He went there and buried the bench. He went there at night 
with a shovel and buried the bench; then he wrote about it on our 
group page and asked us to repost it. People wrote to U. that it was 
a really cool but fairly useless thing to do. [Laughter.] He thinks, 
What was the point of posting a picture? Something has to be done. 
We believe that if something bad like this happens, the municipal 
council has to deal with it (Interview RU31) 
In an interview, another female activist told us how she had 
wanted to take up the issues of rape and the neighborhood’s veterans, 
but her aspirations were not supported. She could not persuade other 
group members to join her, since her proposals seemed too remote 
from what the group was supposed to be doing. 
At the same time, excessive politicization—namely, 
discussions of ideological proclivities and differences—is an 
illegitimate discursive practice in local activist groups. 
The new group style, typical of post-Bolotnaya Square local 
activism, took shape due to the emergence of the local activist groups 
themselves from the spirit and experience of Bolotnaya Square. They 
have become a unique meeting point where the lives of different 
people have intersected, although the paths of people with such 
different careers and interests never cross. 
Thus, what all the new activist groups have in common is a 
unique group style, and this distinguishes them from conventional 
local activism. Members of the new groups see themselves and talk 
about themselves as “citizens of [their] neighborhoods” who do 
battle with specific people, groups, and companies, which are 
affiliated with United Russia and negatively impact the lives of local 
residents. These people are involved in opposition politics, but in the 
form of real things that can be done together, regardless of 
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ideological proclivities, but with the obligatory condition of 
opposition to Putin and his regime. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have developed the model of eventful social 
change at a micro level. This change was politicization of an a-
political activism that was not a break with a-politicism, but a 
rapprochement, the integration and interaction of the familiar and the 
public, the idioms of so-called facts and campaigning, of politics and 
getting real things done that produced the politicization, the social 
change that has proved vital to Russian society. The mechanism of 
politicization was the impact the protests and events of 2011 had on 
local activism. Put crudely, we can see the way local activism was 
shaped as follows. In the absence of institutions that supported and 
reproduced collective action, public discussions, and political 
representation, all things that could have facilitated the formation of 
political subjects, the “sudden” experience of unity and collective 
action itself produced new varieties of political subjectivity and 
societal relations. Consequently, these forms have been transplanted 
into adjacent societal spaces, thus provoking changes. In other 
words, post-Bolotnaya Square local activism is the sum of two parts: 
the experience of “For fair elections” protests and the practices and 
modes of a-political local activism. 
In my text, I have shown that the unity felt by different people 
as a result of their experience at the Bolotnaya Square protests, the 
sense of solidarity that guided the sudden collective action of 
thousands of people, later spread to the neighborhoods of Moscow 
and Petersburg. The neighborhoods gave birth to local activist 
groups that, although they resemble conventional local Russian 
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activism, are fundamentally different from them. The activists in 
these groups have established a stable, reproducible group style that 
combines the apolitical and the political—the realm of the familiar 
and the public sphere, the ethic of small deeds and oppositionism, a 
belief in self-evident facts and political campaigning, 
professionalism and politics as a vocation. 
This synthesis of the apolitical and political is the outcome 
of the politicization of local collective action, as revealed by a 
systematic comparison of the groups I have studied with pre-
Bolotnaya Square activism. I analyzed the mechanics of this social 
transformation, showing how the experience of the event and the 
inertia of the eventful collective experience, channeled to the scale 
of neighborhoods and taking root in the concrete practice of doing 
real things, has gradually altered political (or, rather, apolitical) 
culture. Politics has thus ceased to be conceived as something dirty 
and unwanted, while the image of the conflict with Putin and United 
Russia has become specific and defined. For example, in the course 
of their work, group members have seen the connections among 
party leaders, real estate developers, and government officials. 
My analysis enabled a rethinking of a number of 
methodological and theoretical questions: the relationship between 
culture and experience, meaning and practice, and small-scale and 
large-scale social action. I have also shown that, in the absence of a 
political subject, politicization can be based on social form. The 
game of small deeds, which involves a hidden political 
underpinning, the legitimacy of the internal and the familiar, which 
in reality maintains the legitimacy of public politics in general, and 
the involvement of facts and evidence in the game of political 
representation are what constitutes the politics of the new local 
activism. 
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Chapter VI. The Ukrainian case: Euromaidan  
 
Introduction: Civil war of civic nation?       
  
This section of my dissertation is dedicated to analysis of the 
way that the events of Euromaidan 4  changed the dynamics of 
national and regional identities in Ukraine, including the way that 
the evolution of these identities influenced the ongoing military 
conflict. By analyzing the dynamics of collective identities, I 
critically examine two opposing theses, which in many ways define 
the framework within which discussions about the current political 
situation in Ukraine occur. The first of the theses postulates the 
ongoing “civil war” that divides Ukraine while the second one 
postulates the existence of a “civic nation” as a result of Euromaidan 
and the ensuing “Russian aggression.” 
 These two polemical theses reflect a dichotomy of academic 
approaches to studying the Ukrainian conflict. One suggests framing 
this conflict as a direct consequence of internal (e.g. regional) 
differences and contradictions, supposedly existing at the 
foundations of modern Ukrainian society. The other explains this 
conflict in terms of the actions of elites; primarily of Russian elites, 
                                                          
4 I refer to “Euromaidan” as the entirety of the protests of the winter of 2013-2014. 
I use this definition in order to avoid confusion: some refer to the events of 2004 
as “Maidan.”  
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but Ukrainian and international ones as well. In other words, some 
suggest studying this conflict as if it were deeply rooted in Ukrainian 
society, often as a conflict of identities, while others see this conflict 
as a war brought into the society from within or above. The latter call 
for a rejection of the term “identity,” justifiably seeing within it the 
dangers of essentialism, which risks masking the changeability and 
multilayered nature of collective imaginaries. 
 It is important to note that, in a sharp and politically charged social 
discussion, theoretical, methodological, and political preferences are 
tightly entwined. As such, the language of “regional identities” and 
of the “cultural heterogeneity” of Ukrainian society today hints at 
“civil war.” Simultaneously, the attention given to the behaviors of 
elites conforms with seeing the Ukrainian conflict as artificial and 
forced onto Ukrainian society, by Russia above all. I suggest a third 
approach, which takes into account both the dynamics of social 
sentiments as well as the logics of the socio-political interests of the 
big players. In my opinion, the collective interests of the Ukrainian 
oligarchs and political elites, Putin’s government, Russian far-right 
politicians, and finally of American and European states and 
business elites played, and continue to play, an immensely important 
role in the evolution of the Ukrainian conflict. 
Additionally, it is erroneous to perceive the actions of these 
players as strictly rational and sequential, proceeding from one 
center of decision-making and happening on one level. Furthermore, 
the events that shook Ukraine would have been impossible without 
mass mobilizations, street violence, and the polarization of popular 
opinion; this is more important for the scope of my text. An analysis 
of grassroots participation--though, in this particular case, the very 
definition of grassroots participation becomes another hurdle--
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demands a careful study of collective identities, individual 
motivations, and political understandings. 
 Within the scope of the next two chapters I attempt to analyze the 
various trajectories of the collective understanding of oneself and of 
Ukrainian identity from emerging and declining socio-political 
groups, which influenced the dynamics of the ongoing conflict. In 
order to, on the one hand, escape an essentializing perspective that 
would assert a “dormant conflict between East and West” as an 
initial condition, and on the other hand, to attentively analyze the 
“internal” socio-political contradictions, I draw on theories of 
political subjectivity and qualitative methodologies of sociological 
research: political semiotics, discourse analysis, and a study of life 
histories. I intend to demonstrate the way that the dynamics of 
national and regional collective identities, wrought by Euromaidan 
and its ensuing events, influenced the Ukrainian conflict by both 
containing and aggravating it. 
    Televised Russian propaganda painted those that arrived from 
Western Ukraine as “neo-Nazis” who, having seized power, were 
getting ready to wage war on the “Russian-speaking East.” Against 
that background, one of the great claims of Euromaidan regarding 
the future was, on the contrary, the pathos of overcoming regional 
and linguistic “stereotypes” which had divided the country, which 
supposedly had now finally united itself due to this “dignified 
revolution,” for twenty-five years. 
This perception of “two Ukraines,” East and West, opposed 
to each other, Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking, striving 
towards Europe and gravitating towards Russia, ethno-nationalistic 
and Russian imperialist has, paradoxically, for a long time been both 
propagated and denied by the media and those in power. The 
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historian Andrei Portnov writes that official government discourse, 
called upon to uphold the monopoly of power of the elite over the 
country, pushed an agenda of “Ukrainization” fraught with 
xenophobia while guaranteeing the “Russian-speaking East” that its 
citizens would not be discriminated against (Portnov, 2010). 
Political scientist Lucan Way emphasizes the political 
instrumentalisation of this “conflict of identities” thusly:  
Ukraine’s surprising pluralism was rooted in underdeveloped ruling 
parties, a weak authoritarian state, and national divisions between 
eastern and western Ukraine. Overall, leaders had little capacity to 
keep allies in line, manipulate the electoral process, starve opponents 
of resources, and violently suppress opposition challenges...each of 
Ukraine’s four turnovers (1994, 2004, 2010, 2014) came about 
because the opposition was able to mobilize strong regional support-
-alternatively, Russophile and Ukrainophile--to overcome 
incumbent advantages (Way, 2015: 96). 
He asserts that “This division between western and eastern Ukraine 
was central to Ukrainian politics until 2014. While not immutable, 
the divide often dominated because it provided politicians with an 
easy way to mobilize supporters that leaders found difficult to 
ignore” (Way, 2015). 
Sociologist Peter Rodgers, on the other hand, demonstrates 
that the residents of various Ukrainian regions were forced to appeal, 
one way or another, to the language of regional differences. 
Simultaneously, however, the stereotypical linguistic, ethnic, and 
regional differences dividing society into two regions does not 
reflect the reality within which they live. Local, regional, and 
national collective identities were, and remain, uncertain and fluid 
(Rodgers, 2006). Analysing the results of focus groups comprised of 
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citizens from various regions of Ukraine, Rodgers asserts of the 
participants that, “[although] [they] expressed a clear understanding 
of the regional differences across Ukraine...regionalism in Ukraine 
is a far more complex phenomenon than a simple, dichotomous ‘west 
versus east’ divide”. He further writes that his conclusions evidence 
“the continued significance of the ‘regional’ factor across Ukrainian 
politics and society...however, the real impediments to unity in 
Ukraine may be related to where in the country one lives and how 
one is doing economically rather than who one is ethnically or what 
language one speaks...deeply-rooted regional or sub-regional 
cleavages such as multi-ethnicity, cultural, historical, or socio-
economic factors crosscut ethnic boundaries” (Rodgers, 2006: 171). 
What Rodgers says is that, on the one hand, the regional factor 
matters, regional cleavages do exist, and a belonging to a region 
influences political behavior and electoral preferences. On the other 
hand, the divisions that separate “Eastern” Ukraine from “Western” 
Ukraine, or a “Russian-speaking Ukraine” from a “Ukrainian-
speaking” one, are superficial and do not represent the complex 
social structure of regional, cultural, and political differences in 
Ukraine. 
 After 2004, the nationalist upsurge during the regime of Viktor 
Yushchenko (who continued the two-faceted politics of “to us and to 
you” described by Portnov) and the “pro-Russian response” of 
Victor Yanukovych (which, despite its gravitation towards Russia, 
catalyzed a discourse of national sovereignty and European choice) 
demonstrated the popularity of Ukrainian patriotism. It also 
exhibited the dangers of aggressive Ukrainization, which was 
perceived by many Ukrainians, especially those in the southeast 
regions, as a threat to their identity and economic independence. On 
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the whole, the rhetoric of “two Ukraines” did indeed contribute to 
heating up the regional conflict; but, at the same time, it dampened 
it, promoting the ideas of pluralism and compromise between the 
“East” and “West.” This pluralism was termed by Lucan Way 
“pluralism by default” (Way, 2015). 
It is in part because of this that the idea of unifying the 
country--a unification not in the form of an artificial compromise, 
but of genuine solidarity--despite stereotypical and artificial regional 
differences was, and indeed remains, so popular. The project of 
integrating the country became increasingly in demand during 
moments of revolutionary protest first in 2004, and then in 2013-
2014. The “Orange Revolution” became the first hope for an eventful 
birth of a unified nation belonging to the citizens; a civic nation. It 
showed that protests, the stakes of which were the unification of the 
country on the basis of national identity, were fraught with 
exclusionary nationalism and a new division of society according to 
regional boundaries. 
After the Orange Revolution of 2004, patriotic liberal 
academics hailed the project of “republican nationalism” and wrote 
about how a civic nation was born directly in the course of the 
liberating protests on Maidan Square from the feelings of unity 
experienced by the citizens. These same scholars warned against 
excessive optimism in regards to the unifying character of this 
nationalism, reminding that for many Ukrainians who lived in the 
southwest regions, the Maidan protests appeared to be a threat to 
their identity (Shekhovtsov, 2013). 
The formula of “revolution,” “civic nation,” and then 
“democracy” momentarily returned to public and academic 
discourse after Euromaidan, often in propagandistic and ideological 
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forms. Olga Bertelsen writes that “The Euromaidan fully awakened 
and united the majority of Ukrainian citizens...The revolution 
[promoted] democratic values, which accelerated the nation-
building process in Ukraine” (Bretelsen, 2017: 305). All told, the 
theory of the interrelationship between revolutionary protests, “the 
consolidation of national identity,” and social change became, and 
still remains, a common focal point for patriotic liberal intellectual 
discourse (Kulyk, 2016), while simultaneously being an object of 
reflection and criticism on the side of more perceptive scholars (c.f. 
Arel and Driscoll, 2016). For example, the Canadian political 
scientist Dominique Arel defined, back in 2005 and soon after the 
first Maidan, a milder and more realistic version of the 
aforementioned formula. He wrote that the greatest task facing 
Ukraine as a democratic nation was the spread of the political nation 
born of the Orange Revolution beyond the boundaries of the central 
and western regions that had been seized by this Revolution. In his 
opinion, a “revolution” alone was not enough to give rise to a civic 
society in Ukraine. A governmental politics oriented towards 
allowing the residents of the southwest regions to recognize 
themselves in the new national identity was necessary (Arel, 2005). 
I do not share this normative perspective regarding the organic 
interrelationship between revolutionary protest, national self-
awareness, and democracy; yet, at the same time, I suppose that 
uprisings do indeed give birth to new collective understandings, and 
consider it important to trace what happens to “event-driven” 
identities and the discourses that articular them during and after these 
events. 
The problem posed by Arel is an important one since eventful 
identities are, on the one hand, unique and exclusive (since they are 
inherent in a singular event, one bounded in space and time). On the 
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other hand, those that make use of those identities lay claim to 
nationwide representation and authorship over the form of the 
nation’s future. I will attempt to address the following questions:  
1. Which new identities, inherent to the experience of collective action, 
arose at the “moment” of the Euromaidan?  
2. How did people who found themselves at once inside and outside a 
collective experience of the event articulate, understand, and 
appropriate or reject these identities?  
3. How did these eventful identities and the discourses that articulate 
them migrate to contiguous social spaces, transform, and mix with 
former languages and meanings that remained from before the 
event? 
4. Which social and biographical circumstances influenced the motives 
of different individuals in joining the Maidan or Anti-Maidan and 
the separatist movement, and the formation of different versions of 
collective identities characteristic of these movements? 
5. Finally, how did the evolution of these identities affect the dynamics 
of the Ukrainian conflict? 
 The answers to these questions will allow us to explain why the 
initially inclusive civic identity that appeared at Euromaidan was 
able to both unite a significant portion of Ukrainian society 
(including that of the southwestern regions) under the banner of a 
protest movement while also “mutating” into an exclusive, 
sometimes even xenophobic, nationalist ideology. This nationalist 
ideology not only pushed a significant number of Ukrainians away 
from Maidan, but also contributed to their joining the Anti-Maidan 
or the separatist movement. 
In this chapter I will analyze the very event of Euromaidan. I 
will show how the uprising has forged the new eventful national 
identity that united the protesters. Critically studying the protesters’ 
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narratives and statements I will show the ambiguities and uncertainty 
of this identity.         
 
The dynamics of the events 
     
The Euromaidan movement began on the night of 21 
November 2013 with public protests in Maidan Nezalezhnosti 
("Independence Square") in Kiev, demanding closer European 
integration. The mobilization happened after the Ukrainian 
government suspended preparations for signing the Ukraine–
European Union Association Agreement with the European Union, 
to seek closer economic relations with Russia. Rallies in other cities, 
Kharkov, L’viv, Kherson, happened just after the mobilization in 
Kiev. Students represented the majority of the protesters. After the 
camp in Kiev was violently dispersed by the “Berkut” riot police. 
This event was the “moral shock” for thousands of the citizens. Mass 
protests that started just after the dispersal of protesters transformed 
the student protest for “European integration” into the nation-wide 
popular uprising against the state. Some structural circumstances as 
well as dynamics of contentious politics facilitated this 
transformation. Indeed, Ukrainian sociologist Volodymyr Ishchenko 
argues: 
“Support for Yanukovych at the end of 2013 was not strong and the 
polls projected that he would definitely lose to any opposition 
candidate in the presidential elections scheduled for February 2015 
except for the leader of the far right Svoboda party Oleh Tiahnybok. 
Center for Social and Labor Research systematic protest events data 
showed that the number of social-economic protests was on the rise 
in Ukraine <…> Yanukovich’s slogan about living improvement 
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already now combined with his ostensibly luxury lifestyle and 
corruption became a subject of widespread sarcastic comments by 
the population. Yanukovych had particularly weak support in the 
western and central regions, where the majority of people voted for 
his opponents in the 2004 and 2010 presidential elections” 
(Ishchenko, 2016: 6).  
From the very beginning, there were various motivations 
behind the protest. The majority of the protesters wanted to stop 
corruption and to increase the living standards. However, since all 
kinds of leftist ideology were unpopular due to the stigmatization of 
the Soviet past, liberal and nationalist frames turned out to be the 
most influential in the movement. However, it does not mean that 
social demands were the only driver of the mobilization while 
nationalism and pro-Western liberalism were just a “superstructure” 
as some leftist claimed during the protest. Indeed, some people were 
mobilized by the demand of “Europeanization” of Ukraine. 
However, many supporters of Euromaidan thought that an agreement 
about a free trade zone with the EU would harm the national 
economy. Others saw the protest through the lens of a struggle for a 
national independence from Russia. For them the president 
Yanukovych was the Russia’s protégé.  As Ishchenko puts it, 
“A free trade zone with the EU would probably lead to the de-
industrialisation of Ukraine unless it was combined with big 
investments from western corporations, who would obviously be 
interested in political security and control in return for their 
investments. All this would be combined with an economic shock 
for the majority of Ukrainians, especially for the highly urbanised 
and industrialised eastern regions. The Prime Minister, Mykola 
Azarov, justified the suspension by referring to concerns about the 
consequences in terms of austerity of the IMF credit requirements 
accompanying the one billion euro credit, which would not be 
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enough to cover the economic consequences of the losses in Russian 
market. At the same time, Russia was deliberately trying to prevent 
Ukraine from integrating with Europe by defending its economic, 
political and military interests, which could easily be perceived 
through the lens of Russia’s oppression of Ukrainians in the past. As 
a result, right from the very start, the Maidan protests were fuelled 
not only by European illusions and hopes for a fundamental 
improvement in the Ukrainian state, economy and society but also 
by anti-Russian nationalism” (ibid.: 6). 
The mass rally mobilized more than one million protesters in 
Kiev on 1 December of 2013. The protesters among which the 
nationalists played the important role started occupy the public 
administrations buildings. The politicians who represented the 
parliamentary opposition, including Piotr Poroshenko dissociated 
themselves from the protesters and claimed that hooligans not 
participants of Maidan occupied the buildings. The dispersal of the 
rally and fighting with the police provoked creation of the “self-
defense groups of Maidan” that consisted of both rank-and-file 
participants and far-right activists. On 16 January the deputies from 
the President’s Party of Regions and Communist Party of Ukraine 
passed a number of laws which criminalized protesters' methods 
employed during protests. The laws introduced 10-year jail terms for 
blockading government buildings; hefty fines and prison terms for 
protesters who wear face masks and helmets; and fines and prison 
terms for unauthorized installation of and provision of facilities or 
equipment for tents, stages or amplifiers in public places. The 
passage of the laws led to the escalation of the conflict between 
protesters and the police. The urban warfare was the culmination of 
the battles that started after the repressive laws were passed. More 
than 200 people from both protesters’ riot police’ sides died on 18 
and 19 February. Ishchenko writes about the violent character of 
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Maidan: 
“Maidan was definitely not the peaceful protest as it was for a long 
time described in the sympathetic western press. It escalated to levels 
of violence that are unprecedented in contemporary Ukrainian 
history. However, the major turning points in terms of the 
radicalisation of the protest were clearly responses to police violence 
and governmental repression. The brutal dispersal of the first Maidan 
camp turned the protest into rebellion together with occupations of 
governmental buildings. The package of laws passed on 16 January 
2014 by the pro-government majority that broke parliamentary 
procedures, but which did not impose a dictatorial regime as Maidan 
supporters claimed, nevertheless, systematically limited freedom of 
peaceful assembly and freedom of speech, thereby impeding future 
political activity by any opposition movement. It provoked the new 
phase of Maidan’s radicalization involving mass street violence in 
Kiev city’s center. The government side also systematically used 
paid thugs (so called titushki) to intimidate, abduct and beat the 
Maidan protesters. However, many cases of violence during the 
Maidan events are still unresolved. There is evidence that at least in 
some cases elements of the opposition might have strategically 
staged abductions previously ascribed to government agents” (ibid.: 
7).   
The violent events in February led to the president 
Yanukovych overthrow. On 21 February, President Yanukovych 
signed a compromise deal with opposition leaders. It promised 
constitutional changes to restore certain powers to Parliament. 
Despite the agreement, protesters demanded the President’s 
resignation. They occupied the parliament building, the president's 
administration quarters, the cabinet, and the Interior Ministry. On 21 
February, an impeachment bill was introduced in Parliament. 
President Yanukovych left for Kharkiv and then left the country. 
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Parliament assigned its speaker, Oleksandr Turchynov, as interim 
president on 23 February. The change of the regime provoked the 
extraordinary political and military activity both inside and outside 
Ukraine. “Yanukovych's authority had already been effectively 
dismantled in western regions in the evening of 18 February when 
protesters in many cities attacked law enforcement offices and 
military zones, capturing arms, some of which were used in Kiev in 
the following days. The Parliament’s decision to depose 
Yanukovych was definitely in breach of the Constitution. At the 
same time, the opposition leaders were obviously hesitant to take 
power and were trying to negotiate with Yanukovych, accepting the 
deal signed on 21 February with the support of European foreign 
ministers which would leave Yanukovych as president until 
December 2014. The protest crowd was more radical than the 
opposition leaders, demanding Yanukovych's immediate resignation 
<…> [the strategy of the opposition] does not reject the reality of the 
mass uprising which was only exploited by some forces interested in 
violent change of power” (Ishchenko, 2016: 9). The regime change 
and subsequent events threatened many in the East of the country 
because they feared the new government would repress Russian-
speaking population. As Dominique Arel and Jessie Driscoll argue:  
“By the time of the February 21 vote restoring the old constitution, 
however, Yanukovych’s political base in Russian-speaking regions 
was eroding.  Most MPs from the south left the party’s parliamentary 
faction en masse.  The MPs that remained loyal to Yanukovych until 
the end were mostly either from Crimea or from his Donetsk clan.  
His sudden escape had the effect of vaporizing his support outside of 
Donetsk, making possible his constitutional removal by the Rada the 
next day. The rump Party of Regions afterwards issued a statement 
denouncing Yanukovych for his “treason” and “criminal orders,” 
placing all responsibility for the debacle on him and his close 
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entourage. The new Rada majority quickly annulled a language law 
adopted two years earlier, a symbolic measure interpreted by many 
as imperiling the dominant use of Russian in the south-east” (Arel 
and Driscoll, 2016). 
The huge political and diplomatic conflicts between Ukraine, Russia, 
the U. S. and the EU were the results of these events. As Peter 
Rutland puts it,  
“International players (Russia, the EU, and the US) were heavily 
involved in the unfolding political conflict. Ironically, each accused 
the other of interference in Ukrainian affairs. The EU's Catherine 
Ashton and the US Assistant Secretary of State, Victoria Nuland, 
encouraged Yanukovych and the protesters to reach a compromise - 
while Russia was pushing Yanukovych to hold firm <…> The 
collapse of the 21 February agreement in the face of insurgent 
demonstrators and the flight of Yanukovych was seen by Moscow as 
the point of no return. They assumed the new government would sign 
the association agreement with the EU, apply to join NATO, and 
revoke the agreement granting Russia the use of the Sevastopol base. 
Putin responded with force and vigour – annexing Crimea and using 
surrogates to launch an insurrection in east and south Ukraine” 
(Rutland, 2015: 130). 
It would be wrong, however, to argue that the war in Donbass 
as well as the military conflicts in several Eastern regions were the 
results of only Russia’s interference in Ukraine. To the contrary, the 
mass protests emerged in many Ukrainian cities in response to 
Euromaidan and to regime change. As Ishchenko puts it, “Anti-
Maidan, which during the Maidan protests was mainly organized in 
a top-down manner by the Party of Regions to simulate mass support 
for Yanukovych and also to intimidate Maidan protesters, suddenly 
acquired a powerful grassroots dynamic in regions in south-eastern 
Ukraine in late February. It was indeed a mass movement involving 
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thousands of protesters. They usually demanded referenda to be held 
on the self-determination of Ukrainian regions, sometimes implying 
the federalization of Ukraine, sometimes implying breaking away 
from Ukraine and establishing independent states or joining Russia, 
following the Crimean scenario” (Ishchenko, 2016: 9). The 
proclamation of so-called Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s 
republics” was caused not by Russia’s interference but by the 
disintegration of the state in Donbass. Arel and Driscoll argue that 
the weakness of the state in the region together with grass-roots 
mobilization caused the military civil conflict while Russian 
invasion in August of 2014 transformed it into a conventional war:  
“A predominantly local insurgency faced no practical opposition 
from security organs in this region, after the long-standing regional 
political and economic elites lost their authority as a result of the 
collapse of the Donetsk-dominated Party of Regions at the country’s 
center. The disintegration of the regime in Kyïv paralyzed state 
institutions in the Donbas <…> The record suggests that the 
expectation of a Russian intervention in Eastern Ukraine in the wake 
of Crimea emboldened insurgents, but this expectation cannot 
explain why the state was much weaker in Donbas than elsewhere. 
This internal factor – reflected in the well-documented fact that most 
armed combatants challenging the Ukrainian state were, and are, 
territorial Ukrainian – makes the conflict a civil war. Russian 
military support, and eventually its full-fledged intervention, 
however, transformed it into an atypical and relatively rare type of 
civil war” (Arel and Driscoll, 2016). 
Ukrainian Historian Andrii Portnov retraces the events 
leading to de facto separation of many Donbass cities from Ukraine: 
“The most important date in the timeline of how Ukraine lost control 
over Donetsk and Luhansk is 6 April, 2014. On that day, several 
thousand protesters occupied the Donetsk regional administration 
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building, raising the Russian state flag above it. The local police 
force guarding the building offered little resistance <…> This was 
the second time the Donetsk regional government’s headquarters 
was occupied. In early March 2014, police had to remove supporters 
of an extraordinary session of the regional council after they 
occupied it for several days. But it wasn’t the repeat occupation that 
mattered. Rather, it was Kyiv’s refusal to retake the building by force 
that would have consequences. The spetsnaz unit sent to clear the 
building … refused to storm it” (Portnov, 2016). 
The subsequent events made Russia’s role in the conflict 
visible: “On 12 April 2014, the armed insurrection started, initiated 
in the town of Slavyansk in Donetsk province by an armed group 
under Igor Strelkov (Girkin), a former Russian security service 
officer and monarchist activist. He was followed by a number of 
other Russian volunteers often driven by a nationalist idea of the 
Russian world uniting all Russian-speaking populations around the 
Russian state, sometimes with monarchist (the resurrection of the 
Russian Empire) and far-right interpretations who, during the early 
stages, played leading roles in the emerging Donetsk and Luhansk 
“people’s republics” (Ishchenko, 2016: 10). 
By 16 April, the so-called “Anti-terror Operation” being 
conducted by the Ukrainian government in Donetsk Oblast had hit 
some stumbling blocks. The start of the Anti-terror Operation (ATO) 
was the crucial step in the development of the civil war in Ukraine. 
Arel and Driscoll argue that ATO was the trigger of the war: 
“Incapable of relying on local security forces, the interim Ukrainian 
government declared an “Anti-Terrorist Operation” (ATO) and sent 
in the army. Undeclared war had begun” (Arel and Driscoll, 2016). 
The authors argue:  
“The conflict, which other than Crimea had been limited thus far to 
the symbolic occupation of 
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government buildings, had entered the phase of open military 
confrontation, with fighters external to Donbas serving as vanguard. 
Within a day, Kyïv sent army units under the auspices of an “anti-
terrorist operation” (ATO). Initial encounters were humiliating for 
the Ukrainian side. Confused and unprepared conscripts were easily 
surrounded (by civilians), and many surrendered their weapons 
without a fight. The Donbas pro-Russian protesters expanded into 
armed groups, with significant help from across the border. 
Thousands of volunteers, many veterans of the Soviet/Russian army 
poured in from all parts of Russia, including Chechnya, to join the 
multitude of battalions that were forming in Donbas towns. The 
presence of so many territorial Russians on the evolving battlefield 
led to a widespread perception in Ukraine and the West that armed 
aggression by Russia was now under way in Donbas. The Russian 
government denied any military involvement. Pains were taken to 
ensure that whatever material arrived did so by indirect means. 
Ammunition was sent and volunteers were often recruited through 
military boards and tended to meet, at the Ukrainian border, in 
military facilities – but usually with many layers of plausible 
deniability. Lines of command and control leading to Moscow were 
difficult to establish. The important point is that the vast majority of 
the pro-Russian fighters remained territorial Ukrainians. While there 
is no doubt that intelligence operatives from Russia were active on 
the ground, there is no evidence that regular Russian troops were 
present, in stark contrast to what occurred in Crimea” (ibid.)    
One of the most important events facilitated the armed civil 
conflict in Ukraine was the violent clash between Euromaidan and 
Antimaidan activists on 2 of May in Odessa when 46 Antimaidan 
protesters and 2 Euromaidan activists were killed and over 200 
people were injured. Henry Hale and his co-authors accurately 
retrace the dynamics of the events:  
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“[Euromaidan and Antimaidan in Odessa] had tense relations and 
their activists had clashed before, though only on a small scale and 
without fatalities. According to the 2 May Group investigation, 
representatives of local authorities developed a covert plan together 
with the leaders of the two warring forces (“Antimaidan” and 
“Euromaidan”). The idea was that, after a scheduled pro-Ukrainian 
unity march including local Euromaidan activists and soccer fan 
“ultras” of the Odesa and Khar’kiv soccer teams, which were slated 
to play a game in Odesa on the evening of May 2, the ultras would 
demolish the Kulikovo Pole tents [where Antimaidan activists 
gathered] and no casualties would result. This alleged plan, however, 
was foiled when the leadership of the Kulikovo Pole split, and one 
group issued an appeal to Antimaidan activists to gather in 
downtown Odesa to prevent the march of “fascists.” Violent clashes 
between pro-Maidan and Antimaidan activists in downtown Odesa 
resulted in the first six deaths, all by firearm. The first two were pro-
Maidan activists, the remaining four Antimaidan ones. Pro-Maidan 
activists then marched to Kulikovo Pole, where some Antimaidan 
activists – up to 400 people – decided to barricade themselves inside 
the Trade Union building. Numerous videos show the two sides 
exchanging firearms fire and hurling Molotov cocktails at each 
other, and pro-Maidan protesters burning the tents of the Antimaidan 
camp. Inside the building, a deadly fire started in five separate 
places, according to subsequent investigations, with the main source 
being the barricade in front of the entrance to the building. The 
barricade caught fire as pro-Maidan forces attacked it with Molotov 
cocktails and threw other objects at it, such as a burning tire. Anti-
Maidan activists defending the entrance threw Molotov cocktails as 
well, and the fire grew rapidly because of the flammable wooden 
objects that had been used to construct the barricade as well as the 
combustible liquids that had been brought into the building by its 
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defenders. The front barricade blaze subsequently spread into the 
lobby and up the central staircase, with temperatures rising sharply 
and rapidly due to the chimney effect of the central stairwell, causing 
48 people inside to lose their lives from burns, smoke inhalation, and 
jumping out of the burning building (Hale et al., forthcoming).  
Different researchers have different opinions about whether 
the war would start without Russian invasion. Many believe that if 
Russian interference did not happen the war would not start (Wilson, 
2016). Others, for instance, Dominique Arel and Jessie Driscoll 
think that a partisan, not conventional war would start (Arel, 
Driscoll, 2016). Volodymyr Ishchenko supposes the war would 
happen even without Russia’s invasion: “there were economic and 
cultural grievances in Ukrainian government, disorientation and 
sometimes sabotage of the law-enforcement in those regions for 
almost two months that might have produced a separatist 
insurrection even without support from the Russian government. 
However, it would hardly be able to resist the Ukrainian army for 
such a long time without Russian support. At the same time, the 
Ukrainian government has received Western support in the form of 
non-lethal and lethal weapons from NATO countries, military 
training, and loans from international financial institutions” 
(Ishchenko, 2016: 11). 
I agree with Volodymyr Ishchenko in his general assessment 
of the overall results of the Euromaidan protests: “In sum, Maidan 
combined just social grievances against the corrupt Yanukovych rule 
together with European illusions and anti-Russian nationalism. 
Economic and historical factors determined a significant regional 
unevenness of support for Maidan. However, the protest violence 
and strong far right presence also precluded Maidan from becoming 
a truly fully national revolt against the government. It only made it 
easier to instrumentalise Maidan in the struggle between competing 
155 
 
blocks of Ukrainian political and business elites as well as in 
competition between EU, US and Russian economic and political 
interests” (Ishchenko, 2016: 8). 
In what follows I will turn to the micro analysis of the big 
event of Euromaidan and its consequences.  
 
The trigger of the protest: moral shock 
 
The Ukrainian protest movement was called “Euromaidan”. 
Indeed, the start of the movement was the protest against the 
government that suspended the Ukraine–European Union 
Association Agreement signing. One could see many European flags 
in the streets during the protests. However, does this mean that the 
protests were pro-European? The cliché that the movement was the 
manifestation of pro-European values and orientations of Ukrainians 
became the commonplace in the journalist and popular explanations 
of the causes of the mobilization. In order to understand if the 
movement was pro-European or not, we need to explore what exactly 
the protesters meant by manifestation of European symbols. In other 
words, we need to understand what was the representations of the 
participants of the protests about Europe and how these 
representations politicized in the course of the mobilization? 
“Ukraine is Europe”. This slogan was very popular in the 
beginning of the protests. Indeed those who were motivated by the 
“European choice” for Ukraine represented the big faction of 
protesters. However, Euromaidan was much wider in its motivations. 
Surveys of Euromaidan participants conducted by the Kyiv 
International Institute of Sociology in the moment of the protest 
showed that Association with European Union was not the main 
demand of the protesters:  
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“The motives of people to come to Maidan and to stay there <…> in 
the first place - the brutal repression against protesters (61%), also 
there is a second, a common motif - "desire to change a life in 
Ukraine "(51%, was - 36%), there are also still weighty reasons of 
protests against Viktor Yanukovych refusal to sign Association 
Agreement with the European Union (47%) and the desire to change 
the government in Ukraine (46%) <…> During Maidan there have 
been more clearly focused basic requirements that protesters believe 
to be the main: Viktor Yanukovych's resignation and early 
presidential re-elections (85%) and the release of arrested members 
of Maidan, end the repression (82%, increased for 20%) <…> the 
resignation of the government (68%) <…> dissolution of the 
parliament and calling for early parliamentary re-elections (59%), 
changing the Constitution to return to constitutional reform of 2004, 
which limited the government of the president (62.5%), the creation 
of criminal cases for all who was involved in corruption (62%), the 
Association Agreement with the European Union (49%), the release 
of Yulia Tymoshenko (30%)” (KIIS, 2014).   
 Olga Onuch and Gwendolyn Sasse in their analysis of the 
Euromaidan slogans show that “European motivation” decreased in 
the course of the protests: “According to interviewed protest 
participants, by the first weekend the central demands had shifted to 
‘a better way of life’ and even though ‘Ukraine is Europe’ remained 
a key slogan, the broader protest discourse already focused on the 
expansion of political liberties, rights, state accountability and socio-
economic security” (Onuch and Sasse, 2016: 12). 
Euromaidan supporters came to the street on 21 of November 
not only because they wanted a closer integration with Europe, but 
also because they felt anger and humiliation. They were outraged 
because they believed that the authorities who suspended signing the 
Ukraine–European Union Association Agreement neglected 
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opinions of many Ukrainians who were in favor of the “European 
choice”. In other words, the feeling that people were deceived by the 
government was as important as the change in foreign policy itself:  
If Yanukovych did not say that he signed the agreement, if he did not 
bring hope, I would maybe not … But then it was that our hope was 
betrayed (Interview UK1). 
We conceived it as a gratuitous slap in the face. Yanukovych showed 
he did not care about our opinion (Interview UK2). 
The second wave of mobilization was caused by the fact that 
the protesting students were violently dispersed by the “Berkut” riot 
police. This shocking event took both proponents and opponents of 
the agreement to the streets:  
From the very beginning I did not care about the idea of Maidan. I 
did not support Euro-integration. But I got into a rage when people 
came to express their opinions and were severely beaten <…> My 
position was: I’m her not for Europe, I’m here not for Russia, I’m 
here because I want people not to be slaves (Interview UK3). 
The dispersion of the protest camp was an extraordinary 
event that, one the one hand, was perceived as inadmissible and 
unbelievable occurrence, and, on the other, was an occurrence that 
showed true colors of the Yanukovych’s regime:    
People conceived this… how it is possible to beat people in the city 
center and then prosecute them? It was in contradiction with the 
society in which we believed we lived … because we want something 
better … It was the second phase [of the protest]. That time people 
struggled for a better life… (Interview UK1).  
It is important to say that by that time many people already 
felt indignant at the authorities. Many said in interviews that they 
never trusted any authorities but Yanukovych went beyond the pale 
as he and his cronies grabbed public and private money and assets, 
cut social spending, facilitated corruption etc. In this sense, the 
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dispersion of the protest camp proved the criminal nature of the 
regime.    
I believe that the main idea of Maidan was … It was not Europe. 
People struggled not for Europe … people would not die for such a 
goal … people struggled for freedom, for their rights, because they 
realized they did not want to live in such a society with that 
authorities anymore (Interview UK4). 
Thus, the disruption of the student camp changed the agenda 
of Euromaidan. After this event, the demand for a closer integration 
with Europe became a secondary one. 
At the same time, slogans and symbols related to Europe 
were continued to be visible. However, our qualitative analysis 
showed that those who strategically supported the demand of a closer 
political and economic integration with the European Union was the 
important and numerous part of the movement but was not a 
majority. Indeed, many respondents emphasized that although they 
came to the streets after the police dispersed the protest in favor of 
Euro-integration, they did not support the very demand of the 
integration with Europe: 
I think that the main idea of Maidan was… OK, it was not even the 
Europe. People fought not for the Europe they fought not to become 
citizens of the European Union. People would not die for it. People 
struggled for their freedom in general, for their rights, because they 
saw how those in power treated them (Interview UK4).  
Thus, if the first mobilization of the students for an 
integration with Europe expressed pro-European orientation of the 
students in protest, the crackdown on this rally was the trigger that 
made the protests not only pro-European but rather civic and anti-
authoritarian:  
In my opinion the main goal of Maidan was the resignation of 
Yanukovych. It was terrible how he treated people. The indignation 
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of people was huge. I cannot say that Maidan was for an integration 
with Europe. My personal opinion and this opinion is supported by 
what I heard from other people is that… OK, people said: we don’t 
care about an integration with Europe. Not everybody even 
understood what it meant. The students who came to rally for the 
Integration agreement were for Europe, the rest of the people came 
to the streets because it was intolerable to beat up the children 
(Interview UK5).  
Euromaidan that was the protest for an European integration 
became the protest against the state. What is interesting is that many 
protesters were against a closed integration with the EU due to 
economic and political reasons. However, for those who did not 
support the political demand of an integration with the European 
Union, Europe could still be a metaphor of a better life. As one of 
the respondents said:  
I just want to live in Ukraine. I want neither Russia nor Europe to 
control us. To be honest I don’t want to live in Europe, I just want to 
live in a free country with a freedom of speech like Europeans live 
(Interview UK6).  
For many our respondents Europe was the symbol and 
example of countries where living standards were high and human 
rights were not violated:  
There are two states of mind. The first is the soviet one. The second 
one is pro-European. When people speak about a pro-European 
state of mind, they usually mean that people want to become a part 
of the European Union. But in fact it means the respect for human 
rights for example, respect for the rights of minorities. This is what 
I call pro-European (Interview UK7). 
Our analysis is supported by quantitative research. As Onuch 
and Sasse argue in their quantitative analysis, “When protest 
participants were asked in interviews or focus groups what they 
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wanted from the state, or what they hoped the ‘democratic’ or 
‘European’ future had in store for them, the three different age 
groups of protesters described the following demands: the youngest 
group focused on the quality of higher education and better labour 
market prospects; the middle-aged group on socio-economic 
security, the liberalisation of EU– Ukraine travel and less corruption; 
and the oldest group on pensions and social redistribution. Thus, 
while the trigger that brought the majority of these diverse protesters 
out onto the streets was what they described as ‘the breaking of a 
social contract’ on 21 November and the ‘violation of basic civic and 
human rights’ on 29 and 30 November, the protesters joined the 
protests with a range of different claims motivating their behaviour. 
Neither the activists nor the political opposition were aware of the 
extent of the competing claims and grievances and thus, struggled to 
unite the demands under one umbrella” (Onuch and Sasse, 2016: 16). 
We can single out two different discourses that refer to 
images of Europe. The first one focuses on description of European 
citizens. The second one refers to Europe as a set of institutions, 
norms and rules. Europeans are represented as educated, moderate 
and those who respect the law:  
It is impossible in Europe that people drop litter in the streets. 
Unfortunately we have such habits, we sometimes behave like scum 
(Interview UK4).  
Young people in Europe try to get education. In our country there 
are few who want to be educated… (Interview UK8). 
Thus, contrary to the journalistic cliché the majority of the 
protesters did not identify themselves with Europe. They neither 
thought that Ukraine belonged to the “European civilization” nor 
they wanted Ukraine to become a part of the European Union.  
Rather, they believed that Europe had some level of civic, economic 
and political developments they wanted to achieve in Ukraine.  
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You should understand, when Ukrainians utter the word 
“European” they mean only one thing, it means free, equal, the rule 
of law (Interview UK4).  
What is important is that protester believed that Euromaidan awoke 
some moral virtues in Ukrainians rather than made Ukrainians closer 
to Europe in geopolitical terms:  
You know there is a kind of social responsibility, a kind of social 
consciousness in Europe where people do what is to be done not 
because a policeman forces them but because they know that they 
should do so. I see that this consciousness is awakening in Ukranians 
now and I have more of it now (Interview UK9).  
Protesters claimed there was only one feature that made 
Ukraine similar to Europe or that made Ukraine a European country 
in present. This was democracy they believed. When talking about 
democratic traditions in Ukraine the informants claimed Ukraine and 
Europe was the parts of the common historical trajectory:  
 
Just as the European Union we will not tolerate such paternalistic 
attitudes, we will not tolerate this monarchy … If we are democracy 
let’s be democratic (Interview UK10). 
Thus, the protesters did not share any kind of European 
identity even if many of them saw Europe as an desirable example 
of countries with high living standards and guaranteed human rights.  
European identity was not a one that united all the protesters. Instead, 
national identity was what constituted commonality of the protesters. 
During the movement’s evolution, it was becoming progressively 
nationalistic. As Onuch and Sasse argue, “On 19 January, Berkut 
attacked the protesters at night, and between 19 and 22 January at 
least three people died as a direct result of police action, and many 
more were injured. Process-tracing and participant observation by 
members of our research team, and interviews highlight that this 
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second wave of repressions changed the composition of protesters 
(but not necessarily the broader group of supporters): they now 
included a strong majority of young and middle-aged males, and 
rightwing groups gained a foothold” (Onuch and Sasse, 2016). At 
the same time, anti-Russian slogans were becoming progressively 
popular (KIIS, 2014). However, the nationalistic character of the 
uprising can be understood differently. The Russian propagandistic 
media have been claimed that far-right nationalists were the 
organizers of the protests and then came to power. I will show that, 
alternatively, Ukrainian nationalism that emerged in the course of 
Euromaidan was spontaneous and integrated into the nationalistic 
consensus many people who previously were not patriots. That is 
why I believe that eventful approach is the best instrument to grasp 
the new Ukrainian nationalism. On the other hand, Ukrainian official 
discourses depicted the image of civic and unified, politically 
responsible post-protest society. I will show that the belief that 
Euromaidan created truly civic and unifying nationalism was too 
optimistic. I will demonstrate how new inclusive eventful 
nationalism became more exclusive and even xenophobic due to its 
absorption by the old pre-Maidan nationalistic discourses and 
stereotypes.  
 
    The Eventful Identity of Euromaidan 
 
Academic and public intellectuals on the side of Euromaidan, 
criticizing the depiction of right-nationalist protest in the Russian 
and international press, asserted that Maidan formed an inclusive 
civic nation, uniting people of different political views and those 
who had no political leanings. Andreas Umland et al write, 
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“The resistance in Kyiv includes representatives from all political 
camps as well as non-ideological person who may have problems 
locating themselves politically…[They] constitute a broad 
movement...The situation in which Ukraine’s nation still finds itself 
and the enormous complications of everyday life in such a 
transitional society gave birth to...destructive...opinions, behaviors 
and discourses. Support for fundamentalism, ethnocentrism and 
ultra-nationalism may sometimes have more to do with the 
permanent confusion and daily anxieties of the people living under 
such conditions than with deeper beliefs”5. 
Many researchers have been insisting that Euromaidan was 
not an exclusively nationalistic movement. At least, ethno-
nationalistic. As Onuch and Sasse argue, “most analyses of the 
Maidan to date have looked at these final phases of the protests and 
focused on the Svoboda party and what scholars have called ‘neo-
Nazi’ organisations and a ‘nationalist right’ preoccupied with ethno-
linguistic-nationalist claims. What they have missed, however, is the 
remaining diversity among the protesters and the continuing 
diffusion of protest (including into the spalni reiony, the suburbs of 
Kyiv) throughout this phase in the protest cycle” (Onuch and Sasse, 
2016: 22).  
  Apologist researchers described this national as free from 
any “ideological” content and, for this reason, as having nothing in 
common with xenophobia. As Bertelsen argues, 
The revolution bonded the citizens of Ukraine on the basis of civic 
unity...The Euromaidan fundamentally restructured Ukrainian 
                                                          
5  https://www.change.org/p/to-journalists-commentators-and-analysts-writing-
on-the-ukrainian-protest-movement-euromaidan-kyiv-s-euromaidan-is-a-
liberationist-and-not-extremist-mass-action-of-civic-disobedience 
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political life, promoted patriotic feeling and sharpened civic 
consciousness among the majority of Ukraine’s citizens…[however] 
in Ukraine it would be a daunting task to seek support for nationalist 
slogans (Bertelsen, 2017, 12). 
An empirical analysis of the dynamics of the identities that 
arose during Euromaidan will allow us to decide whether an 
apolitical nature, the absence of deep convictions, and situational 
emotions were the conditions of the formation of a politically stable 
“civic nation” that united Ukraine. 
 An analysis of the narrative dedicated to experience of Euromaidan 
shows that, for the most part, they articulate a “sudden” national 
identity that was formed not before, but during the protest. For 
instance, 
I never thought--I was never a patriot, I never thought...about 
Ukraine the way I think about it now. I didn’t value it in the same 
way. ...We are influenced ...events of one kind or another that are 
happening. At some particular moment, I simply began to [madly] 
love my homeland….I truly don’t know, which moment was the 
breaking point. I understand that it probably happened in the blink 
of an eye (Interview UK11). 
Our interviews emphasize the uniqueness not only of the particular 
moment of the event, but also its location, where a new solidarity is 
formed: 
The people really were like one big family--they helped and trusted 
one another. In general, an unlikely sympathy of spirit, one that 
could only be felt by going there, otherwise, it’s hard to even 
imagine...It was like I was at home. At Maidan, everything was as if 
I were at home, because someone was always worrying about me--
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that was probably the most surprising thing, and the one I liked best 
(Interview UK5). 
 In narratives focusing on individual and collective experience of the 
event, an inclusive identity is articulated, whose political meaning 
lies in the overcoming of stereotypical divisions that have divided 
Ukrainians from different regions previously. One such narrative 
follows: 
This happened definitely during Maidan. Because, after 2004, when 
it seems that Donestsk and Luhansk were one part of Ukraine, and 
Lvov and the Carpathians, another...I think I, for some reason, met 
more people during Maidan from Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and 
Luhansk, than from Lvov. That’s the extent to which Ukraine really 
united itself. If, before, we were truly divided...now we are united, 
we are one people (Interview UK12). 
In this last citation we can see the way that the daily experience of 
meeting and co-presence with other protesters from different regions 
of Ukraine “converted” into a political understanding of national 
unity than exists above regional divisions. The mechanism of this 
conversion is, on the one hand, the temporality of this event 
(“something already happened”) and, on the other hand, the political 
gamble of the Ukrainian uprising--a claim to national representation. 
 In fact, the temporality of “already,” formed by the collective 
experience of a speaker and the generic specificities of narrative, is 
an effective instrument for the fabrication of historical “facts.” As 
Robin Wagner-Pacifici notes in her analysis of the events of 
September 11 and their role in the Congressional Committee’s 
report, which was written in the style of historical narrative, “...to 
argue that in making the statement ‘This is history’ the report is 
making a performative speech act means that the statement has the 
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illocutionary intent and perlocutionary effect of declaring the event 
to be history. In other words, if successful as a performative, the 
event is finished, and September 11 is in the past” (Wagner-Pacifici, 
2010). In fact, this effect can be created not only through a 
performative, but also through a constative, speech act (for more on 
speech acts, c.f. Austin, 1999) that depicts a historically completed 
and politically stable state of affairs, pointing to a historical fact this 
is completed and over with: 
Q: In your opinion, what was the most important thing at Maidan? 
A: Unity. The unity of all people, from all regions. Before, for 
example, in the East, I’d say, ‘you’re, well, not bandits, do whatever 
you want, stay there, in the center, having stuffed yourself,’ and so 
on. This united everyone. There were no more Kharkivians. There 
were Ukrainians and Ukrainians (Interview UK13). 
 Narratives about participation in Euromaidan reference collective 
identity outside ideology and political preference. This specificity of 
identity reflects, on the one hand, the post-Soviet culture of 
depoliticization (c.F. Eliasoph, 1997, Zhuravlev, 2017), 
characterized by ideological indifference (c.f. Kashirskih, 2012), and 
on the other hand, the temporal structure of the event, which assumed 
the primacy of lived experience over political and ideological 
classifications. According to one participant, 
[My] worldview changed drastically [at Maidan]. Some call this a 
citizens’ position, some patriotism, some nationalism. Everyone 
interprets it differently...Some think, that if I love Ukraine, I am a 
nationalist. I don’t know. Maybe I am a patriot, maybe this is some 
kind of citizens’ position. But the fact that I love Ukraine--that’s 
clear (Interview UK11). 
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The Politics of Authenticity 
 
 In the opinions of the most diverse contemporary sociologists, 
depoliticization and the primacy of rich experience over political 
goal-setting is hardly a characteristic only of post-Soviet societies; it 
is a characteristic of modern capitalism on the whole. It is not 
coincidence that German research Gerhard Schulze calls the modern 
capitalism formation “a society of experiences” (Schulze, 1995)6, or 
that Laurent Thevenot links the eventful regime of exploration with 
the industry of consumption and entertainment (Thevenot, 2015). 
Additionally, the post-Soviet culture of political apathy adds to the 
“society of experiences” a fundamental distrust of “politics” and 
“ideology,” as well as a cult of authenticity and trustworthiness, 
which declares ideological discourses mendacious, while “facts” that 
speak for themselves are truthful (Matveev, 2012). It is important to 
note that in contrast to journalists reasoning about “post-truth 
politics” (c.f., for example, Pomerantsev, 2015), who oppose “facts” 
to “emotions,” the politics of authenticity, on the contrary, opposes 
the reliability of “facts” and personal experiences to the discourse of 
                                                          
6 The Russian cultureal researcher Vitaly Kurennoy cleverly describes the Russian 
protests of 2011-2013 in the spirit of Schulze’s theories: “we can ‘bring forth’ a 
relatively simple example of the manifestation of a community of experience, 
linked to the newest protest movements in Russia. Participation in these events is 
extremely emotionally colored. The internet was full of emotional descriptions of 
participation in these acts: how well the people there passed the time, how they 
experienced new, unexpected emotions, related to sincerity, honesty, dignity. That 
is, the language used to describe these events is purely emotional. But attempting 
to put these emotions into some kind of objectified, political, group categories 
meets with huge difficulties. From this I can conclude that those people, who are 
new to these protests and political phenomena, exist within a logic that is similar 
to that of a community of experience. That is, direct emotional experience – and, 
by the way, any collective event of this kind is a very strong and unexpected 
emotional experience. And in many ways this experience becomes more important 
than long-term, rationalized political agendas, to which the existing political 
powers (who, of course, also exist within this social phenomenon) attempt to make 
this experience conform (Kurennoy, 2012). 
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collective interests, ideologies, and political agendas (c.f. Zhuravlev, 
Savel’eva, Alukov, 2014). 
 The ideological formula “Euromaidan fully awakened the united 
Ukrainian citizens” (Bertelsen, 2017) is not so far from reality if we 
read it pragmatically. The crux of it lies not in that Euromaidan, in 
uniting the people, formed a single republican nation, but in the fact 
that the new identity did not express a particular political conception 
or agenda, but rather the lived experience of politicization. 
 In the part of the thesis, devoted to the Russian movement “for fair 
elections,” I show that the discourse of “citizenship,” which founded 
a claim to national representation, reflected not some kind of 
understanding about universal citizens’ rights and freedoms or a 
civic nation, but the experience of the “wakening of a civic 
consciousness” (Zhuralev, 2014). Similarly, the Ukrainian 
Euromaidan formed a new nationalism, rooted in an experience of 
unity and solidarity experienced, directly or indirectly, by the 
participants and supporters of the protests. It is important to note that 
the primacy of collective emotions, the rejection of ideological self-
determination, and a distrust of the protest leaders not only 
contributed to the eventful identity being politically undefined and 
abstract, but also formed a certain universalist ethics of protest. 
 The appellation of “Revolution of Dignity” became an emblematic 
expression of these ethics. The rhetoric of overcoming regional, 
ethnic, and linguistic stereotypes formed part of this universalism: 
This feeling of unity...this huge uprising of national...national and 
that of citizens...Not just national, but specifically national and that 
of the citizens, because there were no divisions there at all, yes? 
Nigoyan is actually Armenian. He’s lived his entire life in 
Poland...no, Belarus, I think. The meaning of “Ukrainian” was, you 
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know, identical to the meaning of “person.” A person with a feeling 
of personal dignity (Interview UK4). 
Thus, the events of Euromaidan formed a politically 
indefinite collective identity that expressed an experience of co-
presence, solidarity, and collective action. Moreover, despite its 
abstractness, and its anti-political ethics, this identity was a 
mobilization towards strengthening the new Ukrainian nationalisms’ 
pretensions to national representations. 
 Eventful identity united in itself nationalist rhetoric and the 
symbolism and ethics of citizenship, which expressed the collective 
experience of politicization beyond any political specifics. One 
woman says, 
It was the symbolism of Ukraine that came to the forefront…Being 
Ukrainian… began to be very strongly identified with this…I don’t 
even know what to call it, it’s that which we call the “Revolution of 
Dignity.” It began to be identified with nobility, with honor…with 
some kind of historical traditions, when our Cossacks marched and 
fought for honor and defended these lands. With a kind of…as is 
described in Gogol…he describes Ukrainians as…a good-humored, 
cheerful, gentle, kind people. This…feeling yourself to be Ukrainian, 
it’s indescribable...Even now...all I have to do...is get...a Ukrainian 
flag out, go like this in the metro, you know, I’m going up the 
escalator, and people will smile and wave like this. It’s a feeling of 
inexpressible commonality (Interview UK4). 
Thus, the politics of identity around Euromaidan is its own form of 
the “politics of authenticity” (Zhuravlev, 2014), characteristic of 
which are a rejection of ideological self-determination and a distrust 
of political representation, the primacy of collective emotions over 
political agendas and social demands, and a special regime of 
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trustworthiness, which assumes a trust of personal experience and 
“facts which speak for themselves,” in opposition to “ideologies and 
propaganda.” As one of the respondents eloquently noted: 
Q: How does Maidan differ as a political movement from 
governmental politics; after all, both are politics? 
A: Maidan is authentic. (Interview UK14). 
 The politics of authenticity is a politics of eventful experience. It is 
in the narratives that concentrate on the experience of participating 
in Euromaidan that was see depictions of authenticity. However, it 
is important to remember that the meaning of Euromaidan’s eventful 
identity is changeable according to a genre, situation, and context. 
 One of our respondents, who was first on the side of Anti-Maidan, 
then joined Maidan, says the following when discussing his political 
preferences using the terminology of social interests of “simple 
people”: 
It’s all the same to me if it’s Europe, not Europe, Asia, Eurasia...I 
will even say: many simple Ukrainians couldn’t care less, who’s in 
power, which direction we’ll go in. Whether it’s the direction of 
Russia or Europe. Ehmm...for all, most, it is important that there is 
peaceful day-to-day life, a good paycheck (Interview UK15). 
However, focusing on narratives that record the personal experience 
of participating in the event, that narrative negates the relevance of 
socio-political demands: 
Q: Do you think Maidan should include social demands in its 
agenda, for example, salaries, pensions? 
A: ...My friends, who were at Maidan alongside those who died, says, 
we didn’t even think about death, because we stood for our friends. 
And in a moment like that, you never think about taxes, salaries, 
171 
 
about...social benefits of some kind...Maidan was more...highly 
spiritual (Interview UK15). 
 The changeability and ambiguity of the eventful “civic nationalism,” 
which - as many thought - almost overnight got rid of regional and 
linguistic stereotypes, makes it, on the hand, tautological: “I think a 
Ukrainian is someone who loves Ukraine, who went to the 
revolution” (Interview UK11). On the other hand, that “civic 
nationalism” is vulnerable in the face of “stereotypical” ethnic, 
regional, and linguistic nationalisms. 
Thus, comparing narratives and taxonomical discourses of 
the informants I showed the contradictory character of the 
Euromaidan national identity. I showed that the narratives of 
personal politicization expressed and shaped the inclusive civic 
identity that had allegedly overcome linguistic, regional and ethnic 
divisions. At the same time, the analysis of the informants’ 
taxonomical discourses showed that this inclusive vision of the 
nation coexisted with the more exclusive one. Moreover, the politics 
of authenticity that is characterized by the dominance of experience 
over demands, paradoxically, made the inclusive identity vulnerable 
to its “colonization” by the more exclusive nationalistic discourses. 
In the next chapter I will turn to the analysis of the civic conflict in 
Ukraine that emerged after Euromaidan. I will analyze the role of the 
protest identity in the process of polarization behind the conflict.      
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Chapter VII. After the protest: polarization 
 
Euromaidan won after Viktor Yanukovych left the country. 
However, many people especially in the East and South were 
disagree with and threaten by the violent regime change, persistence 
of nationalistic symbols, and the abolition of the language law 
adopted two years earlier that allowed the country’s regions to use 
more official languages in addition to Ukrainian if they were spoken 
by over 10 percent of the local population. It was “a symbolic 
measure interpreted by many as imperiling the dominant use of 
Russian in the south-east” (Arel and Driscoll, 2016). Antimaidan 
rallies and marches mobilized many people in different Eastern 
Ukrainian cities. At the same time, Russia’s annexation of Crimea 
and the separatist referendums in Donetsk and Luhansk strengthened 
and amplified Russian nationalistic and separatist tendencies within 
Antimaidan which used to be marginal before march of 2014. In an 
expert interview, Ukrainian sociologist Volodymyr Ishchenko 
claimed that 
“Euromaidan was not supported by the majority of Ukrainians in the 
Eastern and Southern regions. After the annexation of Crimea and 
especially after the war started, two contradictory processes took 
place. On the one hand, Ukrainian nationalistic mobilization and 
Russian nationalistic mobilization polarized public opinion. On the 
other hand, many people who were against violent regime change, 
who were threaten by the far-right groups voyages to the East, and 
who suffered from the progressing economic stagnation did not 
want, however, to side with Russia. That is why many of those who 
could wish to join an opposition movement in fact did not join 
Antimaidan”.  
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Media played the crucial role in polarization of public 
opinion. Both Ukrainian and Russian TV were progressively 
becoming all the more propagandistic. They depicted contrast 
representations of the same events. Ukrainian media insisted that the 
unrest in the Eastern cities was inspired by Russia and that local 
people mostly did not take part in it. Russian media claimed that 
popular uprising was taking place in the Ukrainian East in opposition 
to the “fascist junta” that came to power in Kyiv. As Henry Hale and 
his co-authors write about the Odessa tragedy, “despite the diversity 
of ownership … there was not much diversity in the narratives of the 
May 2 events that the different Ukrainian TV channels advanced … 
The dominant narrative in the coverage of the Odesa events by 
Ukrainian television can be summarized as follows. On May 2, 
Odesa witnessed a planned provocation that was meant to be the first 
step in the large-scale destabilization of southeastern Ukrainian 
regions orchestrated from Russia. The attack on the pro-Maidan 
“Unity March” that started the chain of violence on May 2 was 
undertaken by local anti-Maidan activists and paramilitary groups 
from the breakaway Transnistria region of Moldova, coordinated by 
subversive groups that came from Russia, and financed by former 
officials of the Yanukovych government. The overall goal was to 
implement in Odesa and elsewhere in Ukraine’s southeast the so-
called “Russian spring” scenario that was unfolding in Donbas” 
(Hale et al, forthcoming). The Russian media told an alternative 
story: “The May 2 events were quickly labeled “the 21st century’s 
Khatyn … The deaths in Odesa were caused by Ukrainian radical 
nationalists who had been brought from outside into the city, in 
particular by Right Sector activists from Kyiv and football ultras 
from Kharkiv, and their actions were guided by post-Euromaidan 
Ukrainian law enforcement agencies (the SBU and Ministry of 
Interior). The fact that in mid-April, after the start of the armed 
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conflict in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, Euromaidan activists had 
set up road blocks on the roads leading to Odesa, and that Andriy 
Parubiy, head of the National Defense and Security Council and 
former head of the Euromaidan self-defense units, visited Odesa just 
a few days prior, on April 29, was cited as evidence that the post-
Maidan government and the nationalist radicals had planned the 
killings in advance. Since the events in Odesa coincided with the 
start of Ukrainian military action against separatists in the Donetsk 
region (in Sloviansk and Kramatorsk), they were presented as part of 
a broader aggressive action of the post-Maidan Kyiv “junta” against 
“supporters of federalism” in Ukraine and against Russian-speakers 
more generally” (ibid.) 
Finally, Ukrainian government as well as SBU initially 
framed the Ukrainian conflict in terms of an undeclared war with 
Russia. Our colleague from Bohn International Center for 
Conversion Andreas Heinemann-Grüder took the interviews with 
the commanders of Ukrainian “voluntary” battalions within the 
collaborative project with PS Lab. He revealed that, despite the 
image of voluntary units formed during Euromaidan and then 
transformed into military battalions, many of these squadrons in fact 
were organized and weaponed by the government and SBU. The 
motivation behind such a strategy was that the generals and ministers 
believed that volunteers alone could not fight with the Russian army 
they expected to meet in Donbas. After Crimea was annexed many 
politicians and generals believed that Russia inspired the unrest in 
the Ukrainian East. Another motivation was propagandistic. The 
government needed to construct strategically a spectre of an enemy 
to gain political legitimacy. One of the commanders tells in the 
interview:  
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From the very beginning there were criminals and Russians in 
Donbass… Security officials were passive while true Ukrainians 
would act in another way … The Ministry of Internal Affairs realized 
that Russia was behind the protests in the East … Russia also gave 
directions to separatists … Under supervision of the Minister Avakov 
the decision was made to create the “voluntary special forces” … 
They invited some people from Maidan to the Ministry in order to 
create battalions with mixed functions of police and special forces 
(Interview UK16). 
The result of this polarization was formation of two “parallel” worlds 
of intersubjectivity. As Arel and Driscoll conclude, “Pro-Ukraine 
combatants saw themselves as fighting Russia, though in reality 
most of the people they were shooting at were actually citizens of 
Ukraine. Pro-Russia combatants  saw themselves as fighting the 
West, while a great many of those they were fighting were exactly 
the members of the “Russkii mir” that they were allegedly defending.  
(Both sides imagine that the other is brainwashed by clever state 
propagandists)” (Arel and Driscoll, 2016). 
Under the conditions of polarization of public opinion 
eventful identity transformed dramatically. In what follows I will 
analyze how this identity contributed to the escalation of the conflict. 
 
    Transformation of eventful identity: from inclusion 
to exclusion  
 
We should not repeat the mistake of those researchers who, 
reproducing the rhetoric of activists, insist that Euromaidan formed 
a politically stable civic nation. Events are such that they are 
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represented as completed, as finished. But, as Wagner-Pacifici notes, 
in reality, they are contingent and even restless, changeable 
according to genre and context, politically ambiguous, and, 
consequently, debatable. She writes,  
“[Cultural] genres provide the material for the representations, 
demonstratives, and performatives that direct the traffic of events, 
their shape takings should not be reified. A general theory of the 
restlessness of events must account for the continuous 
transformation of events, as actions and interpretations unfold across 
time, space, diverse media, and variably receptive publics” (Wagner-
Pacifici, 2010: 1371). 
Further on, I will show how the specifics of genres, the 
distancing of time, and the specifics of the lives of those who 
experienced the event from within and without can change national 
identity, transforming it from indefinably-inclusive to xenophobic 
and nationalist. In other words, I will analyze the “migration” of 
eventful identity beyond the boundaries of a single unique place and 
time of the event, the “rails” upon which it travels being life 
experience, cultural genres, and the media. The analysis I provide 
below will allow us to see the problem, articulated ten years ago by 
Dominique Arel, of the “spread” of civic nationalism into the “south-
western” regions from the new perspective. This analysis will also 
allow us to understand the internal undercurrents of civic conflict 
and the war in Donbass, and to more accurately understand their 
nature without recourse to the explanations of polarized ideologies 
using the terminology of “civic nation” or “civil war.” 
 Analyzing narratives about Euromaidan that are increasingly distant 
from it in time, space, and genre, we can see that the discourse of 
authenticity is used not only for telling the history of the unification 
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of citizens above any kind of boundaries, but also to distinguish 
among different categories of citizens. Since we took most of the 
interviews in summer of 2014 we could grasp the moment when 
Euromaidan just passed while the war was just starting. It was the 
moment of the transformation of collective identities emerged during 
Euromaidan. 
One participant says that “if a person cannot truly love 
Ukraine, he cannot be a Ukrainian” (Interview UK11). An analysis 
of the interviews showed that the formula of authenticity can be part 
of a narrative about unity as well as part of a rhetorical strategy that 
distinguishes between “real” and false”, or “true” and “not true” 
Ukrainians (Zhuravlev, 2015). This difference, in turn, recalls the 
distinction between those who were involved, directly or indirectly, 
in the experience of Euromaidan, and those who experienced the 
event from without and did not support it. 
 Speaking about her experience of the event, one of the respondents 
remembers: 
Maidan is such unity…,” “we became one people,” “literally two or 
three years ago, we never would have thought that Dnepropetrovsk 
would participate so actively in the protests...right now, there is no 
prejudiced or aggressive attitude towards the resident of Luhansk 
(Interview UK12). 
The interview with her shows how the experience of the event, 
within which the residents of Kiev, Lvov, and Donbass united 
against a common enemy, provides an emotional charge to an 
understanding of “us” and “them,” “ours” and “strangers’,” and 
“here” and there.” 
 She continues, 
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The national guard and counterterrorist forces -- they are residents 
of Donetsk and Luhansk. How could you imagine that they would 
shoot and kill in their own cities? That--no. I don’t believe it 
(Interview UK12). 
The optics of the experience of unity as “Ukrainians” creates a 
picture of “all Ukrainians,” united by an event that is opposed by 
outside forces--among which there can, by definition, be no 
“citizens.” Thus, in such a condition of civic conflict, the conversion 
of an experience of unity into the political category of the nation 
serves to exclude political opponents from the national identity. 
 This exclusion, it must be noted, is founded on a denial of the very 
possibility of civic conflict, since the civic nation has already 
happened: 
A person who declares that he wants to go to Russia is already 
automatically not a Ukrainian. There are a lot of Russians who 
immigrate into the country. For that reason, I don’t think that this is 
a conflict of brother against brother…[My friends from Luhansk, 
who support Maidan, say that] Luhansk should be flattened and 
covered with cement. It is different from the rest of Ukraine. At the 
same time, this doesn’t mean that we’re ready to do away with the 
Luhansk region. Whatever the majority there might be, there are 
people there who are Ukrainians, who truly want to live in 
Ukraine...I think this is true heroism, because at Maidan, it was easy 
to carry a flag and shout ‘For Ukraine!’, because we were the 
majority. But when people in Donetsk or Luhansk carried a 
Ukrainian flag, they were truly heroic, because people’s attitudes 
toward this were negative and aggressive. (Interview UK12). 
 In her analysis of the events of September 11, Wagner-Pacifici 
shows how they redefined the boundary between “us” and “them.” 
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In order to understand the transformation of identity due to the 
influence of an event, she looks at the use of pronouns and the use 
of the imperative mood: 
“Collective shifters like “we” and “they” become particularly 
charged in historical transition in which identities change...Drawing 
on an example from President George W. Bush’s televised 
conference...we find several confounding deictical shifts…‘Our 
nation must be mindful that there are thousands of Arab-Americans 
who live in New York City, who love their flag just as much as the 
three of us do’...The “we” appears to be ultimately inclusive of all 
Americans, as the nation’s perspective is that initially invoked. Yet 
Arab-Americans and Muslims become unaccountably “they” and 
thus are outside the boundary of this collective “we” even as “they” 
are shown respect” (Wagener-Pacifici, 2010). 
 In the last interview quoted above, we can see the way the 
respondent juxtaposes “this society” (Donbass) with “the rest of 
Ukraine,” the Luhansk region” with “us,” “those who are not read to 
do away with it.” In my opinion, the rhetoric of authenticity 
(“Ukrainians, who truly want to live in Ukraine,” “automatically not 
a Ukrainian”) here serves the function of ideology, legitimizing the 
exclusion of movement’s opponents. The rejection of particular 
regions and sectors of the population, who opposed Euromaidan, 
who are “outside” national identity, is consequently conceived as a 
step on the path towards the completion of the formation of an 
authentic Ukraine and an authentic civic unity. As the interviewee 
says, 
It is silly...to be within the territory of a state and say that you want 
to be in another state...It would be ideal if all those who want to live 
in Russia went and stayed there, and then Ukraine would remain as 
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it is, because the people there would only be those who love her 
(Interview UK12). 
 William Sewell, in his analysis of the French Revolution, analyses 
the rise not only of a new civic identity through the experience of an 
event, but also of a new political legitimacy, which justifies the 
violence and elevates it to the status of a revolutionary deed (Sewell, 
1996). The activists of Euromaidan, having experienced becoming a 
political subject and proclaimed the unification of the nation, 
brought a decisive contribution to the formation of a new political 
legitimacy, which is now used by the Ukrainian government in 
waging the war in the name of the “civic nation.” 
 One of the respondents speaking about his participation in 
Euromaidan, said that “because of Euromaidan, we started to better 
understand our neighbors, started thinking about Odessa and other 
regions.” (Interview UK 11). The respondent also spoke about the 
differences between regions and emphasized the difference between 
the Eastern regions and Central and Western Ukraine: 
Eastern Ukraine...the people living there aren’t like the ones in 
Central Ukraine. Their level of understanding, thinking, intellect is 
lower, for that reason it’s difficult to communicate with them, they 
don’t understand what is being said to them. These are people 
who...are simply stupid, who succumbed to propaganda.” (Interview 
UK 11).  
Speaking of the armed conflict in Donbass, he invokes the 
repressions of the supporters of the separatist movement, which are 
legitimized by an understanding of a civic nation, articulated using 
the language of authenticity: 
After three months...those, who were separatists...if they were truly 
Ukrainians, they would have understood what country they’re living 
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in, what city, and they would have changed their positions. Those 
who didn’t change--they are also terrorists. And I don’t support 
saying that they are ‘simple people,’ they don’t deserve forgiveness. 
(Interview UK 11). 
 Thus, the juxtaposition of narratives, judgements, and classifications 
allows us to see the boundary between those within and those 
without the event--a boundary of time, space, and genre, which 
reflects the boundary between “us” and them.” Attending to this 
boundary allows us to carefully analyze the dynamics of a new 
national identity, which defines and redefines the boundary between 
“real” and “false” Ukrainians, Ukrainians from different regions, and 
“Ukrainians” and “Russians.” In addition to an analysis of genres, 
through which events last, multiply, and transform, a study of life 
stories allows us to see the transformations and mutations of eventful 
identity. 
 
Not true Ukrainians are almost Russians          
 
I have already shown that the inclusive national identity 
emerged in the course of the protests became more exclusive during 
the development of the civil conflict. What are the sources of and 
metaphors used for constructing regional identities by participants of 
the opposing movements? I showed that often opponents of 
Euromaidan were described as “not true Ukrainians” by the 
Euromaidan participants. But who they were if not true Ukrainians? 
Which positive definitions were used to exclude them from the 
national identity? During the civil conflict the image of supporters 
of Antimaidan was depicted differently by Euromaidan activists. 
One of the ways of excluding the opponents from the national 
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identity was association them with “Russians”. While during the 
Euromaidan protests the participants claimed that many Russians 
and Russian-speaking Ukrainians were welcomed in the movement 
which overcame the very opposition between Russian and 
Ukrainian, this opposition was reasserted and re-politicized during 
the military conflict. What is more important is that the negative 
identity of Russians was used to articulate the difference between 
supporters and opponents of Euromaidan and the new government 
inside Ukraine.  One of the metaphors that were used to distinguish 
Eastern regions from the national identity and associate them with 
Russia was the category of passivity. On the one hand, the image of 
passive Easter Ukrainian was the element of the xenophobic 
discourse that Ukrainian nationalists has been using during the last 
decades to stigmatize citizens of the Eastern regions. They were 
depicted as people of “Russian mentality”, or “soviet state of mind” 
therefore passive. On the other hand, active citizenship became the 
emblem of Euromaidan that, participants believed, mobilized and 
politicized many “real” Ukrainians. Euromaidan revitalized the 
representation that Ukrainians in contrast to Russians were 
politically active because of the national mentality and traditions of 
democracy:  
You now, for us, for Ukrainians, when a revolution starts… I even 
don’t know how to explain … Imagine, if the corn comes, you harvest 
it. It is obvious for us. I remember my reaction. Revolution started? 
OK, let’s go! (Interview UK4).    
Sometimes citizens who did not support the protest movement could 
be blamed as “passive”. The integration of two these stigmas – the 
new one of passive opponents of the “revolution” and the old one of 
passive Eastern Ukrainians - during the post-Maidan conflict was the 
result of the absorbing of the new protest collective identity by the 
old nationalistic discourse. 
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Passivity and lack of self-reliance was one of the main 
characteristic of “Russians” in the discourse of our respondents from 
the Maidan camp:  
Concerning Ukrainians and Russians… I see the difference. 
Russians have less of freedom, and they think this is ok, they even 
don’t envy those who have freedom (Interview UK18). 
What is important is that in many interviews passivity and lack of 
freedom were represented as not political constraints imposed by the 
state but as the state of mind of Russians. Russians were depicted as 
passive consumers who “just watch the TV” (Interview UK12). As 
one of the respondents said, even if protests sometimes happen in 
Russia the majority of the population do not want to support them 
because of indifference: “When the Bolotnaya movement was 
suppressed by the state, the Russians whom I know said something 
like “this was right” (Interview UK18). 
Discourse analysis allows to see that the category of 
“Russians” is equated in many interviews with the figure of the 
enemy of Ukraine:  
 A Russian now is a man who says that Ukrainians are his brothers 
but who kill them at the same time. A Russian wants to weaken 
Ukrainian democracy and to annex our lands. A Russian now is a 
man who support imperialistic ambitions of his Tsar, Putin. Indeed, 
the ratings of Putin are extremely high now (Interview UK19). 
Similarly, Ukrainian supporters of Antimaidan were depicted 
as if they would be almost Russians. One of the respondents explains 
the fact that many Ukrainians supported Antimaidan by their 
dependency and the lack of self-reliance:  
Maybe, initially, due to the Russia’ information warfare some of 
[Ukrainians from Donbas] turned out to be affected by this war. 
They [mobilized against Maidan] because these sentiments were 
imposed to them, that were put in their minds (Interview UK20).  
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The lack of intelligence is another stereotype that proponents of 
Euromaidan used to distinguish Russians from Ukrainians. One of 
the respondents describes Russians in terms of a lack of intelligence:  
Russians now degenerate. One can see it if communicate in the 
internet. Really, many people are foolish. You tell them a sentence. 
They cannot understand. Usual sentence, not very difficult 
(Interview UK21). 
 The same respondent describes Ukrainians from the Eastern regions 
in the same way:  
People who live in the Eastern part are different from people from 
the Central Ukraine. Their level of intelligence is lower that’s why 
it’s hard to communicate with them. These people don’t understand 
what you try to tell them. They are just stupid people (Interview 
UK21). 
         
Although, the struggle between Miadan and Animaidan was not a 
class struggle, in some cases of well-educated respondents the image 
of differences between West and East, and between supporters and 
opponents of a social change acquires some class-based 
connotations:  
Donbass is absolutely industrial region … It is not an area of 
intellectuals… People are working in the pits, people are working in 
the factories and they do not see anything except these pits and 
factories … They have never been in L’viv not speaking about 
Europe … And of course in such a situation some radicals appear 
who will join the separatists … Of course there are Ukrainians there 
as well. But it is for sure organized by the Russians and Putin 
(Interview UK4). 
Thus, during the civic conflict the regional differences were re-
articulated in and by the discourse of Euromaidan supporters. The 
images of regional divisions redefined the national identity emerged 
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during the Euromaidan protests. 
 
Radicalization of nationalism   
 
In order to understand better how the old nationalistic 
stereotypes came back in the public sphere in Ukraine and what role 
the “politics of authenticity” played in this process, I have analyzed 
the blogs of some respondents together with their life stories. This 
analysis was aimed at exploration how their national identity and 
their representations of the Eastern regions, especially Donbass, 
changed through time, in the course of the their life and during the 
war. In what follows, I will exemplify this analysis by description of 
two activist identity trajectories. I will show how their identities were 
changed through an analysis of the interviews and the blogs in 
Facebook. 
The discourses of the respondents I chose are distinctive 
examples of identity evolution from Euromaidan to the war. Both of 
them are intellectuals who became engaged in the military activity 
after Euromaidan. They were involved in voluntary battalions that 
were at war during the Anti-terror Operation. One was the part of the 
“Donbass” battalion in which he became a sniper. The second 
became the part of the “Aidar” battalion. However, she left it then 
and became a pilot, an instructor and a fundraiser in her own project, 
the “Center of Airborne Prospecting”. 
As I have pointed out the national identity that initially was 
based on the revolutionary discourse of a unity of the regions then 
was absorbed by the exclusivist and xenophobic rhetoric. One could 
say that a civil conflict always produces exclusion and leads to 
dehumanization. However, an image of the conflict was not 
determined. The sides of the conflicts that emerged in many 
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Ukrainians cities after Maidan were uncertain and undefined in early 
spring of 2014. The dominant representation depicted the conflict 
between unified Ukraine and Russia and its small-numbered agents 
in various regions at that time. However, this image has been 
changing during the war. The old stereotypes about “the East” and 
Donbass as “not Ukrainian” areas re-emerged and the whole regions 
were marked as politically hostile and stigmatized. 
In what follows I will focus on the two different ways of 
objectification and stigmatization of Donbass region in the patriotic 
discourses of two Euromaidan participants. The first respondent is 
initially from Donbass region. As many other supporters and 
participants of Euromaidan he believed that the protests unified the 
country. Being from the cosmopolitan region, he rejected linguistic 
and regional stereotypes and insisted that Euromaidan should be a 
protest not for “Ukrainization” but for “freedom”. However, during 
the war he became radical Ukrainian ethnic nationalist and started 
claiming that Donbass was politically hostile region. The second 
respondent is a student from Kiev. She became a Ukrainian patriot 
before Euromaidan. Her parents took part in the Orange revolution 
while she has been identified herself with “democratic” and 
“patriotic” social strata. Just as another informant she was graduated 
from “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy” that has been considered as the 
patriotic university, the intellectual center that produces national 
elites. Although during Euromaidan she greeted the revolutionary 
“unity” of the West and the East, she became more sceptic about a 
unification just after the military conflict emerged. Considering her 
patriotic background, it was not surprising that after Euromaidan in 
the beginning of the war she re-acquired the belief that Donbass as 
well as the East of Ukraine was different from the Central and 
Western parts of the country. She thought that Ukraine should not 
care about the East and that the government could sacrifice these 
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territories. However, in the course of the war she changed her 
opinion. She came to the idea that the goal of the “revolution” was 
the territorial integrity of Ukraine; otherwise, the believed, Russia 
could annexed not only Crimea but also other regions, including 
Western ones. This evolution was accompanied by the 
transformation of her national identity. She started perceiving 
Donbass as not a “non-Ukrainian” regions but as a field of battle 
between Ukrainian and anti-Ukrainian forces. I will show that both 
respondents developed xenophobic discourse about Donbass during 
the war. However, if in the case of the first respondent who was 
initially from Donbass this stigmatization of the region was the result 
of the exclusion of Donbass from the Ukrainian identity, in the case 
of the second respondent this objectification and stigmatization of 
the region was the result of the inclusion of Donbass in Ukrainian 
identity.             
 
Stigmatization by exclusion  
 
A young teacher from Donetsk who initially supported 
Antimaidan but then became a Euromaidan activist, identified 
himself with multiethnic and multilinguistic region of Donbass. He 
was graduated from the prestigious “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy” and 
then had been working as a secondary school teacher. He moved 
often between Kyiv and Donbass.  In the interview he claims, that he 
is “not ready to die for Ukrainian culture”, because “every culture 
and every language, the Russian, the English, the Ukrainian … is 
beautiful”. However, the analysis of his Facebook posts that were 
written after the interview show that his collective identity was 
transformed dramatically and became much more ethnic-based. He 
stopped identifying himself with the multicultural region and started 
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framing the conflict in terms of “Ukrainians”, “patriots” who 
struggled against “Russians”. 
The transformation of meaning of the category of 
“separatists” he has been using demonstrates the transformation of 
the meaning of his social identity. If in the interview by ‘separatists’ 
he meant those who were involved in the insurgence military units, 
then in Facebook he termed the whole region (with which he 
previously identified himself) “separatist”. He stigmatized the whole 
region as populated by unintelligent and unpatriotic persons:  
These separatists are so stupid! They lay their children open to the 
attack … and then claim that we kill them. Did you try to take your 
children from the military zone, you, stupid idiot? Enjoy your DNR, 
idiot, only you are guilty of all these things. People who have the 
intellect left the region and went to some more safe places. But you, 
stupid idiot, you will live in the place you ‘deserve’ to live. I don’t 
care about what you say like “you kill us (Facebook post, male, born 
1979, higher education, a schoolteacher). 
The category of “Russians” also became the stigma for 
description and exclusion of the Donbass region from the political 
nation. In the interview, the respondent says that Russians and 
Ukrainians the one people:“Russians and Ukrainians are the one 
people” (Facebook post, male, born 1979, higher education, a 
schoolteacher). 
 
He described Euromaidan as the movement that consisted of both 
Russians and Ukrainians. Moreover, he paradoxically opposes 
Russian mentality to Putin claiming that “Russians” who defeated 
Hitler will defeat Putin:  
Maybe Putin has forgotten that Ukrainians are Russians too, we 
defeated the Nazis, we do have imagination, it is impossible to win a 
victory over us. Now you can see how our army, our Ukrainian army 
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… if it was the American army they would have died in a week. But 
our people they are gathering, they buy weapons, this is a popular 
movement (Facebook post, male, born 1979, higher education, a 
schoolteacher). 
At that moment, the military conflict was articulated by the 
respondent as not a conflict between Russians and Ukrainians or 
between Ukraine and Donbass, but as the war between the Slavic 
people and the imperialistic Russian state: 
I was really impressed when I saw that ordinary people, simple 
Slavic women found and neutralized the spies who came from Russia 
(Facebook post, male, born 1979, higher education, a schoolteacher). 
However, the analysis of his posts in Facebook he wrote in 2014-
2015 showed that his national identity began be articulated in terms 
of the opposition between Ukrainians and Russians: “I suppose these 
ideas were imposed by Russia but I’m writing my post in Ukraine” 
(Facebook post, male, born 1979, higher education, a schoolteacher). 
Finally, he started writing about Donbass dwellers as if they would 
be “Russians”:  
They say that Ukraine doesn’t allow [Donbass] people to leave the 
ATO zone. But, please, go to Russia! You wanted to join Russia so 
much. Go there! Go to Putin who is your super-star! Russia is a big 
country! (Facebook post, male, born 1979, higher education, a 
schoolteacher). 
 
Stigmatization by inclusion 
 
The second respondent took part in Euromaidan in Kiev. As 
many other respondents, she used the inclusive nationalistic 
discourse within narratives of the event and proposed more exclusive 
nationalistic discourse within classifications of Ukrainian regions. 
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When talking about her experience of Euromaidan in the interview 
she claims:  
[The propaganda tries] to impose the image of fascism, Nazism, 
chauvinism, xenophobia. Bullshit! In fact, Azeri struggled together 
with gays, while gays prepared Molotov cocktails with priests, you 
know? And Catholics were together with Orthodox, and Muscovites 
form Russia were with priests. There were not these stupid borders 
… it was the uprising of those who were insulted, aggrieved … They 
were just people with dignity (Interview UK21).  
The respondent emphasizes that this atmosphere of solidarity was 
the effect of the unique event:  
Sometimes you hop on a bus, and you hear swears, people stamp on 
both your feet. But do you know how we talked in Maidan about the 
burned buses? “Please”, “excuse me”, “not at all” (laugh) … Of 
course, we are Ukrainians, but … this feeling that you are a 
Ukrainian … it was the same that feeling that you are a citizen … No 
one claimed “I’m the Ukrainian but you have another ethnicity” or 
“I’m the Ukrainian but you speaks Russian”. We didn’t have such 
problems… Russian, Ukrainian language ... doesn’t matter! If you 
went through Maidan with a Russian flag at that time, it would be 
absolutely OK (Interview UK21).  
 However, when she replies to our answers about differences 
between Russians and Ukrainians and between Ukrainian regions, i. 
e. when she produces classifications of the society, not a narrative of 
the event, the uses more exclusive nationalist discourses. This 
discourse is xenophobic toward both Russians and Ukrainians from 
Donbass. The respondent says about Russians:  
The Russians now have a brain cancer. Even those who have been 
common-sense people”; “Here our task, the task of the civil society 
is to control those in power because… you know they are our 
employees. They serve us. It is not like in your country. Despite 
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Ukraine and Poland, in your country people have been served Tsar 
from of old (Interview UK21). 
She speaks about the Ukrainian East and Donbass as specific regions 
with unintelligent population when answers questions about 
differences between Ukrainians cities: 
Donbass is the very specific thing. They are people with education 
of very bad quality. Europe is something unfamiliar for them and 
something unpleasant… They are sovkodrochers [a pejorative for 
passionate sympathizers of the USSR (literary: those who jerk off to 
the USSR), it is used to offend a person with positive attitude towards 
the USSR past by blaming him or her for masturbation to the soviet 
– O. Zh.] <…> After all the West and the East… maybe not the whole 
East but Donbass are different cultural forms <…> the majority of 
Donbass people are passive…maybe there are 10 percent of 
conscious and active citizens <> 80 percent are indifferent mass 
(Interview UK21). 
In the moment of the interview, she claims that Donbass is not 
important region for Ukraine.  For her Donbass is perceived as 
something superfluous and needless for Ukraine. This attitude is 
reflected in the popular opinion that Donbass is an economically 
beneficiary region. According to this opinion, “Ukraine feeds 
Donbass”. Consequentially, Donbass is not Ukraine. The respondent 
says: “I don’t need this Donbass at all. It is just a beneficiary 
region” (Interview UK21). 
However, in half a year after she got involved in Aidar battalion, she 
said in the interview in the media that she changed her opinion:  
[The journalist introduces M.] M. who took part in Maidan did not 
think she could be at war. She believed that Donbass was not worth 
of life of a single Ukrainian. However, she changed her views 
dramatically and became the part of the Aidar Battalion: “I realized 
the historical tendency. Putin is a classical dictator of an Empire. 
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Empire will never stop a war until it has all. I realized that the not 
only Donbass but also the whole Ukraine is at stake in the war. Putin 
needs not only Donbass, he needs the whole Ukraine including 
Khar’kiv, Zhitomir, Odessa and Kiev7 
This change of opinion about desirable military strategy of Ukraine 
was accompanied by the transformation of the national identity. The 
alienating attitude toward Donbass gives place to a colonial one:  
We are not enemies with Donbass people. They are like us but they 
have been living in the depressed region. My uncle, he is still living 
in the territory of NDR (“Donetsk People’s Republic”), He is minor. 
I remember his stories that the only thing he sow was the mine. And 
the only thing they did was drinking vodka. They escape from the 
mine and start drinking and then they go to sleep. Everyday. It’s easy 
to manipulate them. They watch TV and believe that the Ukrainian 
army is guilty8 
The eventful national identity developed into the idea of a 
state integrity during the war. The integration of the Donbass region 
into the image of the Ukrainian nation was the most important 
element of this evolution. Within the process of identity work, 
eventful nationalism and pre-protest nationalistic discourses 
interacted and formed the new hybrid national identity. What is 
interesting is that the experience of the war is perceived in terms of 
continuation of Euromaidan. The experience of collective action 
during the protests and the war were opposed by the informant to the 
corrupted state politics:  
The war is where you want to come back. When it will finish many 
will miss this time. It is hard to explain… Because everything is good 
                                                          
7 https://inforesist.org/ukrainskie-amazonki-mariya-berlinskaya-i-nebo/ 
 
 
8 https://inforesist.org/ukrainskie-amazonki-mariya-berlinskaya-i-nebo/ 
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in the war. Everything is good and better than here, in Kiev. Except 
one thing that people die. There is no corrupt police and laws in the 
war, only freedom! All these people in power, all these bustards keep 
distance from the war. And in the war you can see easily who is who9 
    The rhetoric here is the same as in the narratives about Maidan. 
The struggle for freedom and for the country is opposed to the 
corrupt and cynical state politics. But what is more important for my 
topic is that the experiences of Maidan and the war assert, define and 
re-define a division between “us” and “them” which constitutes 
collective identities. In both Maidan and the war, you understand 
“who is who”. My point however is that supporters of Maidan 
changed their vision of who is who and the very principles of this 
vision during the war. On the one hand, the respondent believes that 
just as in Maidan there are not ethnic, linguistic and other 
stereotypical differences at war. In facebook she writes:  
A war is good because you understand who is who at war. There are 
no nationalities, age, confessions, social status or gender at war. 
There are only people and unpeople at war (Facebook post, female, 
born in 1988, incomplete higher education, a student).  
 
On the other hand, just as in Maidan this “politics of authenticity” 
produced and legitimated new forms of exclusion, stigmatization and 
divisions. After the respondent started perceiving Donbass as the 
part of the nation, she began claiming that there were “our” people 
and the “majority” who were against the Ukrainian army and the 
battalions. The imagined positions of the both groups legitimated the 
military operation. The presence of “our people” in Donbass meant 
                                                          
9 https://inforesist.org/ukrainskie-amazonki-mariya-berlinskaya-i-nebo/ 
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that the Ukrainian army and the battalions should fight until Donbass 
is under control of the state while intellectuals should avoid the 
discourse of “European” Ukraine without Donbass: 
To cut off from Donbass? Only those who hate our people could say 
this. On the one hand, many ours have already died there. On the 
other hand, many ours are still there. By the way there were many 
people who came to Euromaidan in Donetsk (Facebook post, female, 
born in 1988, incomplete higher education, a student). 
 However, as the majority of people were imagined as 
“passive”, “pro-Russian”, unintelligent etc, the informant believed 
they should be sacrificed for a restoration of the territorial integrity. 
As a result even the integration of the Donbass region in the 
imagined community of the nation led to dehumanization. In the 
Facebook she writes:  
It began to rain. The fighters tell that they see the rainbow and it 
would be great to take a picture. I say it were better if a mushroom 
cloud would be rising over Donbass  (Facebook post, female, born 
in 1988, incomplete higher education, a student). 
We could see that stigmatization of the Donbass region and its 
dwellers was the result of two different evolutionary processes. On 
the one hand, an exclusion of Donbass from the national identity led 
to a stigmatization of Donbass dwellers who were described as 
“separatists” and “Russians”. On the other hand, the integration of 
Donbass into the national identity led to the division of its dwellers 
into “ours”, Ukrainians and the pro-Russian “majority”, passive and 
unintelligent.   
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As seen by the eyes of Antimaidan 
 
 It is not enough to describe the evolution of the national 
identity for explaining subjective factors of the civil conflict. One 
has to use a relational perspective in an analysis of collective 
identities if she wants to understand how they influence a dynamics 
of a social and political struggle. The analysis of stigmatization but 
also of internalization of stigma allows explaining the role of 
political subjectivity in the civil conflict. In what follows I will focus 
on interviews we took with the supporters of Antimaidan. Analyzing 
the categories which moved from the Euromaidan discourses to the 
Antimaidan ones will allow us to explore their role in the escalation 
of the conflict. Indeed these cliché were the instruments of mutual 
stereotypization and mutual hate. I have shown that the discourses 
that articulated national identities within Euromaidan were uncertain 
and ambiguous. The narratives of the event expressed inclusive, 
“open to all” identities while the discourses based on taxonomies 
were more exclusive and even xenophobic. The same respondent 
could use both. This ambiguity invokes symbolic battles. An 
opponent of the movement could accused Euromaidan of being 
xenophobic. In response, a supporter could refer to the inclusiveness 
of the movement’s rhetoric. I tried to describe the mechanism of the 
evolution of these discourses and to analyze the dialectic of their 
political meaning. Now I want to explore how supporters and 
participants of Antimaidan themselves conceive these discourses. 
How do they internalize them? Do they reject them? Did these 
discourses become their language of self-description? In other 
words, I will analyze the stereotypes that served as the instrument of 
construction of social identities. How the activists of the Antimaidan 
movement perceived representations of the new protest national 
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identity that emerged within Euromaidan? How did they react to the 
claim that this identity had unified all the Ukrainians? How did they 
perceive and use the stigmas such as “separatist” and “Russians”?  
Although, as I pointed out above, Euromaidan proponents 
equated their opponents with separatists with “pro-Russian” 
orientations, despite media cliché Antimaidan was initially neither 
separatist, nor “Pro-Russian”. There was a fraction of Russian 
nationalists who supported imperialistic politics of the Russian state 
but it was not dominant and failed to impose Russian identity on all 
participants. Some of Antimaidan’s supporters tried to reassert 
Ukrainian national identity:  
Why does Russia come and help us? Should Russian troops, soldiers 
come and help you when you are sitting in your bed and crying or 
just flying the Russian flag? It should not be going in such a way 
(Interview UK23).  
Some of Antimaidan proponents who felt they were excluded from 
the national identity started conceiving themselves as Russians. This 
identity transformation made Russian nationalists and Russian 
imperialistic ideology much stronger. 
We always have perceived ourselves as Ukrainians. Previously we 
went to Russia and told them: don’t confuse, we were not Russians 
we were Ukrainians! But after the 2nd of May we don’t want to be 
Ukrainians anymore. Now we feel more Russian (Interview UK24).  
They were blamed as “Russians” and they interiorized this stigma 
but in a subversive way developing an ‘imperial’ identity. Thus, the 
so-called “Russian world” was not only a result of Kremlin politics 
but also a result of Maidan itself.  
 
 The many interviews with Antimaidan movement participants show 
that they conceived the category of “separatists” as stigma that 
excluded them from the national identity against their will:  “You 
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know if we start flying Ukrainian flags we are Ukrainians too, and 
we have the right to express our opinion. We are not separatists, not 
old sovki” (Interview UK23). This respondent uses the term 
“separatist” in pair with the term “sovok” (the stereotype that is used 
to blame those who are represented as people from Soviet era, not 
intelligent and modern enough etc.). Another respondent says:  
I’m Ukrainian, my mother is Ukrainian, my father is Ukrainian, my 
grandfather was Polish. And I am Ukrainian. You see what the 
situation is? If you don’t cry … now the segregation is happening… 
if you don’t cry “Glory to Ukraine!” or if you don’t reply “Glory to 
heroes!”, you are a separatist, you don’t love your country because 
you are not a patriot (Interview UK25). 
Thus, the discourse of authenticity failed to construct the new long-
term identity. On the contrary, it facilitated the re-emergence of 
stereotypes inherited from the old Ukrainian nationalism to which 
Maidan supporters deliberatively opposed their new “eventful” 
identity. Being internalized as a stigma by the participants of 
Antimaidan these stereotypes contributed to the escalation of the 
civil military conflict. Participants of Antimaidan who believed they 
were excluded from the national identity due to their political views 
reacted differently to this feeling of exclusion. I have shown two 
typical reactions: some activists claimed they were still Ukrainians 
even if Euromaidan wanted to exclude them; other started describe 
themselves as “Russians”. The systematic analysis of the interviews 
shows that there was the third typical reaction. People amplified their 
local identity that was opposed to the national one. In what follows 
I will consider this trajectory of identity transformation. I will focus 
on the case study we did in the city of Khar’kiv. I will analyze the 
local identities and their relation to national identities of dwellers of 
Kharkiv where both Maidan and Antimaidan were mass and 
influential movements.  
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Local and national 
 
Kharkiv is one of the biggest cities in Ukraine. It was the big 
center of engineering industries not only in Ukraine but also in the 
USSR. There are many universities in the city. That is why Kharkiv 
is often called “the city of students”. Traditionally there has been 
very strong local identity in Khar’kiv. Our respondents from the both 
camps emphasized the role of the city when spoke about the 
disruptive political events of 2013-2014:  
It is because Kharkiv is the most important and the biggest city in 
the region they [the government] sent the special service agents here 
against us (Interview UK26).    
The Khar’kiv region earns really much money for the country. That 
is why Antimaidan emerged here (Interview UK27). 
The activists of the both movements emphasized the 
specificity of the city. For instance, they explained that people in 
Khar’kiv speak special language: “Let’s start from the language. 
There are many Khar’kiv words that people from Donetsk would not 
understand…” (Interview UK28). 
Our respondents named themselves “kharkovites” and spoke 
about the city as if it was a political actor: “From the very beginning 
Kharkiv was against Maidan” (Interview UK29); “Kharkiv is afraid 
that something bad could start here” (Interview UK30).  
After the emergence of the civil conflict, the Kharkiv itself 
became the stake in the struggle between Maidan and Antimaidan 
movements. For example, the image of the “city of the students” was 
successfully mobilized by the Maidan proponents who emphasized 
the fact that students from Khar’kiv took the Euromaidan side: 
“Khar’kiv is the intellectual capital of Ukraine. It was not a surprise 
that people here were in favor of the Ukrainian unity (laugh)” 
(Interview UK5).  
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In response, activists and supporters of the Antimaidan 
movement claimed that these students were not kharkovites as such, 
but came to the city from other regions:  
Khar’kiv is the student city and it is very big city and that is why the 
majority of those who came in support of Maidan were students, 
students from the Western and Eastern Ukraine (Interview UK25). 
At the same time, the supporters of Antimaidan claimed their 
motivation was preservation of the city. For instance, when 
Euromaidan activists together with radical nationalists started 
destroying the statues of Lenin, supporters of Antimaidan defended 
them and claimed that the statues were a cultural heritage of the city:  
When it began in Khar’kiv… let’s start with the fact that we defended 
the symbol of the city. OK, maybe some people don’t like Lenin, but 
the statue is the symbol of our city! The statue is located in the city 
center. It was here and it is here and it should stay here, ok? 
(Interview UK30). 
In what follows I will turn to the question of an interaction of 
local and national identities. In the course of the civil conflict, the 
local identity and local patriotism were politicized and modified. 
These changes were the results of the integration or, alternatively, 
contradistinction of the Maidan national identity, on the one hand, 
and the local identities, on the other. For many participants of the 
Antimaidan the feeling of exclusion from the national identity led to 
changes of their social identities. The minority of our respondents 
from the Antimaidan camp mirrored the Euromaidan discourse and 
claimed that they were true Ukrainians while those who supported 
the Maidan movement were not: 
Now, all these people say: “We are all Ukrainians!”. But in fact not 
all of us are Ukrainians. There are some people who supported 
Novorossiya. And there are … I would say pseudo-Ukrainians, Nazi, 
who supported EU and the USA. We are not a single people 
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anymore, we have split (Interview UK27). 
The majority of the informants from the Antimaidan 
movement in Kharkiv reacted to the feeling of exclusion from the 
political nation in a different way. They either amplified their local 
identity (and supported the separatists) or they acquired Russian 
identity (and supported the pan-slavic ideology and Russian 
imperialim). Some of the respondents claimed they became more 
patriotic referring to the local patriotism. This is the type of identity 
work that David Snow termed “identity amplification”:  
You know, I can say that probably after all the events I became more 
patriotic, although before I loved my city as well. I loved Khar’kiv. 
But now I became more patriotic” (Interview UK31). 
This amplification of the local component of social identities 
was the consequences of the conflict between the local and the 
national:  
Q. Do you see yourself a Ukrainian?  
A.Now I define myself as kharkovite but not a Ukrainian.  
Q. What does it mean for you?  
A. How to say… I became the patriot, the patriot of my city and my 
region. Now it doesn’t matter for me how people from Lvov or 
Ternopol will do if we will separate from Ukraine (Interview UK32).  
 
Finally, some respondents acquired the Russian, or pan-
Slavic identity. As I have already said, the activists of the Maidan 
movement often described Ukrainians from the Eastern and 
Southern regions who supported Antimaidan as people who closer 
to Russia than to Ukraine. Some activists of Antimaidan 
appropriated this stigma but in a subversive way. They started 
describing themselves as Russians who were more powerful than 
Ukrainians. One of the respondents exploited the geopolitical terms 
to emphasize the pro-Russian orientation of the dwellers of Kharkiv:  
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The conflict is between the USA and us, Ukrainians. But not those 
Ukrainians who supported these [Maidan] protests, but Ukrainians 
who grew up with Russia, because the majority of the Southern-East 
are Russian-speaking people (Interview UK27). 
In what follows I will describe some results of the analysis 
of life stories of participants of Antimaidan in Kharkiv. This analysis 
allowed me to understand better dynamics of protest politicization 
and collective identity formation.  
 
Biographical trajectories of Antimaidan activists  
 
Since the Euromaidan did not offer an explicit agenda of 
social and political changes, and its media representatives were 
system politicians, elite of the highest ranks, and extreme right-wing 
organizations and leaders, the positive image of the people’s 
‘Revolution of Dignity’ was formed by direct and/or indirect 
experience of participation, which implies intense emotional 
engagement. Ukrainians who were critical of the Euromaidan—
especially those in the southeastern part of the country, where they 
have been excluded from the experience of resistance, the new 
national identity, and the system of political representation—were 
unable to perceive the Euromaidan as a fight for a better future in the 
way that those who participated in it were able to experience. 
 In return, some of them joined the Anti-Maidan and the separatist 
movement. They associated the Euromaidan with unlawful seizure 
of power and ‘Ukrainianship’ as such, which is why they reacted 
with developing alternative identities, e.g. regional, Russian, 
imperial, etc. However, it would be wrong to explain people’s 
support of the Anti-Maidan solely in reference to the absence of 
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being able to participate in the Euromaidan. It would be equally 
wrong to attribute their commitment to the Anti-Maidan to some sort 
of ‘Eastern Ukrainian’, ‘Donbass’, or ‘Russian’ collective identities, 
which existed prior to their politicization. As I have pointed out 
above, despite the widespread discourse of ‘two Ukraines’, identities 
of supporters of the two adversary movements were fluid and 
mobile. Rather, it is these identities in their dynamics that need to be 
explained. 
 Still, it was the rejection of the Maidan and the new government that 
was the main reason for massive numbers of people who joined the 
Anti-Maidan. And, like I have stated before, both Maidan 
participants and those who supported the Anti-Maidan formed their 
collective identities in the protesting and civil conflict experience. 
However, it does not mean that this experience was not defined by 
preceding trajectories and structural social factors. On the contrary, 
in order to better understand why a certain eventful experience 
produced one or other kinds of identities, one must reconstruct the 
circumstances, which do not conclude solely to this experience. In 
other words, one should take a close look at different circumstances 
and motives that spurred people on to different types of support and 
engagement. But is it easy to point out a set of typical circumstances 
and motives? 
 Despite the polarization of public sentiments and the dichotomy 
based on opposing the Euromaidan and the Anti-Maidan, the ‘West’ 
and the ‘East’ of Ukraine, the ‘European” and the ‘Russian’ choice, 
motives and social ‘backstory’ of people’s choosing one side or 
another were often far from being obvious. It is true that apart from 
those people who had already chosen their positions by 2014—
usually the position was either ‘orange’, or ‘pro-Russian’, that is, 
those who grew up in politicized families and those who had already 
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had an experience of being politically active—we met a lot of people 
whose socializing trajectories and, consequently, political attitudes 
were vague. Often, our informants told us how they hesitated when 
deciding whose side to take. We interviewed young people whose 
parents had taken opposite positions in the Ukrainian conflict, as 
well as those who switched from one movement to the other. It is 
important to note that many of our informants, if not the majority of 
them, belonged to the latter group. 
 The conclusion stating the importance of eventful experience and 
reaction to the image of the event does not mean that mobilization in 
support of the Euromaidan or the Antimaidan cannot be explained 
through structural factors. One could rather say that these two factors 
are not sufficient. First, the very same factors that were supposed to 
explain why one or the other side was chosen, such as Russian as 
one’s native language or a combination of factors, for example, low 
social status, unstable employment, and having Russian as a native 
language alone often explained nothing. We have met people 
matching these characteristics both in the Maidan, and the Anti-
Maidan movements. Second, when analyzing the Ukrainian conflict, 
it is easy to confuse the cause and the effect. As Andrei Portnov has 
rightfully noted, in discussions concerning reasons of the Ukrainian 
conflict the notion of identity was used carelessly as a universal 
explanatory scheme, while it was actually the process of emergence 
and transformation of new identities that needed to be explained: 
“Most answers as to why Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk did not 
become Donetsk and Luhansk cites the Donbass’ ‘specific identity’ 
(usually described as ‘Soviet’) as a causal factor. And depending on 
the ideological preferences of the author writing about it, this identity 
is evaluated in either disparaging or complimentary tones […] we 
can (and must) argue about the correct definition of this conflict. But 
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we cannot close our eyes to the fact that, over the course of a year, 
many people have come to see it as a civil war […] a specific 
‘Donbass identity’, especially if the status quo is maintained and the 
‘Transnistrian scenario’ continues to develop, could be the result 
(but not the reason!) of the events of 2014 and the ensuing war” 
(Portnov, 2016). 
Third, often joining one movement or another was influenced by 
multiple random and circumstantial events. Explanation of 
politicization and analysis of variability of collective identities in 
terms of influence of events and in terms of structural conditions 
together with biographical patterns do not contradict but 
complement each other. 
 In the instance where a clear idea of mechanisms rendering social 
positions into perceptions of collective interests and, subsequently, 
into political preferences, is missing, one needs a detailed empirical 
analysis of socio-economic conditions of existence of different 
groups’ agents on the one hand, and analysis of life stories on the 
other hand. This kind of analysis will allow us to begin a systematic 
study of complicated and diverging mechanisms of political 
engagement. It will also allow to shed light on evolution and 
significance of collective identities formed within an experience of 
resistance and conflict. 
 Analysis of biographies of participants in the Khar’kiv Anti-Maidan 
allowed us to mark out several major factors and motives of 
‘reactive’ politicization, which are: politicization as response to a 
threat that supporters of the Anti-Maidan saw in the Euromaidan and 
the new Kiev authorities (then again, it would be wrong to assume 
the Anti-Maidan to be an entirely reactive movement; many activists 
participated in it because they believed that it could have led to social 
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changes, such as democratization, improvement of people’s welfare, 
decrease in corruption, in other words, to something for which the 
Euromaidan was fighting as well). These motives are the economic 
one, the one related to ideological preferences and the motive that I 
named the one of ‘obviousness’. In all of the cases collective identity 
also plays an important role but in order not to fall into essentialism 
and not to make do with a superficial analysis that hastily explains 
the choice of a side through referring to a supposedly stable 
collective identity, I will examine it as a dependent variable. In other 
words, I will describe the way it changes depending on different 
types of activist careers. We will see that politicization and collective 
identity are influenced by several of the following factors or even all 
of them at a time: economic rationality, ideological preferences, 
identity, and credibility of legitimacy of one side or the other based 
on obviousness. At the same time, my analysis shows that different 
factors had different significance for bearers of different trajectories. 
In other words, different factors influenced formation of different 
key motivations that led people to one or another position. Below, I 
will first describe complexes of social conditions and biographical 
patterns that led to ‘reactive’ politicization in a more or less direct 
manner, and then move to more complicated and unconventional 
engagement stories, which will demonstrate how challenging the 
analysis of an eventful protest is. 
 The first motivation is inspired by the fear of possible economic 
difficulties, which might occur as a result of political turnaround 
following the victory of the Euromaidan and the rise to power of a 
new government or the experience of real economic difficulties 
resulting from it. When being interviewed most of our informants 
said that during the whole period of Ukraine’s independence “the 
East fed the country,” however, the way public money was 
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distributed was unfair because most of the resources were spent on 
central and western regions. They said that after the Euromaidan and 
the change of government economic situation in Khar’kiv had 
deteriorated or would deteriorate in the near future because of the 
severance of economic ties with Russia, possible deindustrialization, 
and dissolution of industrial empires, which used to function under 
the auspices of the clan of the former president Viktor Yanukovych. 
However, this economic motivation—fear of welfare diminishing or 
of unemployment—by no means always influenced engagement in 
the Anti-Maidan directly. The analysis shows that this motivation 
had the most powerful influence on people whose family members 
were employees of those enterprises that were directly reliant on 
their ties with Russian customers and people who were entering the 
labor market when the conflict began and had little chance of getting 
hired outside certain fields and enterprises. Usually, their ‘anti-
Ukrainian’ and ‘pro-Russian’ identities reflected their positions in 
regional specialization of labor.  
 For instance, one of the informants said in his interview that despite 
critical attitude towards the former president Yanukovych, his father 
worked at an enterprise that belonged to the president’s clan. As 
explained by our interviewee, although the enterprise managers were 
corrupt and greedy, they insured stability for his family. After spring 
2014 this stability faltered and the young man joined the ‘Anti-
Maidan’ protests. 
 In general, the trajectory of people coming from families, which are 
not that wealthy but whose family members have stable jobs at 
enterprises doing business with Russia is pretty typical among 
supporters of the Antimaidan in Kharkiv. After spring 2014 these 
enterprises might have been closed, moved to different regions, or, 
for example, because of the new political agenda and economic 
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policy, Russian companies might have stopped ordering certain 
goods from Kharkiv enterprises. That is what an Antimaidan activist 
who is a prospective student coming from a working-class family 
told us about economic hardships that her parents faced, 
I: How would you define your family’s income? Low? Moderate? 
R: Before all that, before this revolution, my parents worked, well, 
contentedly. With no complications. And after all this started to 
happen, plants and large enterprises have begun to lay off. And since 
both a welder, and a non-destructive testing inspector are people 
connected with industry, taking this into account, it had a major 
influence on us. It’s just that… there just was no work […] because 
now many plants work four or three days a week and many people 
lose their jobs. It’s just that plants have no new orders, have no 
money. It’s just that their work stops, for example, because of 
problems with gas supply and electricity. 
I: And these enterprises where your mother and father work, why are 
they not resuscitated?  
R: Because there are no orders. Because most orders came from 
Russia. That is why, considering the fact that economic relations 
were suspended, all orders were canceled (Interview UK33).  
 Our informant hoped to get a steady job, maybe with the help of her 
parents. At the same time, she was volunteering in various initiatives 
and non-profit organizations and wanted to make ‘communicating 
with people’ her profession. That is why she planned to enter a 
pedagogical university. Due to difficulties related to finding a job, 
she depended heavily on her parents financially. The fact that they 
lost they jobs had a significant impact on her life: she lost the 
financial support, job prospects became less feasible (“If even my 
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parents don’t have a job, what are the chances that I get one”), and 
obtaining a higher education became an unattainable luxury. 
 Often, being employed at an enterprise that have contracts with 
Russian companies strengthened the Russian linguistic identity. Our 
informant said:  
I was moved [to join the Antiтaidan] by only one thing: the fact that 
they touched Kharkiv’s second regional language, meaning, 
Russian. Kharkiv was a Russian-speaking city from the very 
beginning. Because… well... Here, they only speak Ukrainian in 
regions maybe. And in the city, well, meeting a Ukrainian-speaking 
person is rare. And that is why, like, when they start saying, “Here’s 
the deal, we prohibit using the Russian language, you will even think 
in Ukrainian”! … we, Kharkiv people when we saw the way it all 
goes, said that this is not going to happen (InterviewUK33). 
  As a rule, people from this kind of families did not have a politicized 
Russian or imperial identity. Rather, they considered East Ukraine 
and Russia to be one single region that lives in harmony with the rest 
of Ukraine. Most of these people had ambiguous Russian-Ukrainian 
identities, in presence of which their regional identity was more 
visible. The same informant said in the interview, 
Like, I don’t distinguish Russia from Ukraine that much, because it’s 
all the Soviet Union, which was, of course, these were Russia’s 
achievements. But, of course, when they won the Olympics, well, of 
course I felt proud of Russia. That’s right, so many of my 
acquaintances live in Russia, well done, of course! (Interview 
UK33). 
And then, “I consider myself to be a patriot of Khar’kiv. Just 
Khar’kiv. Because it is this city [that is important to me]” (Interview 
UK33). 
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 We can easily see the important role of the economic factor through 
the example of an Anti-Maidan activist who used to support the 
Euromaidan. A car assembler coming from a single-parent family, 
son of a shop assistant who makes five thousand hryvnias per month 
told us how he switched from the Euromaidan to the Anti-Maidan, 
“I was actually a member of the Patriots of Ukraine group […] we 
occupied the Regional State Administration building. Well, just 
occupied it and held it, and people would just walk around and be 
displeased … with the fact that we occupied it, we were said to be 
fascists and Banderivtsi […] and what happened next, well, people 
gathered around, the Anti-Maidan group, more and more people 
were coming. And… Well, that was it, they also occupied the 
Regional State Administration building and kicked us out. 
Q.: And at what point did you… Initially you were together with the 
Euromaidan, and when did you change your mind and because of 
what? 
A.: Well… I just gave it a thought… The EU, it’s nice of course, and 
America helping us, but Russia, they are our fraternal people, and 
anyway, it’s closer, Russia, well. Like, right now, at this moment 
many of my acquaintances work with, well, Russian enterprises, they 
sew stuff, I don’t know, it’s, like, some sort of business. I mean, like, 
Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Crimea, well, maybe Poltava a tiny little bit, 
these are the regions that fed the entire Ukraine. And now, well, 
Western Ukraine, they say, we want to become Europe, but why they 
want it if we had pulled them for 20 years, and it’s no one but us who 
can make this choice? That’s what I think. 
Q.: And initially you didn’t see it this way? 
A.: At first, I wanted Ukraine to be, well, like, undivided, but now 
you see yourself what kind of situation we have in the country: some 
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say, Russia, others say Europe. And what is Europe? All our 
enterprises will most likely get closed because we can’t compete with 
them. And who will we become in Europe? Well, we will have to 
sweep backyards or something. I’m not fine with it. And Russia, I 
think, like, it might not be all apple pie but gasoline and gas will 
become cheaper. And what else…Well, and maybe plants will be 
built, most likely they will be, and there will be jobs. Well, and it’s 
enough, because, well. Probably, they won’t give us anything else” 
(Interview UK 36). 
 Here, the ‘pro-Russian’ position is a derivative from the idea of 
economic gain coming from trading with Russia. Just like in case of 
the previous informant, this young man had no strong Russian or 
Ukrainian identity, rather, his identity can be called Ukrainian-
Russian, just like in the previous case: 
“Q.: Do you consider yourself to be a Ukrainian? 
A.: Probably yes. After all I was born here. 
Q.: And what does being a Ukrainian mean to you? 
A.: Well, it’s a nation. Well, I was born… It’s just the Ukrainian 
nation. But Russians are our brothers as well, we are Slavic people. 
I just think that we shouldn’t argue because of Europe that will give 
us nothing and America that will also give us nothing with its dollar.  
Q.: And what do you think, what is the difference between Russians 
and Ukrainians? And between the Russian and the Ukrainian 
societies? 
A.: I think there’s pretty much no difference. We have a lot in 
common. Well, maybe it’s just the language. Then again, many 
people in the East, they all speak both Ukrainian and Russian. And 
in the West… Western Ukraine, to me, they are spongers. Spongers 
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that we have taken care of for 20 years. And they gave nothing back” 
(Interview UK 36)  
When reading interviews with informants whose employment is 
deeply dependent on economic ties with Russia, we can observe the 
economic factor ‘in action’. Our informant, a former Ukrainian 
patriot and ‘supporter of United Ukraine’ appealed to the language 
of the East and the West, which does not seem to be habitual for him, 
when he realized how strong the negative influence from the 
Euromaidan can be for his future and the future of his family. The 
notion of the existing differences between the pro-European West 
and the pro-Russian East became part of his political outlook and 
acquired economic meaning in view of impending economic crisis. 
That is why he uses the ‘economic version’ of the discourse of ‘two 
Ukrains’, which claims that “the East feeds the West”. As can be 
seen from the above, people whose families’ income depends 
directly of the country’s trade with Russia, were driven by economic 
rationality in the first place. This rationality was stronger than any 
other motives, which is proved by our informant’s ideological and 
political about-face in the view of a threat to his welfare.  
 Explaining politicization through subjective perception of objective 
economic changes also complies with other research made in this 
field. For instance, Yury Zhukov, an American sociologist 
conducted a quantity analysis of outbursts of violent actions in 
Donbass, which shows that the economic factor was much more 
substantial than the ethnic one in explaining people’s engagement in 
‘militia’ in those towns of the region where certain enterprises were 
located (Zhukov, 2015). Zhukov writes, “Data from the first year of 
the Donbass conflict show that a municipality’s prewar employment 
mix is one of the strongest predictors of rebel activity. Where the 
opportunity costs of rebellion were low – like in machine-building 
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company towns especially exposed with trade shocks with Russia – 
the risk of rebellion was greater overall, separatist violence was more 
frequent, the Ukrainian government lost control earlier, and rebels 
were able to hold on to their territory for longer. Where the 
opportunity costs of rebellion were higher—such as in centers 
dominated by Ukraine’s relatively competitive metals industry—
rebels had a much harder time establishing and maintaining control. 
Economic preferences are not the only determinants of conflict. 
Rebels were able to seize ground much quicker where Russian 
speakers were geographically concentrated. Yet the results of 
Bayesian Model Averaging show that the ‘language effect’ asserted 
itself mostly in areas where economic incentives for (or against) 
rebellion were weak—where the industrial labor force was smaller, 
and the population was less directly exposed to trade shocks. In 
municipalities where a larger share of the population was employed 
in Russia-dependent industries, cultural and linguistic factors proved 
far less salient.” (Zhukov, 2015: 32) 
 As for the motivation of politicization revealed through analysis of 
the Kharkiv Anti-Maidan participants’ life stories, I notionally call 
it ‘political’. Many informants said that they had joined the protest 
because it conformed with their values, beliefs, and ideology. 
However, these narratives often stated that concordance of people’s 
views and goals of the Anti-Maidan was retrospective. Indeed, as a 
rule, activists’ views were indefinite and vague, and goals of the 
movement were inconsistent and badly articulated. That being said, 
those informants who had had prior experience of being politically 
active could actually recognize their own views in the movement and 
join it because of this. 
 Some informants had had the experience of being politically active 
or just the experience of political evaluation of the key events of 
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Ukrainian political life, such as the Orange Revolution. They could 
be zealous supporters of the ‘pro-Russian’ path since 2004 when the 
opposition of ‘the West’ and ‘the East’ became an integral part of 
Ukrainian politics. I will not refer to these informants’ biographies 
because analyzing them does not present any serious challenges. The 
factor of political organizations that played a certain role both in the 
Anti-Maidan, and the separatist movement in the Donbass is far 
more interesting. A number of our informants, though there were not 
many of them, had been involved in activities of ‘pro-Russian’ 
organizations and many of them had been waiting for the moment 
when the question of the pro-Russian and the pro-West future of 
Ukraine would be put bluntly. The social conflict of 2014 became 
this moment. Many of these people were passionate about some sort 
of conspiratorial literature. One of our informants, a young activist 
and an admirer of Russian nationalists shared these memories about 
the beginning of the Anti-Maidan, 
“At the end of September, there was a convention of leaders of 
several civic organizations, Kurginyan, it’s Essence of Time, […] 
Union of Ukrainian Citizens, it’s from a branch of the Professional 
Union of Russian Citizens and Nikolai Starikov […] Back then 
Yanukovich was upselling Ukraine’s European choice to the 
maximum, and we were deciding how we should act depending on 
the way it goes. In other words, basically, back then the Communist 
Party of Ukraine decided to organize a referendum in order to ask 
the people what path Ukraine wants to take. But they said it was 
against the law, they filed a lawsuit there, it was a very complicated 
case, and we decided to have another referendum […] ‘for’ and 
‘against’ entering the European Union” (Interview UK 37). 
 Step by step, this respondent was getting involved into activities of 
a political group that was basically funded by the Russian 
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organization Essence of Time, which later played a certain role in 
the Donbass conflict. He was not a political activist but he had a 
consistent stance on major problems of Ukrainian politics. Just like 
other representatives of this sort of organizations or groups in the 
cities and towns of South-Eastern Ukraine, he was waiting for the 
year 2004 to repeat in order to start taking part in the conflict of ‘the 
West’ and ‘the Russian civilization’. When he got to hear about the 
Euromaidan and the beginning of the Anti-Maidan, he, just like other 
‘alerted theoreticians’, became engaged in political activities. 
 As a rule, this sort of politicized informants bore collective identities 
ingrained in some kind of political project of the future, usually a 
utopian image of a strong state. Often, this identity was Russian in 
one way or another. Yet, territorial, regional, and ideological 
dimensions of this identity could be different. For instance, our 
respondent calls himself ‘Russian’ but claims that in Russia itself 
‘anti-Russian’ forces are in power. That is why he reproduces the 
imperial discourse of ‘marching to Kiev’ but leaves out the demand 
for Ukraine’s joining Russia from it, 
“I consider myself Russian […] [but] I, personally, don’t want to 
join Russia. Unfortunately, there, domestic politics is controlled by 
anti-Russian forces… and, of course, I don’t want to give such 
valuable lands away. After all, Novorossiya if it was the size of 
Ukraine, then the IMF agreement would be annulled, the debts 
would be annulled, meaning… basically, it’s what the Bolsheviks 
used to do, the great Lenin when he wouldn’t acknowledge the debts 
of the Tsar’s army. Of course, most people have negative attitude 
towards Lenin but the sheer fact that in case we win, there will be a 
complete reformation of the state structure, that’s for sure” 
(Interview UK 37) 
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 Finally, the third motivation is the trust based on obviousness. This 
means that people choose their position not based on economic 
rationality or values and ideological preferences, but as a result of 
facing certain evidences, ‘facts’, and experiences that seem to ‘speak 
for themselves’ in favor of one movement or another. It should be 
noted that, in general, under the conditions of ideological apathy and 
a feeble system of political representation, which are characteristic 
of many post-Soviet countries, the habitude of trusting one’s ‘own 
eyes’, ‘facts speaking for themselves’, and one’s personal experience 
in defiance of ‘deceitful’ political and ideological discourses is an 
important part of habitus for representatives of all kinds of social 
groups. As a rule, this ‘obviousness regime’ restrains people from 
collective actions because historically it was formed in opposition to 
‘lies’ of the official Soviet politics. Yet, when public mobilization 
occurs, this factor can play an important role in politicization of 
people who used to be indifferent to politics. Naturally, the veracity 
of rightness of one position or another always plays a part. Often, it 
serves not as a motif of politicization, but rather as a supplementary 
condition confirming and legitimizing those views and beliefs that 
have already been formed. At the same time, under the conditions of 
ambiguity of these beliefs, credibility might play a key role, 
especially when it takes the form of a ‘moral shock’ (Jasper, 2011).  
 The analysis I have conducted shows that the ‘motif of veracity’ 
plays the crucial role in politicization of those people whose 
socialization made choosing a position extremely difficult. These are 
those people who could have chosen both one position and the other. 
The fact that there were many of these people, if not the majority of 
them, among our informants makes analysis of these trajectories and 
this factor an overriding priority. 
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 People who had not have any clear position regarding the 
Euromaidan and the rising conflict, for instance, those who saluted 
the anti-corruption agenda of the Maidan but opposed Ukrainian 
nationalism and the rise to power of politicians and oligarchs from 
the former elite, or those who believed both protests to be 
orchestrated and corrupted projects could have joined both 
movements, though maybe the odds were not equal. Approaching 
the explanation of the dynamics of their political choice and the 
subsequent transformation of their identities requires a detailed 
analysis of the coherence of their experience, in which the key role 
might have been played not by their ideological beliefs and values, 
not by economic motives but by the ‘veracity’ of rightness of one 
side or the other. 
 Below, I will show a fairly typical trajectory of ‘reactive’ 
politicization through the example of two biographies, one of an 
active participant of the Anti-Maidan, the other of a combatant of the 
separatist ‘militia’, both of them were not politically active, 
moreover, were not interested in politics before spring 2014.   
 In the interview with one of our informants who participated in the 
Kharkiv Anti-Maidan, one can notice all of the aforementioned 
motives causing reactive politicization, i.e. the economic, the 
language and identity, and the political factors. For instance, in his 
story he mentions the problem of deterioration of economic relations 
with Russia, 
“at the moment, all of our plants just, I mean just Kharkiv, are 
Russia-oriented. Why are they out of work at the moment? Because 
right now an information war is taking place, an information 
blockade with Russia, that’s why they can’t do anything” (Interview 
UK 38) 
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 However, nowhere in the interview does he say that this problem 
affected him personally. Moreover, he mentions that his income is 
moderate and his job is stable. He says that his native language is 
Russian but, at the same time, he has no distaste for the Ukrainian 
language and he is fluent in it, 
“Q.: What language do you consider to be your mother tongue? 
A.: Russian, and I know Ukrainian but I don’t use it. I speak Russian. 
Q.: And in school, did you study in Russian? 
A.: No, I attended a Ukrainian school” (Interview UK 39) 
 In the interview, he says that in general he supported the 
Yanukovych regime, however, his attitude towards the former 
president was critical, 
“Q.: And would you support Yanukovych? 
A.: Well, I don’t want to say that I would support him but when he 
was in power at least it was peaceful and you knew that no one would 
kill you” (Interview UK 38) 
 In 2004, during the Orange Revolution, he, just like in 2014, held 
‘pro-Russian’ views, however, he did not participate in the protests, 
“I upheld the very same position but I didn’t go out to the square” 
Moreover, he was always skeptical about the ‘big’ politics, 
“None of the presidents… during my life… did something good for 
the country, none of them. They always made lots of pre-election 
promises striving to power but didn’t keep any of these promises” 
(Interview UK 38) 
 On the one hand, his social background seems typical for 
participants of the Anti-Maidan. On the other hand, typicality is 
often deceitful. We met people with similar background in camps of 
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the Khar’kiv and Odessa Euromaidan as well. At some point, he said 
something very telling,  
“[before 2 May 2014] I wasn’t sure about my position” A closer look 
at the interviews reveals that from across all social strata often 
doubted the rightness of both the Maidan and the Anti-Maidan. They 
had had doubts before something happened to them. The doubting 
ones often chose their position after they had suddenly faced 
violence or some sort of eloquent confirmation of the rightness of 
one movement and the criminality of the other. In an expert 
interview, the Ukrainian sociologist Volodymyr Ishchenko argued 
that, in his opinion, Anti-Maidan could become much more popular 
movement acting as an opposition to the new political regime. 
However, the annexation of Crimea by Russia, the Siege of 
Sloviansk by the group of the Russian military officer Igor Strelkov, 
and the referendum of spring 2014 made the Anti-Maidan ‘pro-
Russian’ and ‘separatist’ in the eyes of many people who were not 
pleased with the new government. Eventually, they supported the 
Anti-Terrorist Operation and joined the patriotic consensus of the 
Euromaidan sympathizers. Videos and photographs of Russian 
military men in Crimea or people wearing masks assaulting state 
buildings in Sloviansk appeared to be a shocking and irrefutable 
evidence of the ‘Russian intervention’. At the same time, when 
facing evidences of ‘ultra-right violence’ or the ‘Ukrainian’s army 
war against the Donbass’, these very people could have chosen the 
opposite position. Our informant’s speech continued as follows, 
“I used to have doubts concerning my position but after 2 May in 
Odessa, for me, there’s no Ukraine anymore […] when I saw that 
footage, some amateur video, I’m this kind of person, it’s hard to 
make me cry but after that I was hysterical for two days, I was 
freaked out for two days. Because of all this horror […] So, after, 
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like, this kind of events, like, I started to come, I started to take part 
in Anti-Maidan protests” (Interview UK 38) 
 In many of the interviews constructions directly linking the 
impression coming from what people actually saw and their decision 
to join the fight, such as “after that I started going to protests,” “after 
I had seen it, I decided to sign up for militia,” etc. point at the 
paramount role of the obviousness factor. Often, this obviousness 
was precipitated by the shock of violence. For instance, one of our 
informants, a combatant of a separatist battalion from Donetsk 
recalled the moment he decided to enroll in ‘militia’, 
“In the evening [2 May] we came and saw [on a Youtube channel] 
this outrageous situation, and burnt faces, and some cameraman was 
walking on these corpses in the Professional Union building, and 
they were saying, there’s one more sep, and here’s one more. Well, 
shortly, these guys were already… totally inhuman […] On the 3rd, 
M. called me asking if I am ready to come join the army… And on 4 
May we did. I called this R., I called this S.… they said yes right 
away… and starting from 4 May we’ve been… in the service”  
(Interview UK 39) 
 Going back to our Khar’kiv respondent, it should be noted that his 
encounter with the shock of violence, which made him join the Anti-
Maidan, had a huge impact on his identity. Despite his pro-Russian 
feelings, from his interview we learn that before spring 2014 he had 
born a strong Ukrainian identity, however after 2 May and 
participation in the Anti-Maidan his identity underwent a 180-degree 
turn, 
“I was always proud of the fact that I’m a Ukrainian, but not 
anymore, now I’m not proud of it. I had always, even when I had 
come to Russia, I had always said proudly that I was a Ukrainian. 
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And now it’s disgusting to say that I’m a Ukrainian” (Interview UK 
38) 
 As can be seen from above, one could think that ‘pro-Russian’ views 
of our informant have led him to the ‘anti-Ukrainian’ Anti-Maidan. 
However, a detailed analysis of the interview shows us an entirely 
different picture: in fact, he considered himself to be a Russian-
speaking Ukrainian as opposed to ‘Russians’, however, as the result 
of the events of spring 2014 and his involvement in the Anti-Maidan, 
he stopped being a bearer of the Ukrainian national identity. 
 This sort of trajectory of politicization, which is wide spread among 
participants of the Anti-Maidan and the separatist movement, is even 
more prominent in the example of the combatant of one of the 
separatist battalions. One of our informants comes from a small 
Donbass town D. in Donetsk Oblast, he is a mineworker who came 
through the war and recently emigrated to Russia. 
 Unlike him, his father has always upheld pro-Ukranian views, 
“My father’s position is… pro-Ukrainian… he sort of didn’t get 
along with the Party of Regions, they kind of grabbed his assets, so 
he’s… sort of… pro-Ukrainian… Me, well, I’m a person who has his 
own opinion” 
 Moreover, his father was a coordinator of the election campaign 
office of the leader of the Orange Revolution Viktor Yushchenko in 
the town of D., 
“During the last elections when Yanukovych became the president, 
my father was a member of… Yushchenko’s election campaign team. 
He even coordinated this town, our small town D.” 
 Just like my previous informants, in the interview he talks about 
economic inequality among Ukraine’s regions, 
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“We work… but Ukraine’s budget, it’s a national budget, the budget 
allocation comes from Kiev… we pay our taxes and someone can 
afford not to work and gather mass protests of thousands… All of 
them there [in Western Ukraine] get their allowances and pensions” 
(Interview UK 39) 
 
 At the same time, in his interview he does not say that the economic 
difficulties influenced his political leanings directly. He was always 
able to make enough money to support himself, his wife, and his 
children. 
 Our informant said that he had voted for the Party of Regions but 
was always skeptical about Yanukovych, 
“I have never perceived Yanukovych… as a decent man. 
Q.: Why not him? 
A.: Because the Party of Regions is actually an organized crime 
group… and if in the 90s they were involved in direct racket, then 
later it just went under the name of ‘the Party of Regions’… you join 
this party, you pay a fee, and you’re all good. And if you don’t pay, 
it means that the tax office people will come and you’ll be in trouble” 
(Interview UK 39) 
 
 Moreover, he recalled that he was always indifferent to politics, 
“Actually, I’ve been nowhere near politics” 
 He has always felt like a Russian-speaking person but, at the same 
time, he was a bearer of the cosmopolite Donbass identity and 
considered himself to be a Ukrainian, 
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“My nationality is actually Ukrainian… but we have always 
communicated in Russian, we thought… in Russian 
Q.: And, in general, in your everyday interactions with people, have 
you felt any difference between Russians and Ukrainians, the West 
and the East, the Donbass and the rest of Ukraine? 
A.: No, no. In the 90s, first, many Armenians came… both Armenians 
and Azerbaijanis… we lived in peace… I had friends who were 
Chechens” (Interview UK 39) 
 
 Just like in the case of the previous informant, one might have 
thought that his background—his Russian-speaking identity, loyalty 
to the political environment formed under Yanukovych, and his 
notion of desirability of economic independence of the Donbass—
led him to the separatist movement. However, a detailed analysis of 
his interview shows that, on the contrary, in the beginning of the war 
he was not sure who was right. Moreover, he trusted the Ukrainian 
media more, 
“I wasn’t going to fight a war. Then again, most information I 
received mainly came from the Ukrainian territory, from these media 
saying that terrorists have come, Chechens are basically raping and 
robbing everyone and killing people. They spread fear like this, it 
was, like, well, it was hard not to believe… that Putin’s army 
slaughtered everyone in Donetsk” (Interview UK 39) 
 
 In other words, our informant could have become one of those 
sympathizers of the ‘pro-Russian’ choice who, bearing the Ukrainian 
identity at the same time, took the pro-Ukrainian side because of 
facing evidences of the Russian interference. However, a number of 
223 
 
events made him choose the opposite side. First, when he was 
driving his car on the central square of his town during the 
referendum organized by separatist forces, he saw that the majority 
of people voted for the separation from Ukraine:  
“Initially… mass media, especially the Ukrainian ones, they stirred 
it all up… when… the referendum took place, I saw myself how 
many… people… the central square of the town and there were these 
tents of those who supported the referendum… the Donetsk People’s 
Republic; and on the same day another referendum took place there 
for Ukraine… in support of Ukraine. I saw, like, heaps of people 
coming… like 1 May… demonstration [to vote for the NPR] and this 
kind of trickle towards [the tent set up by pro-Ukrainian forces]” 
(Interview UK 39) 
 
 Then his friends showed him videos, in which he saw the reality of 
war that, according to his own words, bore evidence of the 
criminality of the new Ukrainian government, 
“And then my guys came back from Tula, they had some seasonal 
work there… my former neighbors, they were like, and have you seen 
this, and that, and this? I said no. Well, let’s watch it. We started 
checking it out, in Ukraine you can’t even open these links, see, like 
in this Youtube… about Sloviansk, about Kramatorsk… about 
houses riddled with bullets… and that’s what outraged me, why are 
they… deceiving me?” (Interview UK 39) 
 
 Then, in his native town that ended up being a part of the territory 
controlled by the Ukrainian government, he got beaten up by people 
whom he did not know and identified as government security forces 
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who had come from ‘the center’. Yet, he was not planning to join the 
war, instead, he was going to leave for Kharikiv where his wife and 
children were staying back then, 
“Initially, I wasn’t planning to join the war, meaning, I went there to 
just close everything neatly, I just wanted to nail up my windows here 
and go to my family” (Interview UK 39) 
 
 However, an unforeseen event occurred in his life, and this event has 
completely transformed his trajectory. First, upon his arrival to 
Donetsk, he saw that people on ‘militia’s’ roadblocks were not 
Russian military officers or Chechen contractors but his old 
acquaintances, and then he visited a morgue a day after the Ukrainian 
army raked Donetsk with fire, 
“An acquaintance of mine asked me to go pick his grandmother from 
a morgue… The things that I saw there… they turned me inside out… 
before that I had already spent something like seven days in 
Donetsk… I hadn’t seen any Chechens there, just my guys, when I 
was undergoing practical training in a mine, they worked on that 
site, and then they were standing on the roadblocks here, I talked to 
them… I didn’t see any tough mercenaries, I saw guys that I’d known 
for a long time… this information… my eyes began to open. And… 
after the morgue I got… completely blown away. 
Q.: And what happened in the morgue? 
A.: There were military officers there as well… wearing uniforms… 
But there were also lots of civilians, it was… a day after they raked 
a stop in the 18th Hospital. There were children there, and there 
were women, and… just people who laid there like logs, this way, 
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like they were stacked in a pile of wood. And this really blew me 
away somehow” (Interview UK 39) 
 
 Just like in the case of the previously mentioned informant and many 
other respondents, he made the decision to sign up for ‘militia’ after 
having faced an actual evidence of what he thought to be the 
Ukrainian army violence. 
“I made the decision to go to war precisely because I saw how many 
people, well, not on the news, not on TV, but, like, in real life, how 
many people, common people, meaning, not… common women, well, 
meaning, it’s sure thing that she was no terrorist because she had no 
machinegun, because this woman was wearing regular clothes. 
And… Before that when I’d been studying in a medical school I’d 
attended autopsies but seeing this sort of things, I was just 
shocked…. I was running around, trying to make them take me 
somewhere, back then they wouldn’t, they said that… there were no 
vacancies… it took me a month to get to Motorola. 
Q.: What did you do? Did you decide to join Motorola right away, 
or did you have any...? 
A.: No, I…  just went there like this, I had some, well, I saw some of 
my acquaintances there, on the roadblocks, I came up to the guys 
and I was like, that’s the thing, like, I don’t really have any 
experience, meaning, I’ve served in the army but it’s been somewhat 
like seventeen or sixteen years ago… in short, they sent me the 
squadron protecting the headquarters” (Interview UK 39) 
 
 As a result, his identity underwent a dramatic change; in his 
interview, he emphasized the fact that after that he considered 
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himself to be Ukrainian only by origin, just according to his passport 
data.  
 As can be seen from the above, despite the fact that there are several 
typical factors causing politicization, their influence on ‘reactive’ 
politicization was not always equally strong. On the contrary, the 
role of different factors and motives in people’s deciding to join one 
of the movements varied depending on a range of socio-economic 
conditions of their existence and biographical patterns. In its turn, 
the biographical analysis has shown how complex the dynamics of 
people’s engagement in the Anti-Maidan and the separatist 
movement is. Experience of ‘obviousness’, facing violence and 
evidences proving the verity of information, which conforms 
rightness of one of the confronting sides, could be much more 
important than economic, political, language, and other motives. 
Finally, collective identities strengthening people’s commitment to 
the Anti-Maidan and the separatist movement were the effect, not 
the cause of politicization; but at the same time, different versions 
and meanings of these identities varied depending on people’s 
experience preceding their engagement in a certain movement.  
 
Conclusion 
 
    I showed that Euromaidan although mobilized many people from 
various regions at the same time reinforced identity conflicts. 
However, I do not claim that the protest totally failed to unite and 
integrate the society. It contributed to a formation of a civic 
nationalism and civic identity. Moreover, protesters deliberatively 
wanted to overcome ethno-cultural and linguistic stereotypes that 
hindered a civic identity construction. But the discourse they 
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opposed to these stereotypes was often based on the rhetoric of 
authenticity that, paradoxically, reinforced stereotypization after the 
authentic moment passed. Thus, the “eventful protest” did not 
become a “transformative event”. Indeed, although Euromaidan 
integrated many citizens from the Eastern regions into the new 
nationalistic identity, it failed to change the very dominant symbolic 
structure that opposes Ukrainian patriots to people who live in 
Eastern regions, especially in Donbass. The cause of this failure lies 
in the fact that neither civil society nor the state managed to extend 
the eventful identity beyond the event itself. As a result, while the 
war is going on in Donbass, a hidden civil conflict continues in other 
Eastern regions. As sociologist Nikolay Mitrokhin, radically pro-
Ukrainian author, argues in the report based on his empirical 
research conducted in the Eastern regions of Ukraine, “the majority 
of the citizens [in Odessa, Khar’kiv and Dnepropetrovsk] did not 
support the ‘Revolution of dignity’ as much as the elites in these 
cities did. However, the annexation of Crimea as well as Russia’s 
participation in the conflict in the East were not supported by locals 
too. These actions, alternatively, caused the opposite effect and 
inspired pro-Ukrainian mood that allowed the new elites to gain 
some popular support during the summer of 2014. This support 
allowed them to suppress the separatists but did not provide a 
popular support of their economic and political reforms <…> There 
are many people in Odessa who support pro-Russian clandestine 
movements <…> ordinary people and intellectuals with pro-Russian 
sympathies are numerous in Khar’kiv”. Mitrokhin concludes that 
pro-Russian preferences in the Eastern Ukraine can lead to unrest 
and civic conflicts in near future (Mitrokhin, 2015: 38).       
    Dynamics of eventful identity alone cannot explain the outcomes 
of Euromaidan. However, Russian and Ukrainian elites’ behavior 
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alone cannot explain them as well. One needs to consider various 
structural, contingent and processual factors to explain why the civic 
conflict and then the war emerged in Ukraine after the protest.  
    Indeed, the fact that the separatist movement and then the war 
emerged in Donbass not in other Eastern regions can be explained 
neither by a specific “Donbass identity” nor by the Putin’s Russia 
interference. These factors could play the role (and they did) but the 
key factor was the loss of administrative control over Donbass state 
and military institutions. As Dominique Arell and Jessie Driscoll 
argue “contra the claims of anarchic chaos in the Russian media, 
there was no real state failure in Ukraine. Political order persevered. 
The regime, not the state, collapsed. The exception was Donbas. The 
evidence strongly suggests that a predominantly local insurgency 
faced no practical opposition from security organs in this region, 
after the long-standing regional political and economic elites lost 
their authority as a result of the collapse of the Donetsk-dominated 
Party of Regions at the country’s center. The disintegration of the 
regime in Kyïv paralyzed state  institutions in the Donbas. While the 
annexation of Crimea in March 2014 resulted from Russia’s military 
takeover of existing state institutions on the peninsula, the Donbas 
insurgency, from the outset in April 2014, was intent on building 
parallel institutions. The record suggests that the expectation of a 
Russian intervention in Eastern Ukraine in the wake of Crimea 
emboldened insurgents, but this expectation cannot explain why the 
state was much weaker in Donbas than elsewhere” (Arel and 
Driscoll, 2016). In the same way, one should understand that the fact 
that the new political elite together with the oligarchs managed to 
discipline local authorities in Odessa, Khar’kiv, Dnepropetrovsk and 
other Eastern cities except Donbass (see, for instance, Portnov, 
2016) determined the victory of Euromaidan over Antimaidan in 
these regions despite the fact that Euromaidan was unpopular there.      
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    However, we can fully explain these outcomes only if take into 
account dynamics of popular protest. Both separatist leaders in 
Donbass and pro-Ukrainian forces leaders in Odessa and Khar’kiv 
needed popular support to achieve their goals. That is why my 
analysis of protest engagement contributes to understanding of what 
happened in Ukraine after Euromaidan.  
    But how to explain the failure of civic nationalism transition from 
Euromaidan to the East of the country? My answer is very banal. 
Although Euromaidan was as a popular uprising was the moment of 
empowerment, and of new solidarities, identities and cultural 
meanings emergence, it failed to establish any kind of constituent 
power (see, for instance, Kalyvas, 2005). On the one hand, so-called 
‘leaders of Maidan’ were the opposition politicians from the elite 
who considered the protest as an instrument of taking power. On the 
other hand, the majority of protesters as our research showed, did not 
want to touch ‘big politics’ (Zhuravlev, 2014). Oligarch Petro 
Poroshenko, ex-Foreign Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, ex-Prime 
Minister Oleksandr Turchinov and many others were much more 
powerful and organized than atomized and politically naïve 
protesters.  
    Not surprisingly, the new elite was not interested in 
democratization of the political system. As Oleksandr Fisun argues, 
“2016-2017 reconfiguration of Ukraine’s political system yielded a 
semi-managed democracy. It marked the end of the post-Euromaidan 
divided rule system of 2014-2016, with an intense expansion of 
presidential control over key political institutions and the dismissal 
of Yatsenyuk as an independent power player. Poroshenko 
demonstrated apt usage of both formal and informal levers of 
patronal presidentialism to harness an effective coalition <…> The 
new model has four main features: consolidation of power by 
President Petro Poroshenko, formation of a pro-presidential coalition 
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in parliament, integration of former president Viktor Yanukovych’s 
oligarchic representatives, and a rise in the importance of sub-
national politics. This political system confirms the end of the post-
Euromaidan era of political diversity” (Fisun, 2017). As well as 
Euromaidan itself, its symbolic and cultural inventions were 
instrumentalized by the ruling class. The label of a unified civic 
nation was used by politicians for gaining legitimacy during the war. 
The new government needed far-right movements who were ready 
to transform themselves into para-military battalions since the army 
was in a sad state. That is why they provided them with some 
resources, however, controlling them and keeping them away from 
big politics. The new government relied on nationalistic propaganda 
in order to mobilize popular support at the moment of economic 
crisis. Finally, both Ukrainian propaganda and Russia’s interference 
in Ukraine helped to attribute “pro-Russian” image to any 
oppositional political initiative. 
    That is why initially republican inclusive national identity was 
transformed into a xenophobic one. Analysis of the two interviews 
taken by our colleagues from the Center for Social and Labor 
Research (Kyiv) with the activists of Euromaidan who were the 
leaders of self-organized initiatives within the movement allow to 
analyze the mechanism of political alienation of self-organized 
initiatives. 
    The first informant is a sport couch from L’viv. He has been a 
volunteer who organized the sport club where he trained children 
from needy families. At the same time, he has been working as a 
journalist. During the protests, he regularly went to Kyiv with his 
friends, veterans of the Afghan war. They organized their own self-
defense unit within the protest camp. In the interview, he opposed 
their team to the leaders of Euromaidan:  
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“When we came for the second time to Kyiv, political parties already 
played the main role in Maidan. They did not need us, because we 
were not any party members and they could not control us. It was 
quite obvious … people came to Maidan and saw that these political 
forces controlled everything”.      
He told how the leaders prevented any kind of autonomous collective 
action: 
“The revolutionary headquarter was located in the Trade Union 
building. It was headed by our three political parties. We came and 
suggested we could defense journalists and they went against us … 
It was when the assaults on journalists started … I remember the 
press-conference was about to start … We asked: please, make an 
announcement that there are people here who are ready to defend 
journalists … They did not. During another press-conference I asked 
to make an announcement and they did not again … They never did 
it”.  
He also recalled that they wanted to block Berkut special police in 
the Ukrainian House building where the policemen were waiting for 
order to start an attack on protesters. The protesters from the self-
defense Euromaidan units made the decision to put some snow near 
the entrance and to cover it with water and then to besiege the 
building and to start negotiations on releasing of political prisoners. 
However, the leaders of Euromaidan did not allow them to do it and 
finally escaped the policemen. In fact, he told several stories during 
the interview on how their initiatives were blocked by the heads of 
Euromaidan.    
    As many other respondents, he spoke about overcoming of 
regional cleavages at the moment of Euromaidan. He recalled that 
the policemen in civilian clothes tried to provoke ethnic conflicts 
between Euromaidan activists from Donbass and from Western 
Ukraine in order to split the unified movement. He said that “the 
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conflict between East and West was constructed superficially”. 
However, when talked about Antimaidan movement, i. e. about 
political opponents of Euromaidan, he referred to the stigmatizing 
images: “the base of Antimaidan was Ukrainian East <…> they 
were sportsmen, criminals, drug addicts”. Then he said: “The East 
of the country … they are mostly Russian-speaking people … they 
were taked there from Russia and therefore they have Russian 
identity”.         
     The second informant is one of the leaders of the right wing 
‘Right sector’ from Western Ukraine. He several times told about 
autonomous political initiatives they wanted to organize: “We 
organized meetings, worked with people, published leaflets …”. He 
recalled that after the murder of one of their leaders organized by the 
new Ministry of Internal Affairs they had to stop political activity 
and to perform military tasks: 
“after the annexation and S. murder we started doing other things … 
we started defending Ukraine and its territorial integrity … we had 
to withdraw from political struggle”.  
Again, as many other informants, he, on the one hand, asserted the 
unity of the civic nation:  
“Maidan unified the country … Now we don’t say … we don’t use 
these terms banderovites, easterners, russkies … I never sow as 
many Ukrainian flags in Western Ukraine as in Dnepropetrovsk, 
Nikolaev, Mariupol…”.    
At the same time, when talked about the war he stigmatized the East: 
“All people knew that the most of criminals were in Luhansk and 
Donetsk” 
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Chapter VII. General conclusions 
 
   Microsociology alone cannot explain the structural outcomes of 
both Russian and Ukrainian protests. Indeed, dynamics of 
engagement, collective identities, and vocabularies of motivation 
neither cause mobilization nor determine the structural effects of 
protests and uprisings. However, research into the dynamics of 
collective action allows us to see whether micro-processes of 
mobilization contribute to structural change or, alternatively, serve 
as a tool of social reproduction or both. At the same time, elites 
cannot achieve any transformations of social and political structures 
or a preservation of the status quo without mass support. That is why 
it is crucial to study the dynamics of collective action at the micro 
level. Finally, structural conditions and factors reveal themselves in 
perceptions and practices of persons and groups. In other words, 
structural factors become visible when we study the micro-dynamics 
of collective action. However, one should place this micro-analysis 
into the broader context, both social and theoretical, in order to make 
conclusions about structural change. In this final part of my thesis, I 
will reflect on what the comparison of two cases tells us about post-
Soviet protests and sociological theory. 
 
Events 
 
    My conclusions allow for the theoretical and political significance 
of events and eventfulness to be reconsidered. The empirical 
research I have conducted has allowed me to reveal the ambiguity of 
eventful temporality. In social theory, eventfulness is considered 
both in terms of durable social change and as a momentous break 
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with routines of daily life. In fact, protest events have been 
characterized by both. In cases considered by many researchers, 
routine breaches are accumulated within the duration of a structural 
transformation. However, my research has shown that these two 
eventful temporalities need to be considered separately. Such a 
separation will allow us to better understand why some present-day 
eventful protests do not lead to significant social change. 
After May 1968, political philosophies of events began to 
consider eventfulness as a source of political novelty, new paradigms 
of thinking and acting, and social transformations (Badiou, 2001; de 
Certeau, 1997). At the same time, my research has shown that 
eventful temporalities and eventful experiences can be considered as 
contributing not only to social changes, but also to the alienation of 
people from social transformations and to the reproduction of 
dominant social and political orders. Ukrainian but also Russian 
protesters turned out to be alienated from the products of their 
political activity and from “big” post-protest politics in general not 
by means of a false consciousness, but through the illusion that an 
eventful experience itself brought a social change. Thus, the eventful 
temporality of an extraordinary break with the routine can itself be 
an instrument of protesters’ isolation in a singular time and space. 
This time of eventful protest is present-oriented. Theorist Sergey 
Prozorov claims that the “sterility of the present is an uneventful 
timelessness” (Prozorov, 2008: 213). The author means that the 
“timeless now” of depoliticization is uneventful because it cannot 
produce a political change. However, Kevin McDonald, describing 
contemporary social movements, alternatively interrelates 
presentism and eventfulness: “The temporal pressure associated with 
actions produces a sense of urgency that is central to the culture of 
activism, and to forms of action constructed in terms of ‘the event’”, 
characterized by the “the imperative of immediacy, the utopia of 
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instant exchange and simultaneity” (McDonald, 2010: 119). Could 
it be that eventfulness of contemporary protests contributes to their 
political unproductiveness? Francesca Polletta in her famous book 
on the American protests of 1960s writes that in the activists’ 
narratives, eventful protests were depicted as a “fever”. However, 
this was a strategic step. The author claims: “Why do activists so 
often describe protest as sprung from the head of Zeus, ignoring or 
downright denying the planning that preceded it? Why do they cast 
themselves not as strategic actors but as swept up by forces over 
which they have no control? Activists tell stories for strategic 
reasons […]. For American activists during much of the last century, 
one of the thorniest challenges was to avoid charges of communist 
inﬂuence. Representing protest as homegrown and spur-of-the-
moment was a way to deﬂect claims that it was controlled by 
‘outsiders,’ which meant Communists […] when students described 
the sit-ins as ‘spontaneous,’ and as ‘exploding,’ ‘welling up,’ and 
‘like a fever,’ they captured the indeﬁnable moment when a group of 
separate individuals became a collective actor” (Polletta, 2006: 34). 
But what if loss of control and “like a fever” in some of the present-
day protests is becoming not a strategic narrative but a true logic 
behind the eventful temporality of collective action? Indeed, my 
research shows that both Ukrainian and Russian elites have gained 
from the fact the protests turned out to be limited by the “eventful” 
and “authentic” public sphere. French sociologist Jan-Louis Fabiani 
touches on this problem in his analysis of the recent big protest 
events, for example, Occupy Wall Street in the U. S. and the “Arab 
Spring” in Northern Africa. The author raises the following 
questions: “is the event always doomed to express its irreducible 
singularity or its ephemeral character and end swiftly in 
disenchantment? Or is it, on the contrary, able to propel a new form 
of democracy as distinct from the aggiornamento of an exhausted 
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democratic system or praise of the riot as the midwife of political 
novelty?” (Fabiani, 2013). However, as I have shown, both protests 
tended to spread beyond their time and space. My research has 
revealed that pragmatic and cultural factors facilitated as well as 
hindered the expansion of the eventful protests outside singular 
events. 
 
Cultural and pragmatic factors 
 
    Social change happens when an eventful mobilization meets 
material environments, cultural mechanisms of a transmission of 
subjectivities, routine practices of collective action that allow to 
sustain, reproduce, and spread eventful collective action to a wider 
social context. That is why an integration of the cultural and 
pragmatic approach together with a combination of meso- and 
micro-levels of a study are fruitful for an analysis of eventful social 
change. 
In the Russian case, the protest mobilization produced the 
eventful experience of togetherness that contrasted with previous 
experience of a-politicism and therefore was very inspiring. This 
experience became self-valuable and formed the desire to sustain and 
reproduce the “unity” of all the protesters regardless of their 
ideological preferences or social interests. The crisis of the 
movement, at the same time, led to the “transplantation” of the 
protest solidarities into a local level. The networks of election 
observers translated eventful collective action into a routine practice 
of observation at the polling stations. The fact that electoral 
neighborhoods in Russia coincided with city districts was crucial for 
the emergence of the new local activism. The observers became 
urban militants and municipal deputies. Spatial structure of electoral 
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units facilitated formation of the neighbor “branches” of the “For fair 
elections” movement. At the same time, the legitimacy and 
commonness of the very “genre” of local activism spurred the 
observers to initiate local activist groups. In turn, the materiality of 
courtyards, trees, benches, and so on, made local collective action 
concrete, rooted in familiar spaces, convincing, and, therefore, 
legitimate and attractive for local people. Finally, the increased 
repressions of the nationwide opposition made local collective action 
strategically important. 
In the Ukrainian case, the transformation of the pro-European 
protest into a popular uprising against the government resonated with 
the public mood because many were dissatisfied with Yanukovych’s 
predatory regime. This transformation led to the mobilization of 
thousands of protesters, including the opponents of closer integration 
with the European Union. The emergence of the Maidan camps in 
different cities inspired a feeling of unity and those involved 
cherished the belief that a civic nation had already formed, 
democratization was coming, and civil society had emerged 
throughout the whole country in the course of the protests. However, 
a “transition” of the new civic nation to the Eastern regions of the 
country was hindered by the emergent civil conflict as well as 
Russian interference in Ukraine. Paradoxically, the strong belief in a 
county’s unification that was based on personal eventful experience, 
finally, made Euromaidan enclosed within the singular time and 
space of the protest. It also made Maidan seem hostile to outside 
audiences. This hostility allowed the Antimaidan movement, 
separatists, and Russia to develop the violent conflict in the country. 
At the same time, the new Ukrainian government counted on this 
mix of the “European values” discourse and an aggressive 
nationalistic ideology together with neoliberal policies. The 
authorities, instead of implementing integration politicies, started 
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anti-terrorist operations. In other words, the illusion of nationwide 
unity that emerged during the Euromaidan paradoxically facilitated 
the exclusion of the opponents from the national community as well 
as promoted the spread of nationalism and xenophobia. I have shown 
the role played by eventful collective emotions and experiences, 
“challenging” narratives and ideological taxonomic cognitive 
schemes in the formation of the “politics of authenticity”. This 
politics, in turn, being initially “open to all” then gathered popular 
support for aggressive political and military steps in the name of 
Euromaidan. The polarization and violent conflict did not only 
reproduce the symbolic oppositions between Russian and Ukrainian 
and Eastern and Western, making the new nationalism xenophobic. 
They also blocked the emergence of a nationwide protest movement 
that could manage to change the social and political orders in 
Ukraine. As a result, based on the revolutionary legitimacy produced 
by the masses, the new authorities reasserted authoritarianism, 
exclusive Ukrainian nationalism and a neopatrimonial corrupt state 
(Ishchenko, 2018; Minakov, 2018; Fisun, 2017). Thus, I considered 
some cultural and pragmatic factors, mechanisms and environments 
that facilitated and hindered eventful social change. In the final 
section, I will analyze some structural factors that impacted the both 
protests’ outcomes. As Francesca Polletta claims, “The mix of 
structural and cultural processes that produce new identities and 
interests should be thrown into sharp relief” (Polletta, 2006: 5). 
 
Structural factors 
 
    In her book on narrativity and movements, Francesca Polletta 
argues that considering cultural processes we should not leave aside 
structural factors. On the one hand, the author claims, “the task […] 
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is to grasp not only how culture shapes interests and identities but 
the structural conditions in which it has more or less independent 
force in doing so” (Polletta, 2006: 5). On the other hand, Polletta 
insists that the “culturally and socially privileged” have much more 
power than the unprivileged to produce authoritative and influential 
meanings, interpretations and effects of narratives and discourses in 
general (Polletta, 2006: 16). 
In my opinion, the comparison of the two cases reveals the 
importance of structural factors that influence how much influential 
the other factors, cultural and pragmatic, are. It does not mean that 
“social structures” ontologically dominate cultural and pragmatic 
ones. It means that in societies in which movements are weak and 
are still not able to accumulate political power, some structural 
circumstances are crucial. At the same time, the huge inequalities 
between rank-and-file protesters, “opposition leaders”, and political 
elites and oligarchs make “challenging” discourses of protesters 
vulnerable to be “colonized” by the official rhetoric. 
In the Russian case, I examined how the event widespread to 
new social contexts and produced social change, while within the 
Ukrainian case I showed the circumstances and processes that 
hindered an expansion of the event and blocked social 
transformations. I revealed some mechanisms of post-protest social 
change and social reproduction. On the one hand, I explored the 
integration of “apolitical” activism and “oppositional” politics that 
was produced by the daily practices of collective action devoted to 
both “small deeds” and political campaigns. I showed that this 
integration changed the apolitical culture of urban activism in 
Russia. On the other hand, I analyzed the re-politicization of regional 
divisions in Ukraine that were driven by protest mobilization, within 
which inclusive nationalism had been becoming the exclusive form 
because of the illusion of a plebiscitary all-national mobilization. In 
241 
 
other words, I showed “how” social changes are produced or stop 
short. However, the question “why” remains open. 
I believe that the Russian case looks more “successful” 
because the social changes within it occurred at a local level, while 
the social reproduction I revealed within the Ukrainian case 
happened at a national level. In my opinion, post-Soviet countries 
are the part of the global tendency within which grassroots social 
change is more achievable at the local than at the national level. 
Famous theoretician Frank Ankersmit argues: “political 
scientists recently discovered that local bureaucracies tend to be 
unexpectedly responsive to [local issues] and to react in a creative 
way to how problems are perceived by the people involved. So this 
kind of relatively local and isolated problem had best be left to the 
interplay of direct democracy […]. And on a larger, or even national 
scale one might think of issues […] politicized and polarized by 
tactless political handlings” (Ankersmit, 2002: 116). The author then 
claims that local activism is more effective because it is based on the 
principle of direct democracy while participation in a “big” politics 
requires political representation: “representation is a procedure we 
will rely upon if we wish to put things into their wider context […] 
direct democracy may be the most sensible way to deal with political 
problems that can more or less be isolated from a wider context” 
(ibid.). Indeed, as I have shown, the Euromaidan mobilization was 
characterized by the refusal of political representation. That is why, 
I believe, the paramilitary activities of the “volunteer battalions” as 
well as post-Euromaidan local activism that I do not touch upon here 
turned out to be much more successful than the “big” political 
projects of the movement. The Euromaidan itself as a form of 
grassroots mobilization lacked the political self-determination as 
well as communication on strategic choices among rank-and-file 
protesters. In a sense, the mobilization was initially plebiscitary and, 
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in this sense, “direct”. Ankersmit claims that nowadays, politics is 
characterized by the inequality of democratic power between 
national and local politics: “Our contemporary democracies, both 
Anglo-Saxon and continental, could all be said to have become 
plebiscitary democracies […] Though it must be added that this 
movement toward plebiscitary democracy on the national level is to 
a certain extent counteracted by a movement toward variants of 
direct democracy on the local level. In this way a polarization can be 
observed in our contemporary democracies: they tend to become less 
democratic on the national scale but more sensitive to pressure by 
the people on the local level” (ibid.: 123). In her research on local 
activism, American sociologist Nina Eliasoph claims that local 
collective actions, even if they look selfish, are in fact inspired by 
the democratic ideal. However, as ordinary people are alienated from 
democracy on the national level, they act “close to home”: 
The idea of cultural work [behind local activism] seriously 
acknowledges people's sense of political powerlessness. While 
politicians all over the globe extoll the virtues of voluntary 
associations like the ones portrayed here—treating them as a panacea 
for all social ills, from lack of trust, to crime, to poverty, to economic 
inefficiency—this article shows how hidden obstructions to citizens' 
communication can fuel this prevalent language of political 
disconnection. In an imperfect world [local activists] responded 
dexterously and creatively to powerlessness; [their] response lacked 
different aspects of the democratic ideal. But all retained some aspect 
of it. I can put this even more strongly: the effort at retaining some 
aspect of it included an implicit recognition of its failings. The effort 
at retaining a faith that the world makes sense, is just and democratic, 
included acknowledgment of the ways in which the world does not 
make sense, is not just, not democratic (Eliasoph, 1997: 640). 
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The author criticizes the powerlessness of ordinary people 
who having tried to save democracy, shorten their radius of action: 
“The irony in the United States is that while community-minded 
volunteers, empathetic social service workers, and debate-oriented 
"humanists" try hard to avoid talking about the common good, free 
marketeers and religious fundamentalists use the language of 
obligation, solidarity, and the common good to advocate private 
schooling, private health care, private charity instead of welfare […] 
When the public spirit evaporates from so many others' public 
discourse, these are the loudest ‘public-spirited’ voices left in public: 
the voices that call for citizens to abandon public decision-making 
and abandon public self-reflection (and abandon the common good 
as well)” (ibid.: 639). 
In my research, I have shown these asymmetries in process. 
Considering two similar—to a certain extent—uprisings, I have 
shown how much more difficult it was to convert the energy of 
Euromaidan into a process of systemic change for the social and 
political order, and how effective local collective action, inspired by 
the protests, turned out to be in Russia. In other words, studying the 
cultural and pragmatic dimensions of eventful collective action, I 
have revealed the mechanisms that make democracy possible at the 
local level and the obstacles that alienate ordinary people from 
participation in democratic politics at the national level. 
 
 
 
    
244 
 
Bibliography 
 
Abbott, Andrew (1992). "From Causes to Events" Sociological Methods and 
Research, 20:428-455 
Alexander, Jeffrey (2003). The Meanings of Social Life: A Cultural 
Sociology. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press. 
Alyukov, Maxim, Erpyleva, Svetlana, Zhuravlev, Oleg, Zavadskaya, 
Margarita, Clément, Carine, Magun, Artemy, Matveev, Ilya, 
Nevsky, Andrey, Savelyeva, Natalia & Maria Turovets (2014). 
Politika apolitichnyh: Grazhdanskie dvizheniia v Rossii 2011–2013 
godov [The politics of the apolitical: civic movements in Russia, 
2011–2013], Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie. 
Alyukov, Maxim (2017). “How Does Russian TV Propaganda Really 
Work?” openDemocracy, https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-
russia/maxim-alyukov/how-does-russian-tv-propaganda-really-
work 
Ankersmit, Frank (2002). “Political Representation”. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 
Arel, Dominique (2005). Ukraine has chosen the West, but without 
the East. Pro et Contra, 9(1), July-August. 
Bennett, Elizabeth, Cordner, Alissa, Taylor Klein, Peter, Savell, 
Stephanie, & Gianpaolo Baiocchi (2013). “Disavowing Politics: 
Civic Engagement in an Era of Political Skepticism.” American 
Journal of Sociology 119.2: 518–548. 
Bertelsen, Olga (ed.) (2017). Revolution and War in Contemporary 
Ukraine: The Challenge of Change. ibidem-Verlag, 2016. Soviet and 
Post-Soviet Politics and Society 161, general editor, Andreas 
Umland. 430 pp.  
Bikbov, Alexander (2012). Representation and empowerment // Logos. No 4 
(88). 
245 
 
Boltanski, Luc and Eve Chiapello (2005). “The New Spirit of Capitalism.” 
International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 18.3/4 
(Spring–Summer 2005): 161–188. 
Boltanski, Luc and Eve Chiapello (2007). The New Spirit of Capitalism. 
London & New York: Verso.  
Boltanski, Luc and Laurent Thévenot (2006). On Justification: Economies 
of Worth. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Bennett, Elizabeth, Cordner, Alissa, Taylor Klein, Peter, Savell, 
Stephanie, & Gianpaolo Baiocchi (2013). “Disavowing Politics: 
Civic Engagement in an Era of Political Skepticism.” American 
Journal of Sociology 119.2: 518–548. 
Boltanski, Luc and Eve Chiapello (2005). “The New Spirit of 
Capitalism.” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 
18.3/4 (Spring–Summer 2005): 161–188. 
Boltanski, Luc and Eve Chiapello (2007). The New Spirit of 
Capitalism. London & New York: Verso.  
Boltanski, Luc and Laurent Thévenot (2006). On Justification: 
Economies of Worth. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Bourdieu, Pierre (1988). “Homo Academicus”. Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press. 
Budraitskis Ilya (2014). The Weakest Link of Managed Democracy: How 
the Parliament 
Gave Birth to Nonparliamentary Politics // South Atlantic Quarterly. Vol. 
113. № 1. 
Р. 169–185. 
Clément, Carine, Miryasova, Olga, & Andrei Demidov (2010). Ot 
obyvatelei k aktivistam. Zarozhdaiushchiesia sotsialnye dvizheniia 
v sovremennoi Rossii. [From ordinary folk to activists: emergent 
social movements in modern Russia]. Moscow: Tri kvadrata. 
246 
 
Clément, Carine (2013). “Khimkinskoe dvizhenie. Za lesom 
grazhdanskoe obshchestvo” [The Khimki movement: civil society 
defends a forest]. In Gorodskie dvizheniia v Rossii v 2009–2012: 
na puti k politicheskomu [Urban movements in Russia, 2009–2012: 
on the way to the political], ed. Carine Clément, 146–199. 
Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie. 
Della Porta, Donatella and Gianni Piazza (2003). Voices of the 
Valley, Voices of the Straits: How Protest Creates Communities. 
New York & Oxford: Berghahn Books. 
Della Porta, Donatella (2008). “Eventful Protests, Global 
Conflicts.” Journal of Social Theory 9:2: 27–56. 
Della Porta, Donatella (2014). Mobilizing for Democracy: 
Comparing 1989 and 2011. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Eliasoph, Nina (1996). “Making a Fragile Public: A Talk-Centered 
Study of Citizenship and Power.” Sociological Theory 14.3: 262¬–
289. 
Eliasoph, Nina (1997). “‘Close to Home’: The Work of Avoiding 
Politics.” Theory and Society 26.5: 605–647.  
Eliasoph, Nina and Paul Lichterman (2003). “Culture in 
Interaction.” American Journal of Sociology 4.108: 735–794. 
Fabiani, Jean-Louis (2013). Changes in Public Sphere (1983-2013). 
Eurozine 
https://www.eurozine.com/changes-in-the-public-sphere-1983-
2013/ 
Fillieule, Olivier (2010). “Some Elements of an Interactionist 
Approach to Political Disengagement” Social Movement Studies 
9.1: 1–15. 
247 
 
Fisun, Olexandr (2017). “Ukraine’s Semi-Managed Democracy on 
the March”. Ponars, Eurasia 
http://www.ponarseurasia.org/node/9327 
Gabowitsch, Mischa (2017). Protest in Putin's Russia. Polity Press. 
Gladarev, Boris (2011). “Istoriko-kulturnoe nasledie Peterburga: 
rozhdenie obshchestvennosti iz dukha goroda” [Petersburg’s 
cultural heritage: the emergence of a public from the city’s spirit]. 
In Ot obshchestvennogo k publichnomy [From the social to the 
public], ed. Oleg Kharkhodin, 69–304. St. Petersburg: EUSP Press. 
Grigoriev, Ivan and Dekalchuk, Anna (2015). “School of Autocracy: 
Pensions and Labour Reforms of the First Putin Administration. 
Political Science”. Working paper, Higher School of Economics 
Gudkov, Lev and Boris Dubin (2007). “Post-totalitarnyi sindrom: 
‘upravliaemaia demokratiia’ i apatiia mass” [The post-totalitarian 
syndrome: “managed democracy” and popular apathy]. In Puti 
rossiiskogo postkommunizma [Paths of Russian post-communism], 
ed. Maria Lipman and Anna Riabova, 8–63. Moskva: Elinin.  
Gudkov, Lev, Dubin, Boris & Natalia Zorkaya (2012). “Rossiiskie 
parlamentskie vybory: elektoral’nyi protsess pri avtoritarnom 
rezhime” [Russian parliamentary elections: the electoral process 
under an authoritarian regime]. Vestnik obshchestvennnogo 
mneniia 1.111: 5–31.  
Gudkov, Lev (2017). “Sotsiologiia – eto ne tsifry” [Sociology is 
not about numbers]. openDemocracy, July 17, 2017, 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/lev-gudkov/sociologia-
eto-ne-cifry. 
248 
 
Jasper, James (2011). “Emotions and Social Movements: Twenty 
Years of Theory and Research.” Annual Review of Sociology 37: 
285–304. 
https://www.hse.ru/data/2015/03/03/1091068990/24PS2015.pdf 
Howard, Marc (2003). The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist 
Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ishchenko, Volodymyr (2016). The Ukrainian left during and after the 
Maidan protests.  
https://eastwestaccord.com/the-ukrainian-left-during-and-after-the-maidan-
protests-volodymyr-ishchenko/ 
 
Kalinin, Ilya (2017). Why “Two Russias” are less than “United 
Russia”. Cultural distinctions and political similarities: dialectics of 
the defeat // The Shrew Untamed: Cultural Mechanisms of Political 
Protest in Russia / Ed. by Birgit Beumers, Alexander Etkind and 
Olga Gurova. London: Routledge, 2017. 
Kharkhordin, Oleg (1994). “The Corporate Ethic, the Ethic of 
Samostoyatelnost, and the Spirit of Capitalism: Reflection on 
Market-Building in Post-Soviet Russia.” International Sociology 
9.4: 405–429. 
Kharkhordin, Oleg (1996). “Reveal and Dissimulate: A Genealogy of 
Private Life in Soviet Russia' in J. Weintraub and K. Kumar (eds.) 
Public and Private in Thought and Practice: Perspectives on a Grand 
Dichotomy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 333-63. 
Kharkhordin, Oleg (2016). “Friendship and Politics in Russia.” Common 
Knowledge 22.2: 220–236. 
Kolesnikov, Andrey, Volkov, Denis (2017). Do we want social change? 
(http://carnegie.ru/2017/12/27/ru-pub-75116) 
Krastev, Ivan (2014). "Democracy Disrupted. The Global Politics on 
Protest" (University of Pennsylvania Press).  
249 
 
Kuntz, Philipp and Mark R. Thompson (2009). “More than Just the 
Final Straw: Stolen Elections as Revolutionary Triggers.” 
Comparative Politics 3.41: 253–272. 
Laclau, Ernesto (2005) On Populist Reason , Verso (London) 
Latour, Bruno (1983). “Give Me a Laboratory and I Will Raise the World.” 
In Science Observed: Perspectives on the Social Study of Science, 
ed. Karin Knorr-Cetina and Michael Mulkay, 141–170. London and 
Beverly Hills: Sage. 
Lynch, Allen C. (2005). How Russia is not Ruled: Reflections on Russian 
Political Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Matveev, Ilya (2012). “Effekt podlinnosti” [The effect of authenticity]. 
Russkii zhurnal, March, 12, 2012, http://www.russ.ru/Mirovaya-
povestka/Effekt-podlinnosti 
Mitrokhin, Nikolai (2015). “Between stability and turmoil. The socio-
political situation in the East of Ukraine” http://library.fes.de/pdf-
files/bueros/ukraine/11675.pdf 
 
McAdam, Doug and William Sewell (2001). “It’s about Time: Temporality 
in the Study of Social Movements and Revolutions.” In Silence and 
Voices in the Study of Contentious Politics, ed. Ronald Aminadze, 
Jack Goldstone, Doug McAdam, Elizabeth Perry, William Sewell, 
Sidney Tarrow & Charles Tilly, 89–125. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
McDonald, Kevin (2002). “From Solidarity to Fluidarity: Social Movements 
beyond Collective Identity – The Case of Globalization Conflicts” , 
Social Movement Studies 2(2): 109–128. 
Onuch, Olga and Sasse, Gwendolyn (2016). The Maidan in movement: 
Diversity and the cycles of protest. Europe-Asia Studies 68 (4): 556–
587 
Moore, Adam (2011) “The Eventfulness of Social Reproduction,” 
Sociological Theory, 29:4.  
250 
 
Oswald Ingrid, Voronkov Viktor (2004). “The “Public-Private” Sphere in 
Soviet and Post-Soviet Society. Perception and Dynamic of “Public” 
and “Private” in Contemporary Russia”. European Societies, vol. 6, 
№ 1. 
Pattaroni, Luc (2015). “Difference and the Common of the City: The 
Metamorphosis of the Political from the Urban Struggles of the 
1970s to the Contemporary Urban Order”. In The Making of the 
Common in Social Relations, ed. José Manuel Resende and 
Alexandre Cotovio Martins, 141–172. Newcastle upon Tyne: 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 
Polletta, Francesca (2006). It Was Like a Fever: Storytelling in Protest and 
Politics. University of Chicago Press. 
Polletta, Francesca (1998). “It was like a fever ...” Narrative and identity in 
social protest. Social Problems, 45(2), 137–159. 
Portnov, Andrii (2016). “How ‘Eastern Ukraine’ was lost”. OpenDemocracy 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/andrii-portnov/how-eastern-
ukraine-was-lost 
Portnov, Andrii (2010). “Uprazhneniya s istoriey po Ukrainski [Excercises 
with history in Ukrainian]”. Moscow: OGI, Polit.ru, Memorial 
Prozorov, Sergei (2008). “Russian Postcommunism and the End of 
History.” Studies of Eastern European Thought 60: 207–230. 
Rodgers, Peter (2006). “'Understanding Regionalism and the Politics of 
Identity in Ukraine's Eastern Borderlands”. Nationalities Papers 
34(2): 157–74 
Rogov, Kirill (2011) “Gipoteza tret’ego tsikla: rossiiane o proshedshikh 
vyborakh i aktsiiakh protesta” [The third cycle hypothesis: Russians 
on recent elections and protests]. Levada Center, 
http://www.levada.ru/28--2012-2011/rossiyane-ob-aktsiyakh-
protesta-i-proshedshikh-vyborakh. 
Rutland, Peter (2015). An unnecessary war: The geopolitical roots of the 
Ukraine conflict. In A. Pikulicka Wilczewska & R. Sakwa (Eds.), 
251 
 
Ukraine and Russia: People, politics, propaganda and perspectives 
(pp. 129–140). Bristol, UK: E-International Relations. 
Savelyeva, Natalia (2013). “Edinstvo raznykh: representatsiia i populizm v 
dvizhenii ‘Za chestnye vybory’” [The unity of different people: 
representation and populism in the Fair Elections movement]. 
Sotsiologiia vlasti 4: 59–78. 
Savelyeva, Natalia and Zavadskaya, Margarita (2014). “Stolen Elections vs 
Stolen Votes: Politicization through Elections in Russia 2011-12” in 
Erpyleva, Svetlana and Artemy Magun (Eds.). The Politics of 
Apoliticals: Civic Movements in Russia, 2011-13. Moscow: New 
Literary Review. 
Sewell, William (1996). “Historical Events as Transformations of 
Structures: Inventing Revolution at the Bastille.” Theory and Society 
25.6: 841–881. 
Shekhovtsov, Anton (2013). “The “Orange revolution” and the “sacred” 
birth of a civic-republican Ukrainian nation”. Nationalities Papers 
41(5) 
Shlapentokh, Vladimir (1989). Public and private life of the Soviet people: 
changing values in post-Stalin Russia. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Tarrow, Sidney (2011). “Why Occupy Wall Street is not the Tea Party of 
the Left”. Foreign Affairs 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-america/2011-10-
10/why-occupy-wall-street-not-tea-party-left 
 
Thévenot, Laurent (2001). “Pragmatic Regimes Governing the 
Engagement with the World”. In The Practice Turn in 
Contemporary Theory. Ed. Theodor R. Schatzki, Karen Knorr 
Cetina, & Eike von Savigny, 64–82. London & New York: 
Routledge. 
252 
 
Thévenot, Laurent (2015). “Voicing Concern and Difference: From Public 
Spaces to Common-places.” European Journal of Cultural and 
Political Sociology 1.1: 7–34. 
Thévenot, Laurent and Michael Moody (2001). “Comparing Models of 
Strategy Interests, and the Public Good in French and American 
Environmental Disputes.” In Rethinking Comparative Cultural 
Sociology: Repertoires of Evaluation in France and the United 
States, ed. Michèle Lamont and Laurent Thévenot, 273–306. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Tugal, Cihan (2015). “Elusive revolt: The contradictory Rise of Middle 
Class Politics”. Thesis Eleven, Vol. 130(1) 74–95 
Volpina, Natasha (2012). “Teoriia malikh del” [The theory of small deeds]. 
Snob, November 19, 2012, 
http://www.snob.ru/profile/21090/blog/54899. 
Wagner-Pacifici, Robin (2010). “Theorizing the Restlessness of Events.” 
American Journal of Sociology 115.5: 1351–1386. 
Way, Lucan (2015). “Pluralism by Default: Weak Autocrats and the Rise of 
Competitive Politics”. John Hopkins University Press.  
Weber, Max (1958). “Politics as a Vocation.” In From Max Weber: Essays 
in Sociology, ed. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, 77–128. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Yurchak, Alexei (2005). Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: 
The Last Soviet Generation. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Zharkov, Vasily (2017). “Ne boiatsia sobstvennykh grazhdan. Pochemu 
liberalam ne nuzhny izbirateli-natsionalisty” [Not being afraid of our 
own citizens. Why liberals have no need of nationalist voters]. 
Novaya Gazeta, June 24, 2017, 
https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2017/07/24/73227-ne-
boyatsya-sobstvennyh-grazhdan. 
Zhelnina, Anna (2014). “‘Ya v eto ne lezu’: vospriiatie lichnogo i 
obshchestvenogo sredi rossiiskoi molodezhi nakanune vyborov” [“I 
253 
 
don’t mess with that”: Russian young people’s sense of the personal 
and the public on the eve of the elections]. In Politika apolitichnyh: 
Grazhdanskie dvizheniia v Rossii 2011–2013 godov [The politics of 
the apolitical: civic movements in Russia, 2011–2013], ed. Maxim 
Alyukov et al., 143–180.  Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie. 
Zhukov, Yuri (2016). “The economics of rebellion in eastern Ukraine”. 
Journal of comparative economics 44 (1), 1-15 
Zhuravlev, Oleg (2014). “Inertsiia postsovetskoi depolitizatsii i politizatsii 
2011–2012 godov” [The inertia of post-Soviet depoliticization and 
politicization during 2011–2012]. In Politika apolitichnyh: 
Grazhdanskie dvizheniia v Rossii 2011–2013 godov [The politics of 
the apolitical: civic movements in Russia, 2011–2013], ed. Maxim 
Alyukov et al., 27–70.  Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie. 
Zhuravlev, Oleg, Savelyeva, Natalia and Svetlana Erpyleva (2014). 
“Razobshchennost’ i solidarnost’ v novykh rossiiskikh 
grazhdanskikh dvizheniiakh.” [Disunity and solidarity in the new 
Russian civic movements]. In Politika apolitichnyh: Grazhdanskie 
dvizheniia v Rossii 2011–2013 godov [The politics of the apolitical: 
civic movements in Russia, 2011–2013], ed. Maxim Alyukov et al., 
445–471.  Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie. 
Zhuravlev, Oleg and Ilya Matveev (2017). “‘Postpravda’ i ee problemy: ot 
postsovetskogo prostranstva k mirovomu kontekstu” [Post-truth and 
its problems: from the post-Soviet space to the global context]. Paper 
presented at the Malye Bannye Chteniia conference, April 28–29, 
2017, St. Petersburg, Russia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
254 
 
The list of the interviews  
 
The Russian cases 
 
Interview RU1: March, 2012, St. Petersburg, male, born in 1982, higher 
education, historian, protest participant 
Interview RU2: April, 2012, St. Petersburg, male, born in 1981, higher 
education, businessman, member of Civic Association 
Interview RU3: February, 2012, St. Petersburg, female, born in 1974, higher 
education, protest participant 
Interview RU4: February, 2012, St. Petersburg, female, born in 1990, 
incomplete higher education, student, protest participant 
Interview RU5 December, 2011, Moscow, male, born 1989, a student, 
protest participant 
Interview RU6 December, 2011, Moscow, female, born 1990, the profession 
is unknown, protest participant  
Interview RU7: February, 2012, St. Petersburg, female, born in 1987, higher 
education, host of a radio music program, protest participant 
Interview RU8: February, 2012, Moscow, male, born 1988, higher 
education, software developer, protest participant 
Interview RU9: October, 2012, St. Petersburg, male, born 1980, higher 
education, accountant, protest participant 
Interview RU10: February, 2012, Paris, female, born 1957, higher 
education, journalist, protest participant 
Interview RU11: October, 2012, St. Petersburg, male, born 1982, higher 
education, a university lecturer, protest participant 
Interview RU12: October, 2012, St. Petersburg, male, born 1987, higher 
education, a student, protest participant 
Interview RU13: October, 2012, St. Petersburg, female, born 1982, higher 
education, a cultural worker, protest participant 
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Interview RU14: January, 2013, Moscow, female, born 1995, incomplete 
higher education, student, member of Headquarter 
Interview RU15: April, 2012, St. Petersburg, female, born 1983, higher 
education, lawyer, member of Civic Association 
Interview RU16: February, 2012, Moscow, male, born 1984, higher 
education, programmer, protest participant 
Interview RU17: January, 2013, Moscow, male, born 1986, higher 
education, a journalist, member of Headquarter 
Interview RU18: April, 2012, St. Petersburg, male, born 1989, higher 
education, unemployed, member of Civic Association 
Interview RU19: May, 2012, St. Petersburg, male, born 1996, pupil, member 
of Civic Association 
Interview RU20: September, 2015, Moscow, male, born 1979, member of 
Civic Community 
Interview RU21: May, 2012, St. Petersburg, male, born1969, higher 
education, businessman, member of Civic Association 
Interview RU22: November, 2015, Moscow, male, born 1988, higher 
education, engineer, member of People’s Council 
Interview RU23: September, 2015, Moscow, male, born 1980, higher 
education, lawyer, member of Pubic Council 
Interview RU25: February, 2013, Moscow, male, born 1984, higher 
education, physicist, member of Headquarter 
Interview RU26: November, 2013, Moscow, male, born 1975, vocational 
training, businessman, member of Headquarter 
Interview RU27: November, 2013, Moscow, male, born 1982, vocational 
training, programmer, member of People’s Council 
Interview RU28: September, 2015, Moscow, female, born 1981, higher 
education, economist, member of Public Council 
Interview RU29: September, 2015, Moscow, male, born 1964, higher 
education, doctor, member of Public Council 
Interview RU30: June, 2012, Moscow, female 
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Interview RU31: September, 2013, Moscow, male, born 1987, higher 
education, an engineer, member of Headquarter 
Interview RU32: December, 2015, Moscow, male, born 1966, higher 
education, an urbanist, member of Headquarter 
Interview RU33: September, 2014, St. Petersburg, female, born in 1981, 
incomplete higher education, a journalist, member of Civic 
Association 
 
The Ukrainian cases 
 
Interview UK1: July, 2014, Kyiv, female, born 1984, higher education, 
Euromaidan participant 
Interview UK2: July, 2014, Kyiv, male, born 1979, higher education, a 
journalist, Euromaidan participant 
Interview UK3: July, 2014, Khar’kiv, male, born 1987, higher education, a 
businessman, Euromaidan participant 
Interview UK4: July, 2014, Kyiv, female, born 1992, incomplete higher 
education, a student, Euromaidan participant 
Interview UK5: July, 2014, Odessa, female, born 1988, higher education, 
the advisor of the rector in the university, Euromaidan participant 
Interview UK6: July, 2014, Kiev, male, born 1985, higher education, 
unemployed, Euromaidan participant 
Interview UK7: July, 2014, Kharkiv, male, born 1990, higher education, an 
architect, Euromaidan participant 
Interview UK8: July, 2014, Kiev, female, born 1988, incomplete higher 
education, a secretary, Euromaidan participant 
Interview UK9: July, 2014, Kiev, female, born 1987, higher education, a 
journalist, Euromaidan participant 
Interview UK10: July, 2014, Kiev, male, born 1989, higher education, a 
businessman, Euromaidan participant 
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Interview UK11: July, 2014, Kiev, male, born 1990, higher education, 
employee of a transportation company, Euromaidan participant 
Interview UK12: July, 2014, Kiev, female, born 1997, pupil, Euromaidan 
participant 
Interview UK13: July, 2014, Kiev, male, born 1989, higher education in 
international relations, a businessman  
Interview UK14: July, 2014, Kiev, female, born 1985, higher education, a 
psychologist and a cultural worker in museum  
Interview UK15: July, 2014, Kiev, male, born 1979, higher education, a 
schoolteacher, Euromaidan participant 
Interview UK16: the ex-commander of one of the battalions that took part 
in ATO 
Interview UK18: July, 2014, Odessa, female, born 1983, higher education, 
a manager, Euromaidan participant 
Interview UK19: July, 2014, Kiev, male, born 1990, incomplete higher 
education, a student, Euromaidan participant 
Interview UK20: July, 2014, Kiev, male, born 1972, secondary education, a 
gatekeeper, Euromaidan participant 
Interview UK21: July, 2014, Kiev, male, born 1990, higher education, 
Euromaidan participant 
Interview UK22: July, 2014, Kiev, female, born in 1988, incomplete higher 
education, a student, Euromaidan participant 
Interview UK23:  July, 2014, Odessa, male, born 1991, incomplete higher 
education, a student, Antimaidan participant 
Interview UK24: July, 2014, Odessa, female, born 1953, higher education, 
retired, Antimaidan participant 
Interview UK25: July, 2014, Kharkiv, male, born 1984, Antimaidan 
participant 
Interview UK26: July, 2014, Kharkiv, male, born 1992, incomplete higher 
education, a student, bookmaker, Antimaidan participant 
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Interview UK27: July, 2014, Kharkiv, male, incomplete higher education, 
salesmen at the market, Antimaidan participant 
Interview UK28: July, 2014, Kharkiv, male, born 1990, incomplete higher 
education a student, freelancer, Euromaidan participant 
Interview UK29: July, 2014, Kharkiv, female, born 1962, higher education, 
Antimaidan participant 
Interview UK30: July, 2014, Kharkiv, male, born 1988, higher education, a 
courier, Antimaidan participant 
Interview UK31: July, 2014, Kharkiv, male, born 1961, higher education, 
businessman, Antimaidan participant 
Interview UK32: July, 2014, Kharkiv, male, born 1978, secondary 
education, a worker, Antimaidan participant 
Interview UK33:July, 2014, Kharkiv, male, born 1997, a high school 
student, Antimaidan participant 
Interview UK36: July, 2014, Kharkiv, male, born 1993, a car assembler 
coming from a single-parent family, son of a shop assistant, 
Antimaidan participant  
Interview UK37: July, 2014, Kharkiv, male, born 1992, incomplete higher 
education, book-maker, Antimaidan participant 
Interview UK38: July, 2014, Kharkiv, male, the date of born is unknown, 
secondary professional education, a cook, Antimaidan participant 
Interview UK39: July, 2016, Donetsk, male, born 1976, higher education, a 
worker, a combatant in a separatist battalion   
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